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THURSDAY MORNING SESSION

August 17, 1978
The Public Oversight Board Public Hearing on Scope
of Services by CPA Firms, SEC Practice Section, American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants convened at 9:00

o’clock in the United-B Room of the Hyatt Regency Hotel,
Chicago, Illinois, with Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman,

.........

presiding.

MR. JOHN J. McCLOY:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We

have a rather long schedule this morning, and I am terribly
anxious to keep up with it so we don’t get behind and we
can give an opportunity to everybody that wants to be heard,

to be heard.
Sitting before you here are the Public Oversight
Board of the AICPA SEC Practice Section.

I think that is

the dignified title, and this Board has the imposing task

of overseeing the operations of the self-regulatory

program of the AICPA to help insure its thoroughness and

its fairness and its efficient operation when it is in
place and functioning.

As I see our role, it was not one having line

authority to make decisions or act in any sort of way as a

reviewing body in regard to the action of the profession
in the course of its self-regulatory functions, but we are
charged and very pointedly charged, I think, with the

duty of observing the operation of the system and reporting
to appropriate bodies as to our thoughts and recommendations

arising from that observation.

We have been asked to render

our judgments on proposals now being put forward to limit,

at least to some degree, the scope of the management
advisory services which the accounting firms should engage
in at the same time they are called upon to attest the
fairness of the financial information of the client.
The proposals arise out of the very strong desire
that those responsible for the conduct of audits of

companies should maintain a fully objective and independent
attitude, in regard to their relationships with those

companies who employ them so that all who rely on those

statements may have the confidence that the auditors’
findings and attitudes embody that independence and that

objectivity.
We are aware that this subject of the so-called
"MAS”

(management advisory services) is not a new one.

Much already has been written about it and said about it,
and having been given the duty of taking a look at the
background,

I am practically blind from having tried to

read and keep up with what has appeared.

We felt that

before we were in a position where we could render a

judgment in regard to this, we might make provision for
a hearing as there were a number of interested groups

who did indicate that they would like to have their
thoughts brought at least up-to-date.

It became apparent

that this was a desirable thing to do even though so much
ink had been spilt heretofore on this subject.

We are

aware that there are many varied views.
I have asked Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Vice Chairman
of our Board, a former Chairman of the SEC, and a partner
in the law firm of Gardner, Carton and Douglas, to take

the laboring oar in preparing for these hearings and
preparing us for the position that we now occupy in

sitting in judgment as to some of the recommendations

in respect to this subject.
I think I ought to say that we are quite aware

of the fact that this subject is one in which very
significant and substantial interests are involved.
I don’t contemplate that we will be in a
position to render any opinions, so to speak, from the

bench today on it.

I think I ought to also warn you that

our decisions aren’t decisive, though I dare say they
may be influential.

It is quite possible, as I see it

at least, that some of the judgments of the Board we may
2

want to defer until the Board observing the self-regulatory

procedures has gained more experience before we conclude
what our final judgments are on the whole subject.

I am now going to turn the conduct of this hearing

over to Mr. Garrett as he and his firm, as I say, have
pulled the laboring oar in the preparatory work for it,

and in many other respects he is better qualified and

equipped than I am to assume this task.
But before I do that, I would like to introduce

to you the members of the Board.

I will start with

Professor William L. Cary who is on my left.

He is

Professor at the Columbia Law School, and a former Chairman
of the SEC.

I might say that Mr. John Harper, another Board
member, couldn't be with us today because he recently
came on the Board, and his appointments had jelled, as had

ours.

He is a former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman,

as you may know, of ALCOA.

Mr. Arthur Wood, on my right, is former Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of Sears Roebuck & Co.

I have mentioned Mr. Garrett.

Mr. Charles Manzoni

is from Mr. Garrett's firm.

He and Mr. Richard Stark is on the right of Mr.
Wood.

He is a member of my firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley

& McCloy, and he has been looking over and supervising

the legal work which we have had to assume in large part
in connection with the organization of the POB.
Mr. Matusiak is a former partner of Alexander

Grant & Company, and he is the Executive Director of the
POB.

I think I have introduced everybody.
I have
referred to Mr. Garrett.
I am going to turn the proceedings

over to him and let him conduct this hearing throughout.
views.

I hope we will have a chance to really get your
In the first place we shall be glad to have your

statements and then we can perhaps have some questions
3

afterwards, all for the purpose and all for the objective
of trying to educate us, as well as you perhaps, as to

some of the problems that we face in trying to make
our recommendations on this subject.
Mr. Garrett, will you take over.
MR. RAY GARRETT, JR.:

Thank you very much, Mr.

McCloy.

I imagine that most of you have participated
in sessions similar to this, but in case you have not,

I should emphasize it is not a trial.

Nobody is here by

compulsion or under oath, so we hope you tell us the

truth.

We are grateful to you rather than being in
any accusatory or judgment sense.

We very much want

education, and the benefit of as many views from as many
directions as we can get because we know that to the

extent that our conclusions and recommendations are

influential, this particular issue, or set of issues,
probably has a more immediate and deeper effect on the
financial welfare of more accountants than any of the

other issues that we are dealing with in the selfregulatory program.

This sort of thing can put people out of

business.

We know that, and we don’t want to participate

in recommending anything that has that kind of effect

upon people without understanding as best we possibly
can what we are recommending and why.
So we are grateful to you, both for the written

comments that you and your associate firms have supplied,

and also for the willingness to take the trouble to come
here and actually talk to us.
We do have a court reporter present making a

record, a transcript, for our own benefit.

We also have

before us, each of us on the panel, the written materials

that have been submitted, but in giving your statements,
I think probably the wise thing is not to assume that we
4

have all read them all.
I dare say at this point there are varying

degrees of diligence and time available and some of
the written statements just, in fact, arrived this

morning.

As to your own presentations, we have allowed
a half hour apiece.

We will have, incidentally, a coffee

break from 10:15 to 10:30.

The half hour is yours, but

if it is all consumed in reading a prepared paper, it
will suffer from our point of view from lack of any

opportunity to ask any clarifying questions, but that
is up to the individual persons who are making statements
as to the extent to which they want to read a prepared
paper or summarize or present their views in any fashion

that is suitable to them.
As I say once more, the setting is somewhat

more formidable than I think we had anticipated, but
this is a friendly educational session and not a court,
and not a place in which anybody is intended to get hurt

in any fashion.

We will begin—I don’t know whether copies of

this schedule have been made available, Lou, to anybody
else.

Have they?
MR. LOUIS W. MATUSIAK:

MR. GARRETT:

Yes, they have.

That will make it easier.

Good.

The first persons to make statements are George

Catlett and Bill Mueller from Arthur Andersen & Co.
I would appreciate it very much if we could get
started, George and Bill.
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MR. GEORGE R. CATLETT:

I am George R. Catlett,

a senior partner of Arthur Andersen & Co., and I am
accompanied by William J. Mueller, Vice Chairman of our

firm with responsibility of our administrative services
practice.
My written statement has been submitted to you

in advance of this hearing, and I will summarize a few

of the matters covered by that statement.

When society grants to accounting firms the
authority to give reports on financial statements for use

by the public, certain responsibilities go with that
authority.

These responsibilities include engaging only

in those activities that do not detract in any significant
way from the attest function.

There have been controversy and confusion about
the need for restrictions on the services of accounting
firms.

Unless the underlying reasons are analyzed and

applied in a sensible and logical manner, no useful
purpose will have been served for investors, for the

business community, for the accounting profession, or

for anyone else.
In considering the limitations on the scope of

services of accounting firms, I believe that two basic
criteria are involved: independence and compatibility.

All other criteria represent guidelines for the
implementation of these basic criteria.

Independence is a cornerstone of the attest

function.

General agreement exists on the general

proposition that accounting firms should not engage in
activities that compromise or adversely reflect on the
attest function in a manner that would impair or appear

to impair the independence of the auditors in giving
reports on financial statements.

The divergence of views with respect to
independence does not result from the general concept
involved but from questions concerning how the concept
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should be applied.
Some agreement exists on the general proposition

that accounting firms should perform only those services
that are compatible with their responsibilities to the
public.

The credibility of independent auditors which

is so necessary in carrying out their function in our

American system depends upon a clear demonstration that
CPAs, independent of clients and government alike, serve
the public interest and perform a vital role in our

system better than any other arrangement.

If an accounting firm were to appear to be like
a department store, constantly adding diverse and unrelated

lines, an adverse image of such a firm could be created.

The attest function could appear to be downgraded, at
least in the eyes of persons outside the accounting

profession, whether or not independence is really affected.
This is illustrated by the fact that certain services,
such as plant layout and design which are currently under
some criticism, are only remotely related, if at all,

to independence.
The divergence of views with respect to how a

compatibility criterion should be applied is greater

than with respect to independence, because the accounting

profession has recognized the independence issue for a

much longer time and has had more experience in dealing
with it.

The principal guideline in the proposed
amendment relating to the compatibility criterion is the

restriction of "accounting and auditing related skills"
which replaces the existing guideline of "accounting and

financial related areas." This is a substantive change.
While "skills" may have some merit as a guideline, "areas"
would give more understandable, and probably more desirable,
guidance in the long run.

The "skills" presumably could

be used in any area even though such area is not related
to accounting, financial or auditing.
7

The application of the criteria only to

services performed for SEC reporting companies was added
to the original membership requirements of the SEC

Practice Section by specific vote of the AICPA's Council
because of the emphasis on publicly owned companies and

because of the concerns of smaller accounting firms about
possible limitations on their services for privately

owned companies.

Smaller firms have had a continuing

question about whether rules adopted in this context
eventually would adversely affect their practice.

Undue

restrictions should not be placed on these firms in

serving privately owned companies.

The fact that there

are two sections in the AICPA Division for Firms
represents recognition of the different characteristics
of the nature of public accounting as it related to

companies under the jurisdiction of the SEC and to

privately owned companies .
Auditors who elect to audit publicly owned

companies should be affected more by "public interest"
and "investor interest."

Such auditors assume a

relatively greater burden in maintaining credibility

in the eyes of investors and other interested parties,

particularly insofar as the compatibility criterion

is concerned.

The same general rules with respect to

independence should apply to all auditors.

However,

a greater burden in this regard may fall on the auditors

of publicly owned companies.

A question exists, particularly for the larger
accounting firms with many publicly owned clients,
concerning the desirability of offering certain services

to privately owned audit clients and to nonaudit
clients but not to publicly owned audit clients.

Such a distinction between audit and nonaudit clients
can be made under the independence criterion, but it
is more difficult to do so under the compatibility

criterion.
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I see no impelling reason to change the

traditional work of either large or small accounting firms
for independence or compatibility reasons in the areas

of (1) taxes and (2) the design and installation of
accounting systems and the performance of studies related

to accounting, general record keeping and control.

Other

services in accounting and financial related areas may
also be acceptable.

However, there will be some services

such as those discussed in the proposed appendix that
should be reviewed and considered periodically.
The Executive Committee of the SEC Practice

Section plans to review the entire record of this public
hearing and consider the views of the Public Oversight

Board.

I am confident that the Executive Committee can

and will make improvements in the proposed amendments so

that the objectives we are all seeking can be achieved

and the public interest can be served.

Thank you for the opportunity of appearing at

this hearing.
MR. CATLETT:

Bill and I will be glad to answer

any questions you may have.

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, George.

We will start with the Board members first.
Have any of you questions that you would like to put?

PROFESSOR WILLIAM L. CARY:
a number of questions.

I would like to ask

One, of course, is not related

to your firm, George, and therefore perhaps not quite

proper to ask you, and yet one of the issues that is

before us is this matter of the actuarial services.

Obviously, your firm does not perform them.
Is this a matter of principle, or do you have a view as
to how that should be handled by other firms?

MR. CATLETT:

I think the actuarial area is

one that should be given careful consideration by your

Board and by the Executive Committee.

It is an area that

has had much discussion in Washington, as you know, along
9

with a few other areas.

I would like to answer your question by making
a few comments about it.

I will try to relate it to

some of the statements that I have just made.

I think actuarial work is in an accounting

and financial area, as we think of the various criteria.
I don’t think there is much argument about that.
It is a skill that could be used on audits

of certain companies, but I do not believe that it is
a skill that is necessary for accounting firms to have.
One evidence of this is that most accounting firms do
not have actuarial skill.

You certainly can’t say that it is necessary
to have such skills to make adequate audits, although
it is a skill that could be used if you did have it.

One of the questions that is raised in this
area is whether, when there is actuarial work and audit
work in the same firm, the actuarial arm of the firm

is playing a major role in determining amounts that are
in financial statements which the auditors, on the other

hand, end up auditing as part of the financial statements.
One of the questions that is raised in this

regard is whether the auditors would be as likely to

question the methods and assumptions and various things
going into the actuarial computations as they might if

it was done by another firm.

I am not commenting on that.

I am just saying

these are the kinds of questions that come up.

There is also the question of how much

participation there is by the client in the actuarial
determinations.

Of course, this leads into the

independence question.

Actuarial work is the work of

a separate and distinct profession.
The point that arises sometimes when this is

discussed is that some people argue that it is desirable
and necessary to have the actuarial skill for the audit
10

function.

The same thing could be said, I think, of

geologists, appraisers, lawyers and a lot of other

matters that relate to audits.

In making audits,

auditors rely to some extent on geologists in oil

company audits, appraisers with respect to mergers,
and of course, lawyers in various ways.
This is a subject that has been under

discussion and needs careful consideration, and our

firm does not do it.

Some firms do do it.

These

are the things that need to be considered in deciding

this question, and it is one that has to have careful
consideration if for no other reason than it has been
under question in Washington and other circles.

PROFESSOR CARY:

May I ask one more question?

It relates only peripherally to the preceding question.
Bill Mueller can probably help us.
The MAS concept is so broad that each person
has a different, I suppose, definition of it.

I take it that in your firm it is a fairly
narrowly defined role.

Does that correctly differentiate

it, say, in your firm from other firms—some of the
other firms?
MR. WILLIAM J. MUELLER:

I am at a little

disadvantage because I am really not that conversant
with all of the nuances and the scopes of practice of

the other firms.

I can only speak for ourselves.

We internally do not really feel that our
scope of practice is narrow.

It involves primarily the

design, development, implementation of control systems
for management, and the accounting and operations areas

of various enterprises, private and governmental.
It
also involves the studies related to these methods.
It keeps us all very, very busy hiring enough

people to do the work that comes to us in these areas,

and we have never really seriously considered going into
some of the peripheral areas that other firms have gone
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into.

There are some that we have looked at, and

on a policy basis, decided that we didn’t want to get
into them.

There are others we have looked at and

decided we just didn’t have the requisite expertise
and because of this chose as a matter of business

strategy not to get into them.
MR. GARRETT:

When you say "on a policy basis,"

do you mean that they would not meet one of the two
criteria that you have set forth; either they would not
be compatible with the audit function or they would

jeopardize your independence?
MR. MUELLER:

That is correct.

MR. GARRETT:

Could you name an example of

one that you decided not to go into and on which of

those grounds?
MR. MUELLER:

Yes, I think I could.

You know,

it is an interesting question because I think we could
say that executive recruiting does not meet our criteria.
On the other hand, even if it had been acceptable, I

think we would probably not have chosen to go into it
for other reasons, but nevertheless, that is one area

that does not meet our criteria.
MR. McCLOY:

Are there any other ones that you

can think of besides the "head hunting?"
MR. MUELLER:

Nothing that we have seriously

considered going into.

MR. GARRETT:

I presume by executive recruiting

the emphasis is on the executive.
MR. MUELLER. That is right.
MR. GARRETT: You don’t decline the help people
find employees at a lower level than executives.

MR. MUELLER:

As you know, we do attempt to

help our own employees become placed when it is decided

that they no longer have a future career with our firm
or unilaterally decide that they do not want to be in
12

public accounting.

We do advise them of openings that

we are aware of in our client organizations.
We don't do this on what might be considered
a professional basis.

It is merely a clerical clearing

house type of operation.

We make these names known to

the clients, and also make it known to our people that

there are openings with clients.

We certainly attempt not to imply firm

endorsement, however, to the qualities or merits of
these people when we make these types of referrals.

MR. CATLETT:

I might make a couple of comments.

One of the distinctions in, say, the recruiting area

is that we have never done executive search in the sense

of going out and searching out people and screening
them and that sort of thing.
MR. McCLOY:

You will respond to inquiries,

though?
MR. CATLETT:

That is right.

Our extent of

that has either been referring our own people or casual

referrals.

Somebody would say, "Do you know anybody?"

We would say, "We know Tom Jones.

You might talk to him."

But we have never gone out and written letters,
placed ads and tried to find people and screen them.

MR. GARRETT:

Organizationally, you do not have

a department or branch for such services.
MR. CATLETT:

No.

One other area that we

considered, I think it is fair to say, was when some
of the firms acquired actuarial firms.

When that came

up, we considered whether or not we should go into that

area, and we decided not to for various reasons.
MR. McCLOY:
you do plant layouts?

May I ask you one question.

Do

MR. MUELLER: No, sir, we do not.
MR. ARTHUR M. WOOD:
I would like to ask what

percentage of your clients are privately owned?
MR. CATLETT:
I presently don’t have that
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statistic in mind.
MR. WOOD:

I can tell how many are public.
It doesn’t have to be accurate.

MR. CATLETT:

We have between one thousand

and eleven hundred companies under SEC jurisdiction,

which would be in the publicly owned area.

Of course,

we have many thousands, many more small clients.

In

numbers, we have a lot more privately owned clients

than we have publicly owned.

We have many thousands

of privately owned clients, whereas we have a thousand
or eleven hundred companies under the SEC.
Of course, in volume of work, the proportions

are different because the publicly owned companies
tend to be much bigger engagements, but they are both
important part of our practice;

We don’t in any way

deemphasize or consider our privately owned clients

to be second rate.

We consider them just as important

clients, and try to give them the same quality of
service.
MR. MUELLER:

there, George.

I might be able to add something

A look we did at this a little while

ago would indicate that the number, from order of

general magnitude, might be about ten thousand or
eleven thousand in that area, in the privately owned.

MR. WOOD:

Do you see any difference in the

requirements of privately owned or small publicly owned

clients for a broader range of advisory services?
MR. CATLETT:

I might comment and Bill may

add some, too.
I think the type of service you give is a

little different because if it is a smaller company, you
tend to give more of a continuing service and your

relationships tend to be a little more personal, month

to month, than large companies, and perhaps at times
you tend to give more business advice and help them in

various ways.

As far as our administrative services practice
14

is concerned, I don’t think it is a whole lot different.

Bill, you might comment on that.
MR. MUELLER:

No, there really isn't in

principle a great deal of difference.

I think perhaps

some of the techniques that one uses in performing the

services are somewhat different.

Perhaps you are more

of an educator working with a small business than you
would be with a larger one.

Perhaps you have to explain

why you are doing what you are doing a little more

clearly in some respects in a more basic manner than you
would in a larger organization, but the results, the

outputs of your services, tend to be the same.
MR. WOOD:

We have had comments from a number

of smaller auditing firms, and from a number of small

businesses, clients of those firms, which indicate that
a rather broad advisory service is vital to their success

and those seem to me to be rather compelling.
MR. MUELLER:

If I could make a comment on that

I think that maybe you are talking, when you talk about
the privately owned company, about a different kind of
a client than when you are talking about a very small

accounting firm serving the small privately owned
company.

There are different degrees of smallness
involved, so that maybe we are not talking about the
same type of organization when we talk small as the
smaller accounting firm is in all cases.

Maybe we

should characterize it as large, medium and small.

When we refer to small, we are sometimes talking about
the

medium-sized company.

When they are talking small,

they are talking about a smaller entity that perhaps
does need more day-to-day attention and different types

of advice.

Also, this is a matter of firm organization

to some extent, and this is why I would like George
to also respond to this.

It may well be in the very
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small company that the accountant, the auditor, is the

person who is rendering this type of, let's call it,
informal MAS advice.

In our organization, our group,

we call it administrative services, is performing
project type work with these clients, whereas the

audit division is performing the day-to-day consulting
type advice that the smaller practitioner refers to as
MAS.

MR. CATLETT:

I agree.

I think it would be

unfortunate if undue restrictions are put on accounting
firms in working with small companies, particularly
so long as it doesn't affect their independence in

giving opinions on financial statements.
Another important point, too, is that when

an accounting firm elects to go into the area of auditing
publicly owned companies with public investors and the

related public interest—and accounting firms don't
have to do this and some firms, of course, don't have

that type of auditing—such election to go into that

practice, whether you have one or a thousand publicly
owned clients, means that you are assuming an additional

responsibility to the public.

There is a larger public

interest in such work than for a privately owned company.

I think firms should be expected to have a higher level

of public responsibility and consider the public interest
more, and the effect on the public, which involves

independence and compatibility and those kinds of things

to a greater degree than in the case of the smaller,
privately owned companies.
You can argue: What is the difference?

me there is a big difference.

To

There is a big public

interest difference in the case of a large publicly
owned company, and I think the managements of those

companies feel it as well.
MR. WOOD: You have stressed or have identified
independence and compatibility of services as the two
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principal criteria that you consider as affecting your
attest function.

You then referred to the Executive Committee's

proposed test that services use accounting and auditingrelated skills.

Who is going to decide whether a

particular service requires the use of accounting-or
auditing-related skills?

Who is going to be the judge

of that relationship?
MR. CATLETT:

I suppose that insofar as the SEC

Practice Section is concerned, the accounting firm
itself would make the first judgment.

Then if there

was any question, it could come up in the peer review
program and go through the Peer Review Committee up to

the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee would

then decide whether or not it agreed with the firm on

that point.

In your monitoring function you could also

look at it, if there was a question and controversy,

so in the end it would have to be a judgment matter by
whoever is making it.

Thus, it would be first the

firm, secondly the Executive Committee, and thirdly

your views from a monitoring standpoint.

But, of

course, any of these judgments would have to be a

matter of opinion.

The test that is in the plan now is accounting
and financial related areas.

That is what was in the

initial plan and that is being changed, at least by the
proposed amendment.

In either event, it is a judgmental

matter, but as I pointed out, there is a difference,
a significant difference, between accounting and

financial related areas and accounting and auditing

related skills. They are different kinds of tests,
but both would require judgment.
MR. WOOD: That is all I have.
MR. GARRETT: You would prefer to areas termed
as more closely meeting the concept of compatibility,

I presume.
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I have thought about that a lot,

MR. CATLETT:

and the Executive Committee debated this at great
length before the plan was originally adopted.

What

is in the plan now, in the original document, is the
accounting and financial related areas which I

thought was the right way to go about it in the first
place.

I personally would prefer to stay there rather

than to shift to the other one.

I wouldn’t say that

skills is not a possible way to go about it and is
not one that you could live with, but you understand

I have a preference in the other direction.
The questions that arise in this area, such
as in Washington, cause people to think in terms of

areas.
The plant layout and all of those types of

things relate to areas basically, and people tend to
think in terms of areas.

When you get into compatibility,

they think about whether a particular area is compatible

with the audit area.

People think that way, and it is

easier to understand, and easier to apply.

In the

long run, a test based on areas will be better for

the accounting profession and everybody else.

The skills test is another approach.
test is the other way around.

This

You need the skill on

Therefore, it is all right to use it in

the audit.

other areas.
One problem, though, long-range, is that
accounting and auditing related skills can be used
in areas that have nothing to do with accounting and

financial related areas.

Then when you meet the test,

but are clear out in left field, you will be subject

to severe criticism.
MR. GARRETT:

I understand your argument

to be that if accounting and auditing related skills

include anything that an auditor ought to be able to
understand or would have some use for in conducting
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an audit, that could go just about everywhere depending

upon your clients.
MR. CATLETT:

Including law.

MR. GARRETT:

Yes, sure.

that, George.

truce.

(Laughter)

We won’t get into

That war is a temporary

You could go into geology and engineering and

all sorts of things.

MR. CATLETT:

Not only that, but also even

a skill about which there is not much argument, such

as an accounting computer skill or something, such as
that, there isn’t much argument about, you could go

outside the accounting and financial areas and use
the skill for engineering or something like that which
has nothing to do with accounting or financial at all.
MR. GARRETT:

But why should there be a

compatibility criterion, however we phrase it, if you

have satisfied the independence need?

I suppose we

are going to find universal conceptual agreement, at
least, on the independence question.
MR. CATLETT:

You will find conceptual

agreement; but you will find great disagreement about

what constitutes it.

MR. GARRETT:

I am certain we will.

MR. CATLETT:

It has been my job in our firm

to worry about our own policies in this area, and for
the last ten or fifteen years I have struggled with it

in our firm.

We have been debating it for a year in

the Institute, and of course, we have debated it even

before that.
With all the commotion that there has been in

Washington and in articles that have been written about
this subject and questions that have been raised in the
academic area, it has become obvious to me that there
are two basic tests.

Independence obviously is one

test, but the perceptions of this problem, whether
right or wrong, have caused questions to be raised
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in a lot of places, including Washington.

Outside

the accounting profession, there is a concern, and

I think I can say there is a serious concern, which
is not frivolous, about the practice in some areas
that has nothing to do with independence.

This is a

legitimate concern, and therefore it has to be in the
area of image or compatibility or something like that.

I like "compatibility" better than "image" as a word,
but there has to be something there.

could be a veterinarian

Otherwise, you

and a thousand other things.

You could do almost anything that you could legally
do.

After all, if we were veterinarians, that wouldn’t

affect our independence on audits, but I am not so

sure it would be a good idea from the viewpoint of the

public.
MR. GARRETT:

But you might come to that

conclusion from a business point of view, mightn’t

you?
MR. CATLETT:

Sure, but all I am saying is

that the independence test alone would permit you to

do thousands of things that are way out, that have
absolutely nothing to do with independence on audits.

It just seems to me, on the face of it, that this is
not desirable.

Therefore, there has to be some test

on that side, and I use the word "compatibility" in

searching for a word in that area.

The conceptual

aspect of this is that if society gives us the authority
and right and responsibility to certify financial

statements, on which the public is going to rely,
they expect us to operate efficiently in that area
and do things that are compatible with that, and
they don't expect us to do a thousand other things

at the same time.

We would either downgrade what we

are doing or, at least, downgrade what it looks like

we are doing, and this could impair the attest

function on which our whole business community relies.
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One of the important things in our system is the

reporting on financial statements by auditors and the

reliance of the millions and millions of people on
that.

In fact, the whole free enterprise system

is somewhat dependent on it because it involves the
credibility of financial reporting of business

enterprises.

It is such an important crucial function

that you don't want to water it down with too many
other unrelated things that are not accounting and

financial related, even though they might not affect
independence.
MR. McCLOY:

Are you saying, in the case of

public owned companies, the conduct of the accounting

firm has to take into account appearances to a greater
degree than privately owned companies?

There is no question about

MR. CATLETT:

that.
MR. McCLOY:

Even though there is no causal

connection between them.
MR. CATLETT:

Some people say that if you

are really independent, what difference does it make.
But it makes a lot of difference, because if the
public in this country on a broad basis ever decided
and perceived that they no longer could rely on the

certification of auditors, then not only would the

accounting firms suffer but the whole business system
would suffer.

This is such as important link in our

system that we have to zealously guard it and not let

it be ruined by a bunch of irrelevant things.

Of course, I realize that when I say
"compatibility,” there is a lot of argument about
what that means, too, but what I am trying to explain

is the general idea.

There are a lot of services

that can be performed that are a great service to

clients and are compatible and help society and help
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But, not only would the

the business community.

accounting firms suffer, but every one would suffer,

business in particular, if the financial statements
issued by publicly owned companies in this country

were such that the people getting them were not

sure whether they could trust them or not.
is going to be the first to suffer.

Business

That really

brings on government regulation.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I would just like to revert

back to one other area to which you made reference,

George, about large firms.

I mean, that you have a

higher public responsibility vis-a-vis the large
firms than vis-a-vis the small ones.

Now, trying to analyze it, does that mean
that criteria should differ between large and small
firms?

I am asking myself, try to think it through

this way.

It seems to be that small firms are still

public firms in one sense or another because most of

the companies that you would audit or anybody would

audit would have a few outside shareholders.
MR. CATLETT:

Or you might have bank loans.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Right.

I was going to say

you have bank loans, creditors and then you have

probably some outsiders, although you may not call
them the public because it is not that broad.
With that in mind, it seems to me that as

far as applying the criterion of independence is

concerned, it is probably a policy matter.

Looking

at it from our standpoint, it may not be wise to have
a different policy vis-a-vis the small than vis-a-vis

the large firm for independence.

The appearance which you just referred to,
maybe there is a difference because that is a public,

but am I right in analyzing it that way?
MR. CATLETT:
I think in general I would
agree with that.

I would have the same two criteria
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as far as basic criteria are concerned.

What I am

talking about is the application of them.

I agree that in the independence area there
would be less difference than in the compatibility

area.

Basically, there shouldn’t be a difference in

the independence area, if you are certifying financial
statements.

But even there, there is a zone in the

application where maybe you lean over backwards to be

more pure in auditing a big publicly owned company

than you might in the case of a privately owned
company just because there is a big public interest.
There is more concern in Washington at the SEC and

everywhere else about publicly owned companies.
It’s a small zone of differences.

I think

there is a wider zone in the compatibility area.

I

would have those two criteria, but I would apply the

compatibility one somewhat differently.

I wouldn’t

have any significant difference on independence.
I think the basic matters of independence,

like owning stock in the company or having your
brother as president and such as that, are no
different in a big company than, a little one.

But,

what I am trying to say is that there may be marginal

areas in the public arena where you ought to lean

over backwards to be sure there is no question of
appearance of independence.
MR. GARRETT:

We are about out of time,

but I don’t want to totally frustrate Lou and Dick
and Charlie.

Do any of you have a question there

that you would like to put?

MR. CHARLES R. MANZONI:
I just have one.
If the compatibility criteria is an important

matter, doesn’t it relate to the firm providing it
rather than the client to whom the particular service
is provided?
For example, the standards now or the criteria
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discussed providing certain services to SEC clients,

it would seem to me that if you are concerned with

an image problem, that image problem would arise
by providing it to any one.
MR. CATLETT:

I think that is right in

general, except to the extent I was commenting
previously that it may be even more apparent in the
audit of publicly owned companies.

The restriction

that is in the plan at the moment was put in there by
Council which is a higher body than the SEC Practice

Section, with the idea that it was an SEC Practice
Section, and therefore, its jurisdiction was only
for SEC clients.

Also, with a lot of Council members

being from smaller firms, they were concerned about
the effect on smaller firms, so the Council put that

restriction in the plan after the interim committee
had originally designed it.

When it went to the Council for final

approval, it did not have that restriction in it.
The Council put it in on the floor of the Council
meeting that this would only relate to SEC companies.
This is jurisdictional, which is a different point

than yours, because you are talking philosophically,

but there is a jurisdictional question within the
Institute.

How much authority does the SEC Practice

Section have to restrict beyond the services to

Philosophically you

companies that are SEC clients?

are right but with some of the variations I have been

talking about.
MR. GARRETT:

One last question and then

I think we are going to have to turn to the next

person.
The SEC’s release, the recent accounting

series release, requiring the disclosure of the
percentage that MAS or nonauditing service fees bear
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to the auditing fees, I presume is based, well, it

must be based on the thought that there is some
significance to the relationship.

I presume it

would be that the higher the percentage of nonauditing
fees to auditing fees, the more likely it is that

independence has been jeopardized.

Is that true?

Does that make sense to you?
MR. CATLETT:

I assume that is their logic.

I personally think they are off on a tangent trying
to do something.

They haven’t done it.

MR. GARRETT:

You wouldn't recommend that

MR. CATLETT:

I would not.

approach?

I don't think

it accomplishes what they set out to do.

MR. GARRETT:

Rather than worry about

compatibility, would you say MAS fees can't exceed
25% of audit fees or any number?

MR. CATLETT:
to the major issues.

I think it is kind of irrelevant

I think the SEC felt it had to

do something, and it first proposed some other things.

It received a lost of flak and cutback and ended up
with this.

I think it believed that it had to put

something out.
MR. GARRETT:

They should have waited until

we had completed this hearing.

MR. CATLETT:

They should have.

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. Vanatta and Mr. Krisher.
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(Laughter)

MR. CHESTER B. VANATTA:

I am Chester B. Vanatta,

the Firm Managing Partner of Arthur Young & Company.
It is a pleasure for me to appear on behalf of my
firm before this hearing the the Public Oversight Board.

In my position as Firm Managing Partner,
I have day-to-day line management responsibility for
the operations of our firm in the United States.

In

addition, I am a member of our firm's Management Committee,

which is our senior policy committee and equivalent to
what some call a board of directors.

I am a CPA.

One aspect of my experience might be particularly
worth mentioning.

That is the fact that eight years of

my professional career was in the management consulting

activities of our firm—as a staff consultant, a manager,
and a partner.

This experience is particularly relevant

because of the subject matter of these hearings.

I have

been there—and I know on a first-hand basis the
professionalism with which that aspect of the practice

of accountancy is conducted.
As Mr. Garrett and Mr. McCloy stated, this

hearing is to assist you in commenting on and making
recommendations as to the scope of services appropriate
for CPA firms, and specifically as to the proposal of
the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section.

Our firm's chairman, Bill Kanaga, participated actively

in the formation of the SEC Practice Section and is a

member of its Executive Committee.

To that extent then,

our firm has participated in the scope of service

deliberations, although the draft being considered is
not consistent with the views of our firm.

As a firm,

we have consistently maintained that there is no logical
basis for restricting a CPA firm's scope of service.

We urge the Board to avoid endorsing conclusions arrived
at in response to perceived pressures to "do something"
unless those conclusions have substance and are based
on the facts.
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The remainder of my remarks will address

fundamental convictions which our firm and I hold
regarding scope of service, amplify the reasoning

supporting those beliefs, and, finally, make three
specific recommendations for consideration by this
Board.
OUR BELIEFS

With regard to scope of service considerations,
the cornerstone of our firm’s conviction is that CPA

firms must first and foremost be protective of their
public audit responsibility and its impact on the
business capital market.

In other words, CPAs should

conduct their professional practice in such a way that
it enhances, rather than detracts from, the credibility
of audit opinions.

Thus, we believe that:

If non-audit services provided by CPA
firms in any manner compromise the

independence of the auditor in fact,

such services should be curtailed.
(In other words, not provided to audit
clients.)

If non-audit services provided by CPA

firms impair audit independence in
appearance to a knowledgeable person
aware of all the facts, such services
should be curtailed.

If non-audit services provided by CPA

firms negatively impact the effectiveness
of audit performance, such services

should be curtailed.
There is no question in our minds that maintaining the
credibility of the audit function is and must continue

to be of paramount importance to the independent auditor.
OUR REASONING
As pointed out in our paper submitted earlier,
there has been no documented evidence of independence
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compromise in fact resulting from CPA firms providing
non-audit services.

This is true even though there

have been extensive research efforts by critics and

others.

The statistics are truly remarkable—in the

45 years since security laws were first written

requiring independent audits, and with the tens of
thousands of corporate audits performed in each of

those years, not one single case of compromised
independence relating to providing tax and management
services has been found.

In our opinion, this is a

substantial hurdle that those who would impose arbitrary
restrictions on the scope of auditors’ practice must
cross.

They have not crossed it.
Rather, the criticism of CPA firms providing

non-audit services principally rests on a theoretical

concern relating to the "appearance" of independence.

This point of view conveniently ignores the concept
of independence being based on the views of a

knowledgeable person aware of all of the facts of
an individual situation.

The critics seem to maintain

that the CPA must appear independent to an uninformed
person possessing no facts.

Such a point of view is

so unreasonable that those criticizing on this basis
must have other, unstated objectives in mind.

As to audit effectiveness, in our paper we
speak at some length to the point that non-audit services
can and frequently do improve the effectiveness of

audits and that they do not impair such effectiveness.
The knowledge gained from management advisory service

involvement with clients enables the auditor to have
a greater understanding and appreciation of the client's

systems and operating environment and thus can favorably,

at times materially, impact audit effectiveness.

This

is in addition to the fact that having available in the
firm the skills used in providing non-audit services

is often of invaluable assistance in executing an audit.
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In considering the scope of service question,

it is important that we remind ourselves of the overall

objective the practitioner must serve—contributing
to the integrity and the effectiveness of the
business capital market of this nation.

To our way

of thinking, it is preposterous to conceive that the
market’s ability to function has been negatively

affected by CPA firms providing corporate tax advice;

suggesting work simplification techniques and assisting
in the development of productivity measurement and

improvement programs; counseling management as they

define the experience and qualifications for a top or
middle management position; recommending three candidates

as qualified for a division controller ’s job; designing
a cost accounting system; reviewing the effectiveness

of the EDP and systems activities of the company and
reporting in laymens terms; or the many other types

of management advisory services historically provided
by our and other CPA firms.

Providing non-audit

services has not hurt the capital market.

To the

contrary, we submit that the capital market and,

therefore, the public has directly benefitted.

And,

such services have been of benefit to private companies

served by our firm and others.
OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
We offer for the Board’s consideration three
specific recommendations which we believe, taken

together, are an appropriate basis for scope of
service determination, and provide a means for

continuing control and monitoring of that scope of

service.

They are as follows:
1. The Board should forcefully recommend

that there be no general proscription of
services.

In that regard, we suggest

you not endorse the accounting and auditing
related skills concept of the proposed
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amendment being considered at these
hearings.

Rather, we believe the Board

should embrace a concept of prohibiting
service to an audit client only when
specific services to be provided a

specific audit client would impair the

audit firm's independence.

We believe

this is the only service limitation

securely founded on logic, and it can
only be applied on an individual case-

by-case basis.
2.

The Board should recommend that individual
CPA firms have the responsibility to review
the specific services provided with the
Audit Committee or the Board of Directors

of all public audit clients.

While the

CPA firm should have primary responsibility
for maintaining their independence, the
Audit Committee should review on a regular

basis the services provided and independently

consider audit independence in light of
the facts.

3.

The Board should recommend that the SEC

Practice Section explicitly require that
the peer review process include
consideration of any potential impact on
audit independence from acceptance of non-

audit engagements.

This analysis should

include a review of the firm's policies,

procedures and documentation standards,
and verification that such acceptance

criteria are being followed.

These

policies and procedures should be such

that thorough and thoughtful consideration

is given to any potential impact on audit
independence.

The acceptance criteria we
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use and believe appropriate include the

considerations that:
a.

We are not acting for, or in the

capacity of management.

b.

The client can arrive at an informed
opinion on the propriety of our work

and recommendations.
c.

Our relationship with other clients
or third parties does not pose a
conflict of interest.

d.

Personnel assigned to the engagement
have no material financial interest

in the client or its affiliates.
In addition, we evaluate with great care
consulting engagements where decisions

made in reliance on our work will be

irreversible and are of such importance
that the outcome may have a significant

adverse impact on the future operating
results and/or financial viability of the
client.

If needed, the SEC Practice Section could
prescribe the acceptance criteria, including
specific matters to be considered.

This requirement to include a review of
the acceptance of non-audit services in

the peer review process would, we believe,

complete the loop of positive and
continuing control over the auditor
maintaining his independence.
These three recommendations would not place

artificial limits on the scope of services to be offered
by CPAs.

Nor do they involve just saying "trust us—

we'll consider the circumstances and conclude what
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reasonable men, having knowledge of all the facts would

Rather, the recommendations provide a basis

conclude."

for objective and informed individuals outside of the

CPA firm, both outside the profession and within, to
have access to all the facts and judge whether audit

independence would be or was impaired.
The accounting profession has been preoccupied
for the past 18 to 24 months with issues relating to
its internal operations, its structure, and its scope

of services.

We sincerely hope that the Board will

take a forceful stance along the lines of our
recommendations and by so doing contribute materially

to clearing the air on this subject.

Such action would

serve the profession well—allowing us to turn our full
efforts to serving clients and fulfilling our
responsibilities to the users of financial statements.

Such a refocus would without doubt be in the public

interest.
Thank you.
MR. VANATTA:

I appreciate the opportunity to

be here, and I will be happy to respond to any questions
that you might have.
MR. GARRETT:

I assume you will have some.

Thank you, Mr. Vanatta.

Mr.

McCloy, have you any questions?

MR. McCLOY:

I may have some questions as we

go along, but I am thinking of a comment.

I don’t

place as much value, as you seem to do, on this lack
of record.

I am not so sure that the lack of record is

all that significant.

I am not so sure how that record

would appear.

There may not be any cases on it, but in
fact, if there was a lack of independence there, I don't

know that it would come up in the courts.
subtle thing.
MR. VANATTA:

It is a more

I think that we are reasonably

close together, Mr. McCloy,

I believe that it is a
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consideration and an important consideration, particularly
if logic will not support prohibiting certain services.
I give it, I guess, more weight than you do,

because of the tremendous efforts that have been made
by various people in attempting to identify situations

where independence might have been compromised.
My recommendation, and specifically the last

of the three recommendations, addresses the substance
of your point.

I am recommending providing a positive

mechanism for informed people who can reach a knowledgeable

conclusion, having access to the facts, which possibly
critics or others didn’t have.

I recognize that.

MR. McCLOY:

I keep coming

back to this classical analogy of Ceasar’s wife.

She

has got to be above suspicion no matter who the

gossiper is in the street in Rome.

And there is

suspicion perhaps since the Cohen Commission said there
was a significant minority that expressed some doubts.
When they used "significant," I guess they were meeting

your point, or at least, they are subconsciously
meeting your point.

This was not an ill-informed

group.
MR. VANATTA:

On that point, Mr. McCloy,

and I always kind of chuckle when I see those two words
together—significant minority, though I do not disagree

with the Cohen Commission on any of their research or
their findings and conclusions in that area, I think

it important to also point out that their research,
their studies, and their findings were that as

individuals better understood, became more informed

and were closer to the scene of what was actually
happening, in other words became more knowledgeable,
the concern significantly decreased.

I think that is

a very, very important point for this Board to consider.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. WOOD.

I may want to come back.

You offered three criteria.
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The

second one I noted was that services should be prohibited

when it is clear that they would impair the independence
of the audit firm, and suggesting it be applied on a

case-by-case basis.
MR. VANATTA:

MR. WOOD:

Yes, sir.

Can you give us an example of a

service which would clearly impair independence?
MR. VANATTA:

Can I give you an example of a

service?
MR. WOOD:

Of a service performed by a CPA

firm.
MR. VANATTA:

Yes, a service that would not

meet the criteria that I mentioned in my prepared remarks,

that would involve doing work that we believe management
does not have the capability to review, to reach informed

conclusions concerning.

In other words, acting in place

of management.

There are disagreements within the profession,

and I think honest disagreements in the main, but I would
include in that particular category what is called turnkey

computer services.

By definition turnkey, as we explain in our
paper, involves doing all of the work involved in the
design and programming of a system or installing a
prepackaged system, testing it, getting it operational,
and turning it over to the client.

I think by definition that implies that there

is not the adequate amount of client participation in
reviewing the work, in reaching informed judgments
concerning the propriety of the work and in assuring

themselves that everything has been considered in their
individual situation.

That is an example of where I believe one
could get into at least the fringe of acting in place

of management.

If it is a semantics problem, then

let’s not call it turnkey.

Let's call it full
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implementation work.

That would be a form of, and there are all

kinds of others, original, specialized services but
it does not have the necessary management participation
involved.
MR. WOOD.

In many of the papers submitted,

we see the principle of many accounting firms that
their service should be advisory, and of course, should
not be managerial.

I think you are saying the same thing.
would not provide a turnkey computer system.

You

You would

advise management.

You didn’t mention advisory services as opposed

to management, but you are saying the same thing.
MR. VANATTA:
I would agree with you.

If I understand your comments,

You are paraphrasing what I am

saying accurately, yes.
MR. WOOD:

What you have just suggested brings

to mind a service which I think could be important to

management.

Suppose your firm in looking at the computer
system and the controls that are built into the system,
let’s say on accounts payable, you found that the

computer staff of the client was, in your judgment,
inadequate, you would have to go to management and
say: "We don’t want to tell you what this system has

to be and oppose it, but your staff, in our judgment,

must have competent people," then management asks you,

"Can you find us one?"
then?

What would your response be

Would you engage in helping management to find a

competent person?

MR. VANATTA: We would assist management,
and this gets into, the area that you are asking about,
I assume, is that of executive recruitment services.

MR. WOOD: Right.
MR. VANATTA: And Mr. McCloy, I don’t like to
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call it head hunting, as you kiddingly referred to it

earlier.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. VANATTA:

An unfortunate connotation.
I am talking about professional

executive recruitment services.

Yes, our firm does have

that included in our scope of services.

In the

particular situation you describe, according to the
level of the position, if it would meet both our
professional and business criteria, we would participate
and accept an engagement to assist the client in finding

suitable and qualified personnel to meet their needs.
I don’t mean to be picking on words, but I

think it is important from a concept standpoint that
I elaborate on the question, "Would we locate a

person?"

We would first assure that we understood

the needs of the position.

We would discuss this with

management, possibly assist them in their thought

process of defining the requirements, experience

needed, et cetera, for the position.
Then we would seek out qualified candidates,

individuals that we thought would qualify for the
position.

Do appropriate reference checking, do

appropriate interviewing with them, and would

recommend an individual to that client as in our

opinion being qualified and worthy of consideration
for the position.
We have as a policy to recommend never just

one, but three people as qualified, and the client
management themselves are the ones that make the
selection, make the decision, and we do not get into
negotiating with the client on behalf of compensation,

fringe benefits, that kind of thing.

We believe this

is a service that our clients need. We believe that
we can provide it and do provide it on a professional
basis, that we consider all of the independence aspects

related thereto, that it does not compromise independence,
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or if it would for any reason, we wouldn’t accept

the engagement.
We believe that when there is a client

need that in some way there is going to be assistance
from the CPA firm.

I don’t care whether you want

to call it casual referrals or what.

We believe that

the need can best be provided on a professional

consulting basis subject to all of the disciplines
of the practice.
Thank you.

MR. WOOD:

MR. VANATTA:

I didn’t mean for that to be

such a long answer, Mr. Wood.
PROFESSOR CARY:

I have only one question,

but it stems from what Mr. Wood has raised.

What if you found that one of the Big

Eight announced they were going to merge Booz, Allen,
Hamilton or McKinsey & Company.

What would your

reaction be?
MR. VANATTA:

Surprise—great surprise.

(Laughter)
PROFESSOR CARY:

I assume.

That is why I

asked it, but not let’s see what is wrong with it in
terms of no restrictions.

You said there would be no

restrictions.
MR. VANATTA:

In my opinion, Mr. Cary, there

would be nothing wrong with it.

The previous person

appearing discussed what was termed compatibility.
We use the term image in our paper.

I think you

have to be very careful to not get image mixed up

with independence.

That is very, very important.

In the previous discussion, and I think I

am addressing the question, you talked about getting

into geology and so forth.

Mr. answer to that is that I would not

prohibit that.

Our firm is not going to go into the

geology and so forth.
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My answer to that is that I would not
prohibit that.

Our firm is not going to go into

the geological engineering business, but logically,
I see no reason why those services should be

proscribed.

I would, rather than attempting to

react to all kinds of different perceptions or
desires for image, I would let the marketplace make
that decision.

I believe if a CPA firm starts

diffusing its focus too much, and if there truly
are questions among business as to compatibility,

image and the kind of firm that they want to
associate with, the audit committee of the board

of directors that are going to be reviewing your
firm’s scope of services would forcibly speak
I believe, even if one

through their decisions.

were to assume that just major firms would do it,

that the marketplace should make the decision
rather than an arbitrary decision being made by

any particular body.

PROFESSOR CARY:

answer.

That is quite an adequate

I mean, that is an answer all right.
MR. VANATTA:

If it is not adequate, I

would be happy to enlarge on it.

PROFESSOR CARY:

(Laughter)

You haven’t limited

yourself, put it that way.

MR. VANATTA:

Because we believe as a

firm, and I personally believe, that it would be

inappropriate to artificially limit scope of services.
MR. WOOD:

I have one more question, Ray.

You suggested that the audit committee of
the board should review the services that the CPA

firm engaged provides.
MR. VANATTA: Yes, sir.
MR. WOOD: And the audit committee should
make the determination whether these services would

affect, or impair independence.
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I believe that was it.

MR. VANATTA:

I indicated that the CPA

firm has the primary responsibility for being

independent, that the audit committee in their role,

or the board of directors if there is not an audit
committee, I believe should have the responsibility

as an audit committee for reviewing the facts and

reaching their own independent conclusion as to
whether they agree or not with the CPA firm.

MR. WOOD:

Audit committees, as we know,

have had a lot of attention.

All listed firms now

must have an audit committee of the board.

I am just wondering whether they are going
to be competent to make this judgment.

They haven’t

had the benefit of these hearings, and study of all
these fine position papers from the profession.

I am sure that Mr. McCloy’s Audit Committee,
and he is chairman of two or three, is pretty

sophisticated, but I am just wondering whether in
the great cross-section of American business, you

have got on boards of directors, people who are going
to be able to do this especially if we get too much

complication, and the AICPA in its wisdom finally
decides on very particular parameters and definitions.

MR. VANATTA:

I believe I understand your

question, Mr. Wood, and I think that the generic
problem of enough qualified members for audit
committees and so forth, which you are suggesting

is a related issue, some people do think is a problem.
I would not agree with the conclusion that

your reasoning would seem to lead one to, and I
personally believe that if we were to take that tack,
we would be underestimating the capability of members

of the board and audit committees.

If one does not

have the background, if one cannot get the background,
if one can’t go to some educational sessions that
CPA firms and other for-profit organizations are
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holding, to be able to perform effectively as an

audit committee member, then I think we have some

other larger problems, but I would not artificially
restrict the scope of a CPA’s services because of

that.

Why penalize CPA firms in their services

because audit committees are perceived not to be

able to do their job?
I do have the other additional restriction

or control, of course, built in from the standpoint
of professionals themselves reviewing through the
peer review program the independence question as
related to non-audit services.
MR. WOOD:

I think this has been constructive

in the sense that we, the AICPA, when this issue is

resolved, would, and it’s your suggestion that audit

committees should always question CPAs in their twicea-year or at least once-a-year review with them on
the services they are performing, I think the

profession can do a real service for American business
and boards in providing the same kind of material that
you have already provided the audit committees, and

I have read them, the pamphlets of several of the Big
Eight firms, at least—what the audit committees ought

to get into.

MR. McCLOY:

I come back, if I may.

thinking about this thing.

I was

Particularly if you are

talking about audit committees.

I have had that

experience on audit committees.

MR. VANATTA:

Extensive experience, I

understand.
MR. McCLOY:

I find in some cases that they

have had difficulty in finding outside directors.

am not sure the ruling was a good one that the SEC
put out.

I am inclined to think maybe if you had
one member of the management that knew something
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about the business, it might be a better audit
committee than if you had just X, so many black,

so many white, so many feminists, so many people,

whatever you have to do.
I was with you for a while.

MR. VANATTA:
(Laughter)

MR. McCLOY:

So that I think there is

something in the thought that maybe it may be too

easy to get the expert outside group of directors,
knowledgeable outside directors.

That will come

about in time, but for the moment, I think they are
having some difficulty with it because almost by

hypothesis they want to put on the audit committee

somebody that has nothing to do with the business.
The other thing is about this recruitment
of executives.

I may be one of the uninformed in the

streets that you were referring to whose judgment
you shouldn’t be given much attention.
I have a gut reaction to this thing—

that it is unwise to have this all out service of
obtaining executives or the chief accounting officer

and to sort of commission an accounting firm that
is doing your auditing to find that man for you.

I just think it might encroach upon this concept

of independence.
Maybe it isn't complete.

Maybe you haven't

got any record of abuses, but as I say, I have a

gut reaction against it.

I have a feeling that with

the accountancy profession, as with my profession,
there is some opprobrium at the moment.

You have

to duck when you say you are a lawyer, and you have
to duck when you say you are an accountant in view

of some of the records we have had and some audit

failures.
Maybe there is a pressure, as I say, to be
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above suspicion, as Caesar's wife, and maybe you
ought to eliminate it, just for the sake of the
repute and the importance of the credibility of the

accountants.
MR. VANATTA:

I understand the point of

view you are expressing, Mr. McCloy.

I respectfully

disagree with that line of thinking, though I do
agree that there is some suspicion—you mention
your gut reaction.

But I don't think that important

decisions affecting certified public accountants,

their clients and others, should be made just on

feelings, on emotion.

where it stops then.
whose reaction?

The problem is I don't know

Whose feelings, whose emotions

I think that it is important to

consider that aspect of it.
I understand and respect your viewpoint.

MR. McCLOY:

I feel that there are some

things the accountants can do in the MAS field that

are helpful to the audit.

However, this on I

react to, and I think that informed people do.
Now a query:

Is this something that you

should take into account or that you would take

into account if you were in our place?
MR. VANATTA:

into account.

I think you should take it

I would not get into quantifying

the impact that it should have on you.

I think this

is indicative of the need, because executive

recruitment is a focal point of an area that is
easily discussed and one can have strong feelings

on it one way of the other, for the whole thought
process to really be thought through clearly and
that you take into account the future implications
for other areas of decisions that are made in this
particular area.
Also, I would suggest that you take into

account the feelings, the reactions, that people
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have in this kind of a thing, providing executive
recruitment on a professional discipline basis,

and compare that to what the feelings, what the
appearance might be, of the CPA partner referring

one of his close friends, a person he has worked

with, to that organization, or of placing one of
their partners with that organization.
I think that the whole area must be

reviewed before any conclusion is reached.
MR. McCLOY:

This is one of these

situations where you have to face the dilemma.

As Mr. Churchill used to say to me frequently:
These are some of the goddam bloody dilemmas of

life.

You have to make the judgment.
MR. VANATTA:

(Laughter)

Mr. McCloy, I know it

doesn’t apply to you, and I mean that sincerely,

but when you are referring to attorneys and others
who feel like they have to duck, and this is going

to sound like waving a flag, I must say I think
that is one of the problems.

Too many people

in business and the professions and others have
ducked too often, and we need to stand up and be

counted on these matters that I think are very
important.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, Mr. Vanatta.

MR. VANATTA:

Thank you.

MR. GARRETT:

Before we break for coffee

I think I ought to observe that the legal profession

somewhat excels the accounting profession in getting
into trouble.

After all, we got raked over by the

President himself and all you have been able to
attract is a retiring Congressman and a deceased
Senator.

(Laughter)

But with a little effort.
(Laughter) I
would like when we resume, our next person will be
Mr. Arnstein.

Is he here?

Good.
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How about Mr. Green

who follows him?

And Mr. Auerbach.

Thank you very much.

We will take 15 minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)

MR. GARRETT:

Let’s reassemble.

Lou Matusiak

has had several questions with respect to the availability

of written comments or prepared statements, that have
been presented to the Board.
available documents.

They are all publicly

They are physically available

at Lou’s office in New York City or he will send you
a copy for the cost of copying if you will write him

or give him a note to that effect.

With respect to copies of the transcript, it
is also public as a matter of policy and can be examined

at the office of Lou Matusiak or I am sure you can order
copies from the reporter if you wish to do so before

you leave.
We will proceed with Mr. Peter Arnstein of
John F. Forbes & Company.

Mr. Arnstein, please.
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MR. PETER ARNSTEIN:

You have my written

statement, and I will try to summarize it and maybe
make some observations which are not in the statement.

Our firm is a regional firm.
approximately 200 professionals.

We have

We are regarded

as a small firm by the large firms and a large firm

by the small firm.

(Laughter)

We practice entirely on

We have 9 offices.
the West Coast.

We figure that approximately 12% of

our revenue is derived from clients who are registered

with the SEC.
As with smaller firms, a much higher proportion

or our revenue is derived from tax services and
approximately 6% from a formally organized MAS service.

I am Chairman of the Executive Committee
of our firm, and I am responsible for its accounting
and auditing practice.

Since 1961, I have served on various Institute

committees, including the MAS Committee.

I was for

six years on the Institute’s Ethics Committee and

Chairman of its Independence Committee for three years,
and during that time I conferred with Andy Barr, the

former Chief Accountant of the SEC, on many occasions.
In my position with the firm, I am often called upon
to settle or resolve potential or actual independence

problems and I was a partner in charge of MAS services

when we were starting it, going into that field, in
the early Sixties, and I am primarily an auditor.

During all of this period, for at least 15
years, I have been dealing with the management advisory

independence question in these various capacities,
and I am interested in seeing it resolved in a way
that is beneficial to the public, business, the
profession and won't hurt our firm.
I think that the two previous gentlemen who

were before this Board, and it is quite apparent to me
45

that you gentlemen recognize the problems, are well
aware of the problems, and I would just like to say

this, that I am persuaded with these years of

experience with it that the only practically sound

and theoretically sound criteria for restricting
MAS services is on the basis of independence; and

that with respect to the performance of non-audit
services, role is the only theoretically sound and
practice manner to do it.

We have had a lot of experience with role,

and it is a practical approach, and for example,
the question of executive recruiting and particularly

head-hunting for senior executives is concerned,
there is a question, I think, whether the role of
the auditor is compromised by hiring a chief

executive because inevitably no matter what the
auditor does in separating himself and being an

independent consultant, there is a possibility that
he has a vested interest in the success of the

executive whom he has been instrumental in placing.

When it comes to skills and the breadth
of services that are performed, there has never been
a case where some audit failure was dependent on
the performance or lack of independence resulting

from the performance of non-audit services.

As an

audit partner over a number of years and as the
top authority in our firm for settling these

problems that come up in connection with audit
independence, and even in our size firm they come

up often, and when we feel that our objectivity
is threatened, I would say 99.9% of the time the

problems come up in the context or our suggesting
adjustments to the client's financial statements

to which the management objects.

There is, I would

say, the fundamental nexus of independence, that is,
if we don't come to a satisfactory agreement, we may
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be fired.
That is overwhelmingly the situation that
prevails, and really nothing else determines real

independence except how the auditor performs under
those circumstances.

Even in our practice, and quite frequently
with non-SEC clients, contractors who have to show a

certain net worth in order to get adequate bonding,
private companies who have to show liquidity in order
to get credit, family-owned companies where some of

the family owns part of the company but is not in
management, and another section of the family operates
it and the non-managers are often very critical of

how the operating part does, so that the question of
what the financial statements are going to show and
what the auditors are going to say about it comes up

quite frequently.

Overwhelmingly the objectivity and

integrity of the auditor is tested under those
circumstances.

MAS never comes into the picture.

I think we realize, and I think Mr. McCloy
particularly has focused on the problem that when it

comes to publicly held companies, we have to be like
Caesar’s wife.

There is this gut feeling that certain

services dilute the auditor’s image as an expert or
somehow they don’t seem right.
When we were trying in the MAS Committee in
the early Sixties, and this was my first exposure to

this problem, to describe an appropriate scope of
services for CPAs, immediately those firms who don’t

perform psychological testing, and we don’t perform
psychological testing in our firm, said, "Well,
obviously, you shouldn't do psychological testing,"
and those firms who did psychological testing had

all kinds of very good reasons why they should do

psychological testing.
I think they were probably
right.
I think, for example, you can make a pretty
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good case that if we as auditors had the results of
psychological tests of some of the chief executives

and financial officers of the firms we audit we would

be a lot more knowledgeable than going out and
counting inventory (Laughter) because when we do get

into some of these audit problems and we discuss
among ourselves, that it, within the firm: What are
the motivations of this particular executive?

Is

I think that if you

he really telling the truth?

examine audit failures, and I have been involved
fortunately not as a defendant but as an expert

in assisting lawyers in some of these massive audit

failures, perhaps if the auditor could have knowledge
that the chief executive really was a liar, or as

in the renowned case of McKesson Robbins really

wasn’t the person he purported to be at all,
(Laughter) it would have been very helpful.

So that you can make a strong case for
psychological testing, but there is this gut feeling

that maybe auditors shouldn’t do it.

In order to

satisfy this substantial minority of people who are

less acquainted with what actually goes on than
anybody else, I think that we can acknowledge that
some restriction should be made so that these
questions don’t arise.
The important thing, and it is particularly

important to our firm, is that if such restrictions

are made, that they are completely separated from

independence considerations.

They are acknowledged

as image problems that have no logical basis and
are simply being made to satisfy the critics, and
I may be putting it in an unnecessarily negative

aspect, but that is the way it ought to be done,
so that there is no spill-over to the very valuable
non-audit services that firms of our size perform

for our non-SEC clients.
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As you acknowledge, and I think you realize,

most of our size clients do not have CPAs on their
staff.

They rely on us.

specialists.

They do not have computer

They rely on us for all kinds of things.

We are in an excellent position to serve them.
As an auditor, we probably are, as other

auditors are, the outside person who goes around and
is more intimately acquainted with our clients’

operations and how other businesses operate than

others, and I think over a period of years we get
a very good idea why some businesses are successful
and some are not, and you might say our function as

a bee spreading the pollen of success is an important

one, in the economy of this country.

So that if some

way our services are to be restricted, then it is for
public image, and it is not based on independence

because there is no theoretical reasoning or experience
that says that independence is affected as long as

role is maintained.
I would like to also comment on the account

ing and auditing skills criterion.

I think that we

have certain criticisms with the restrictions and
the reasons for the restrictions presently contained

in Section 4.

I have read it and read it and read it,

and I still don't make too much sense out of it.

I am presently a member of the National Review Board
and have been a member of the Trial Board panel,

but particularly as a former Ethics Committee member,

I would not want to underestimate the ability of the
Ethics Committee or any other technical committee

in the Institute to sit around and, maybe in this
room I have spent days, certainly one of these rooms
down on this floor, trying to dissect similar problems,
and we don't get to a resolution.

I would say in the

examples of what are accounting and auditing skills
and what are not, there is probably in each one of
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these categories food for weeks and months of argument

and discussion.

I agree entirely with my friend,

George Catlett, on role as a criterion.

I think also

I would like to say that the thing that is implied
in here is that perhaps our tax services are affected
because in one of these documents, tax advisory

services is defined as a non-audit service.

As is

entirely logical, most of our clients ask us to
They have nobody in the

prepare their tax returns.

firm that can do that.

Generally in our firm our

auditors prepare the initial draft which is a logical

outgrowth of their auditing.
They assemble the information.

When you

get down to a client’s bottom line, half of it may

go to taxes, and so we get a very good idea of what
the tax problems of the client are.

We get some

ideas as to maybe how they can be improved or where
the trouble areas are.

It is very logical.

Accountants have always been involved in taxes, and
we feel that there is an implied threat and a spill
over that possibly because taxes in some sense are

an adversary procedure, that down the line it will
be prohibited even though the jurisdiction has been

limited to services for SEC clients.

As has been

previously pointed out, it is impossible to
distinguish independence questions vis-a-vis
public and private companies.

It is possible to

distinguish image problems, and if image is a basis
for proscription, as it may very well be, then it
can be acknowledged that it will not affect services

for privately held companies.
I think I have covered most of the material

in my prepared remarks.

I appreciate the opportunity

to be able to present them to you.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, Mr. Arnstein.

Mr. McCloy, do you have any questions?
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MR. McCLOY:

You constantly referred to role

as distinguished from skills.
on it.

Would you just elaborate

I have read your written statement.

You talked

as if you only looked at this from the point of view
of role the problems would be resolved.

elaborate on that.

Will you

What do you mean by "role” and what

should be our approach to this dilemma that we refer to?

Tell me how that term helps us.
MR. ARNSTEIN:
part.

I think role is an acknowledged

It has been embodied in the independence

literature.

It is embodied in the rule that an

accountant or an auditor should not perform any

management functions, and there is a long history, as
a matter of fact, at the present time.

Take a simple

matter like auditing our own work, and at the present
time the profession’s position is somewhat different

from the SEC’s position as to what part an auditor
can play, let’s say, in keeping the books.

I was the Chairman of the Independence
Committee when the current interpretations were issued,
and you might say we agreed to disagree.

We came

pretty close but did not entirely agree, and role is
a difficult thing to judge as to where you cross

the line because we have had publicly held clients
where the client really didn't know how much money
they had made until we got through with our audit.
We may make 150 journal entries.

important ones.

Let's say all the

Have we kept the books, and

accountants sometimes add things up by the number
of journal entries although some may be for 25 dollars.
We hope not, and some for half the profit, but for
example, how do you measure it? When you get over

100, have you kept the books or not?
MR. McCLOY: Do you mean in management?
MR. ARNSTEIN:

So it is a difficult thing.

Yet, I think it has always been acknowledged that role
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in the performance of non-audit services or in the

performance of accounting services is an important
consideration in determining whether you are independent
or not.

We have addressed it, and we can distinguish.
In my written statement, if it is independence,

it ought to be decided on role.

If it is not

independence, and role is a part of independence,
then it ought to be image.

We can't separate

independence between private and publicly owned

companies, but we can separate image.

Image is a public

thing, but independence is pervasive throughout public
and private practice.
MR. McCLOY:

You talked about taxes.

It seems

to me as long as I can recall, accountants have been

preparing corporation returns.
I am thinking of what we are probably going

to hear this afternoon from the actuaries.

They make

a big point about the vice that is involved in reviewing
your own work.

Aren't accountants reviewing their own work

when they do the tax returns?

They can come to the

audit, and they must make a decision that the tax work
has been well done before they make the attest.

Isn't

that reviewing your own work?
MR. ARNSTEIN:

extent it is.

That is right, and to a certain

I think you could say that taxes, the

income taxes, are a result of the operations of the

company so that no matter who does the work, you are

going to come up with a figure.
MR. McCLOY:

It is an interpretation of the

law.
MR. ARNSTEIN:

It is an interpretation of

rules, but then we as auditors are in the position of
interpreting accounting rules which go right to the

heart of the subject.
When the chief executive officer and the
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chief financial officer as they presently do sign
representation letters that they are responsible for

the fair presentation of financial statements in

accordance with generally accepted accounting

principles, often they know very little about
generally accepted accounting principles, and we
know a lot more and we tell them what they are, so it

is a difficult thing to separate.
MR. McCLOY:

You have had a lot of experience,

as you point out in your qualification statement.
Suppose you should put yourself in our position.

What

MAS would you proscribe and what would you permit.

Since the objections are not

MR. ARNSTEIN:

based on logic, I think, and some of the services
that are already proscribed as part of the SEC
Section rules, are services which are mentioned as
kind of offending the propriety of "the public" if

you put quotes around "the public," and are services
which seem far removed from independence considerations,

although they may not necessarily be removed from

independence considerations, although they may not
necessarily be removed, I can't say except that it

be based on what is the image?

And the determination

of image is a nonlogical process.

I think that somehow

or other the Board has to get a feeling for what will
satisfy this public out there and say that the image
of the profession is unfavorably regarded because

certain firms perform these for public clients and
considering the pluses and minuses, just proscribe
them.

To a certain extent it is just like dealing

with unidentified flying objects.
process.

MR. McCLOY:
That is great help.

It is not a logical

Thank you very much for that.

(Laughter)

PROFESSOR CARY:

It is realistic.

MR. RICHARD A STARK:
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I am not sure that

I understand the distinction you are making on the

image point.

You say image is a public matter and

that proscriptions should apply only those performing
SEC work or work done for SEC clients.

I would have thought that the public that
you are referring to would be the persons relying on

Whether it is a broad

the financial statements.

public such as shareholders of a publicly held company

receiving financial statements or a narrow constituency

such as the nonmanaging owners of a company that you

spoke of or the creditors, there would still be a

public perception and I would think it would be
important to preserve whatever image qualities are
desirable in either case.

MR. ARNSTEIN:

I think that the term "image"

is unfortunate and perhaps George Catlett's term,

compatibility, is a little better because it is hard
to distinguish image from appearance because in

judging independence questions we use the fact and
appearance of independence.

But image doesn't have

anything to do with independence because in practice

we know it doesn't affect independence as long as
role is maintained, and that other things are very

much more important.
We should acknowledge it is image, and I

think that if you look at the polls and so forth,
that the people who seem to have the idea about non-

audit services affecting independence are generally
people who are removed from the scene.

I think

Mr. Vanatta referred to that.
One of the significant findings is that
the more people know about it, the less they are

worried about MAS service. So when you get the
smaller companies and everybody knows everybody
else, I don't really think that they are concerned
with that subject at all.

Really, it is all those
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people out there who are the public, and have very
little contact with it.
MR. GARRETT:

We are running a little late.

Do you have any further questions?
MR. MATUSIAK:

If I understood

I have one.

Mr. Catlett’s position correctly, he would proscribe
the rendering of any services by a firm that had an

SEC client.

You seem to say that you can render some

services to non-SEC audit clients that would be
proscribed to an SEC audit client.

Is that correct?

MR. ARNSTEIN:

That is correct.

MR. MATUSIAK:

You are not afraid that there

would be some spillover over time or that if you were
an auditor for a non-SEC client and you rendered to
them a service that you would not render to an SEC
client, that you would have no problem with that?
MR. ARNSTEIN:

Well, I am worried about

spillover and very much worried, and therefore, I

think the essence of my statement is that if the

proscription is based on image and image is a concept

of the public and if non-public companies don’t have
a public, so to speak, that the spillover won’t occur

as long as it is adequately contained.
PROFESSOR CARY:

Mr. Arnstein, I just wanted

to relate myself to one point in connection with your

type of firm.
You indicate yours is a 200-man firm,
professional firm, and obviously, as you say, you
can't speak for the small firms, and yet perhaps you

have a better impression of firms below that than
the big firms do.
I am not sure, but I will accept
that for a premise for a moment.

If that is the case of the firms with the
number of professionals of your size and less, when

you speak of their performing MAS services, is it the

same kind of MAS services that we are talking about
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vis-a-vis big firms?

For instance, how many firms

below your size have computer specialists, for example?

They wouldn’t have anybody who was doing formal
executive recruiting, plant layout, actuaries, would
they?

I am just wondering what are we dealing with
in terms of organizations of the 200 professional or

less?
MR. ARNSTEIN:

I can’t speak exactly.

All

I can say is that the practice of firms our size and

smaller vary a great deal.
I do know of smaller firms than ours who are
in psychological testing.

PROFESSOR CARY:
testing in these firms?
MR. ARNSTEIN:

And never had any logical
(Laughter)

I do know of firms, for example,

that specialize in marketing and so forth so that I

don't know what the impact is, but I don’t think it

would be wise to make an assumption.

In fact, I

know it wouldn't be because I do know that there are

relatively small firms who specialize in what can be
regarded as non-audit practice.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I am amazed that a firm of

under 200 could be engaged in psychological testing

and anything that is somewhat, shall we say, way out
relatively, and still perform the auditing function
which is its primary function.
MR. ARNSTEIN:

In this particular firm, I

think the managing partner is a graduate psychologist

as well as a CPA.
I am a graduate engineer, although I wouldn’t
want to build anything for anybody.

(Laughter)

I

would say also that you referred to computer

specialists.

In this day and age almost any firm has

to have one.
PROFESSOR CARY:

That is probably one area
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plus the taxes, you said.
Mr. Arnste
in, in your experience

MR. GARRETT:

or observation, do you gain or lose clients because
of the variety or the quality of this MAS service?
MR. ARNSTEIN:

There is no question about it.

If we don’t provide a full range of services of what

accountants are expected to provide, then they will go
to competitive firms which can provide all of those

services.

For example, this I have got to say, comes

up in executive recruiting a good deal.

When a client

is looking for a chief financial officer, they ask us,
and we very much want to supply one because they will

go and ask a competitor, and then maybe this gets into

independence to a certain extent.
A competitor will place their own man, who
will feel loyal to this other firm and all kinds of

things like that.
And change auditors.

MR. GARRETT:
MR. ARNSTEIN:
MR. GARRETT:

Sure.

Thank you very much, Mr.

Arnstein.

Mr. Green.

Forster.

Eric Green of Harris, Kerr,

Is this Mr. Noonan coming with him?

That is right.

MR. ERIC F. GREEN:
MR. GARRETT:

Proceed, gentlemen.
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I am Eric Green.

MR. ERIC F. GREEN:

is Donal Noonan.

This

We are both very much pleased to

have the opportunity of being here.
Perhaps by way of introduction, I should

just say a few words about our firm.

We are one of

the smaller of the national firms.
We also happen to be rather a strong
international firm in public accounting and in

management advisory services.

Both of us CPAs.

Both of us have spent

many years of our lives as audit partners, and both
of us now dedicate, I would say, 95% of our time to
our MAS practice.
In our written brief we have pointed out

some of the areas in which we are rather specialized,
and in some respects we are rather unique in providing

certain types of MAS services to our clients, both

audit clients and non-audit clients.

Very briefly, the position of our firm in
respect to scope of services, is that no restrictions

are warranted such as those that are proposed.

We

believe that they would be harmful, unjust and
completely uncalled for by any past events.

These

points have been already mentioned by other speakers.

We are confident of our own ability to
decide, guided by our own internal rules of conduct
and those of the MAS Practice Standards of the AICPA

that we can decide for ourselves the scope of
services that we should provide.

We do not doubt our independence in
rendering them, and we also know from experience
that our clients will decide whether we are the best
suppliers of their needs.

A free market exists particularly with
respect to the provision of management advisory
services, and we believe it should continue to
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exist without harmful regulation.

However, rather than dwell on the negative
side, we should like to draw the Board’s attention to

the positive values of MAS services to audit clients
and others.

For example, we see demands from

governments for better, more comprehensive audits

of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and they
are certainly needed.

We have SEC requirements for disclosure
of replacement values of assets.

The private sector

is constantly seeking new insights into its operating

methods and businesses turn to their public

accountants for study and advice.

They also turn

to other business consultants frequently on a highly

competitive basis.

That is to say that CPA’s management

advisory services have grown because there is demand
for them.

It is not that we went out and invited

them, as it were, but people came to us to provide
the services, and in fact, we believe that CPAs in

general are often the most efficient, economic and

effective suppliers of those services.

We believe that the benefits that accrue

to stockholders and to the economy as a whole, when
services are rendered, greatly overtakes any possible
dangers that some allege exist.

It is asserted in the summary of notice
78-1 that the practice of public accounting has its
origins in the attest function.

In the case of our

firm, at least, the MAS function preceded the attest
function to some extent, certainly in the United

States.

When our firm came here in 1911 at the

request of an English client, it was to provide
essentially what are now referred to as management
advisory services because of a perceived competency
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that we had in the kind of services that that client
was looking for.
Our management advisory services are still
provided internationally, and it is important to us

and to our firm that they continue.
As the private sector seeks to expand

overseas, it seeks the advice of its business
consultants.

Many of our MAS services involve our

overseas offices.

Our British associates who are

already, as I am sure you are aware, living in highly
regulated society, have expressed amazement at the

proposed scope restrictions that would affect them

also because we must practice as one firm in our
international work.
They ask us:

How can we willingly abridge

our rights to practice professionally when no public
good is promised except in the minds of our detractors?

Unfortunately, the issue has become political rather
than professional, and as we say in our written
brief, we have serious concern that the proposed
proscriptions will be unconstitutional restraints

on our rights to practice our profession.
I am going to ask my partner, Donal Noonan

just to say a few words on this other political
question since so many other speakers are covering

most eloquently some of the more professional aspects
of this discussion.

If you would, Don.

MR. DONAL C. NOONAN:

Gentlemen, I am a CPA

by examination in New York and by reciprocity in

California.
I practice in California now, although
originally I was in our New York office.

I am also an attorney admitted to practice

in the State of New York, and Mr. McCloy, I hope I
don’t have to duck twice when I say that.
The certificate granted me by New York and

by California, and to my fellow CPAs around the country
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in the various states, permit me to hold myself out
to the public as a certified public accountant, but

I do not find in any place that this grant of status
restricts me in the pursuit of an honest livelihood

in the business world.
You have in the record the position of my

firm and have heard the comments of my partner and
colleague, but I would like to approach the issue from

a different perspective.

First off, I would like to add my whole

hearted personal endorsement to Chester Vanatta’s

comments.

They were most eloquently presented.
The professional public accountant is

highly regarded and respected for his integrity, his

independence, his objectivity, his competence, his
knowledge of the client’s affairs, his knowledge

of the client’s business, and by education, which
does not stop upon attaining an undergraduate or

graduate degree but is a life-long process, he has

frequently many other attainments.

You heard Mr.

Arnstein state that he has an engineering degree,
and there are many CPAs who have degrees in other

than auditing and accounting.

By experience gained in the marketplace
and in the field and in industry, he attains a

knowledge and a capability far beyond that which
we would normally associate with the attest function
alone.

By application of his knowledge and testing
of that knowledge and his experience to problems of

his clients, he has demonstrated to the community,
to his clients, his ability to undertake and solve

complex business problems.
The accountant as professional adviser, as
a diagnostician of business ills, as a dispenser

of curative advice, has established a standing in
61

the business, financial and industrial community

that is the envy of those less qualified or worse,
those whose motivation to criticize is politically

based and on a "popular" concept, if you will.

I submit that our reaction to the so-called

Senate staff study, the Metcalf report, if you will,
is indeed an overreaction to a witch hunt.

The very title of the report, The Accounting
Establishment, reveals the underlying bias and lack

of objectivity of its authors.
The pronouncement of other politically

motivated individuals including one from my present
home state are replete with innuendoes and charges

and false assumptions and peculiarly lacking in

facts or case studies.

Broad generalities based

on pure assumptions can confuse the uninformed

segment of the public perhaps, but should not confuse
us.

Witch hunters will always find witches.
UFO hunters will always find UFOs.

And leprechaun

seekers, my parent’s native land, will always find

leprechauns, but we should direct our efforts toward
seeking the truth and toward educating the public
in the truth and not waste our time tilting at

windmills set in motion by misinformed, biased,

politically motivated, would be critics of our
professional activities.

There is not a scintilla

of evidence that the independence, integrity or

objectivity of any CPAs have been compromised or
impaired by management services performed for audit
clients or any other clients.

The charge itself is an insult which
demands proof from those making the charge and not

proof of a negative which is an impossible feat.
We should avoid even the appearance of

seeking isolated instances or claimed instances of
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lack of independence, but rather seek out the truth,
the real benefit to our clients, to the community
and to society as a whole of the advisory and consulting

services performed by the accounting profession.
I believe that an analysis and perhaps a
scrutiny of the motives of our detractors will

disclose a conflict of interest there, that is to
say the least, unbecoming their status in the community

and demeaning to the integrity of the profession of

which I am proud to be a member.

I recommend that the proposed Amendment

be rejected.

I thank you.

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, gentlemen.

Are

there questions?

MR. McCLOY:

Is there any area that you

proscribe or any types of business advice that you

refuse to give?
MR. GREEN:

We are very careful only to

accept engagements that we feel we can complete with

full competence and due care and all the standards
that are applicable, I think in general, to CPAs’
work, but specifically are documented in the MAS

Practice Standards.

So yes, if someone comes to us

to undertake a study for coal mining, for example,

we would say: No, that is not our expertise, and
we would perhaps try to find the right firm and
recommend them, but no, we would not accept

engagements that we didn’t feel we could complete.

Does that answer your question?
MR. McCLOY:

I guess it does.

MR. NOONAN: Might I just piggy-back on that.
In the past where that situation has occurred, and it

has occurred frequently, we have joint ventured, if

you will, assignments with other professionals in the
performance of assignments which included our

expertise applied to the project at hand coupled
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with the expertise of others.

So that if we have any question as to our
own competence, which we would have as a natural
outcome of, for example, studying a coal mine, we

would.
MR. McCLOY:

You would go out and get a

coal expert to help you.

Is that the idea?

Dig out

MR. NOONAN:

That is the idea.

MR. McCLOY:

There is no limit.

MR. NOONAN:

There is no limit we can see

the facts.

to place on the profession.

I think if we individually

place a limit on ourselves, because of our own
evaluation of our own competence, that is one thing.,

but to place that limitation on the entire profession

is, in my opinion, an error because there are others

within the profession who would have that competence
and to whom we would direct such a client or potential

client.
MR. WOOD:

Would you have different members

of the firm performing management advisory services

and a check on the accounts and internal controls
in the final certification of the attest function?
MR. NOONON:

Yes, as a matter of fact, in

our firm, and I say this only because of the fact that
we do have a firm of sufficient size to permit, and

I would not want to impose the same restrictions on
smaller firms.

We have three separate divisions in

the firm: the audit, or attest division, audit and

accounting, the tax department which is involved
primarily in taxes, and we have our management

advisory services department of which I am the

Western Regional Coordinator and of which Mr. Green

is the National Director, and yes, we do have those

separations.

All of us have come through the attest

function to become partners in the firm, to become
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CPAs and have had considerable experience in the
audit function.

I dare say that our management

advisory services have given us a much broader
insight into the problems and the opportunities
to perform a better audit as a result of management

advisory services than would otherwise be the case.
PROFESSOR CARY:

What is the size of your

firm in terms of professionals?
MR. GREEN:

We have at the present time

in the United States about 600 professional staff.

Overseas I don’t know.

It is more like another

thousand, I think, over the world.
PROFESSOR CARY:

If you were to identify

your role in the field of management advisory
services, how many of the areas would it cover that
are referred to in the notice here including marketing

consulting, plant layout, product design and executive
recruiting, insurance actuarial services, employee

benefit and so forth?

How many of those would it

cover?
MR. GREEN:

The main impact on our

practice would be in the marketing research area

specifically.

It would cover others to a less degree.

For example, executive recruiting—like many firms we

don’t have a large department doing it, but we

certainly don’t want to be denied the opportunity

of assisting our clients in seeking executives.

There is an important thing that we bring
out in our written brief regarding market research.

It struck us as curious that there was no suggestion
of proscribing what are commonly known as economic

feasibility studies of which we undertake a great
many.
In so doing over the years that we have been
doing them, we have grown more and more aware of the

need for quite intensive market research in undertaking
a satisfactory economic feasibility study.

That can

cover such things as attitude and behavioral studies
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because all those things of that nature enter into
the judgment regarding the success of a proposed

venture about which an economic feasibility study

is to be written.
It struck us as curious that some aspects
of those market research questions were not considered

to be suitable for CPAs to undertake, whereas the

way we look at it, we think it is absolutely
essential that many of them do be undertaken, and
we firmly believe that we should undertake them in

house rather than relying on outside authorities
to give us the information that we should need any

way in order to complete the study.

MR. WOOD:

If you gave a client some brief

recommendations on market research and they accepted

your recommendations and they turned out badly and
business was a flop, how would that affect your

attest function?

I don't think it would affect

MR. GREEN:

It might affect our pocketbooks

our attest function.
very rapidly.
MR. WOOD.

You answered the question as

I thought you would.

If you give some market research

advice and it doesn't pan out as you hoped or as
management hoped when they accepted your advice, I

don't see how it would affect your independence as

an auditor.
MR. GREEN:
MR. NOONAN:
purely that, Mr. Wood.

No, we don't think so.

And more so, our advice is

It is advice and recommendations

and in order for that advice to become reality and a
fact of life, that advice has to be accepted, adopted

and implemented by the client who then assumes the

responsibility for it.

We don't duck a responsibility

for performing the service, but we certainly don't

assume, and the client recognizes this, that we do
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not assume or assure a guarantee that the outcome
will be as projected.

You wouldn't imagine there

MR. GARRETT:

being any temptation to cooperate in making it look
a little better?
Oh, it never crossed our minds

MR. NOONAN:

that such a thing could happen.
MR. GREEN:

Those of you who are familiar

with the internal working of accounting firms, I can

assure you there is a pretty strong independence of

thought, particularly differences of opinion, among
the audit partners and the MAS partners on many

occasions, but the thought of a compromise, no.
They wouldn't be that eager

MR. GARRETT:
to make you look good?

MR. GREEN:

No, I think they really wouldn't.

MR. NOONAN:

It might be just the contrary.

(Laughter)
MR. MATUSIAK:

For a non-audit client,

because of your expertise in the hospitality industry,

would you accept an assignment which was quasi-management
in nature for a non-audit client?
Oh, yes, we do it regularly.

MR. NOONAN:

In fact, for clients who are non-audit clients of any
firm who are seeking an objective determination as to

the potential success of a project that they envision,
they have in mind a certain project, and they say:

"Would this succeed under these circumstances in this

place?"

And they will come to us.
MR. MATUSIAK:

You provide manpower then to

perform the management function.
MR. NOONAN: No, no.

MR. GREEN:

I think perhaps there has been

a misunderstanding of your question.

We undertake

management advisory service work for non-audit clients,

but not if we would not be independent.
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We would not

undertake a study if, in fact, we were going to become
the managers.

We do not become managers.

MR. NOONAN:

Oh, no.

In no instance would

we be involved in the implementation of those
recommendations or the supervision of construction
or management of a project, no.
MR. McCLOY:

Roughly, how many of your clients

are SEC registered?
MR. GREEN:

Some 35.

We are not heavily

In the other hand, our SEC

involved in SEC clients.

clients are very important to us.

We certainly intend

to maintain a position in the SEC Section of the AICPA.

MR. McCLOY:

What other countries is your

firm involved in besides England?

MR. GREEN:

We have offices in many parts of

the world, particularly in Africa, the Caribbean, all
over Europe.
MR. NOONAN:

Australia, New Zealand, Canada.

MR. GREEN:

And that does raise an important

issue really in our international practice, the

consistency with which we can approach work.

MR. GARRETT:

Are there no similar restrictions

in the British practice?

MR. GREEN:
MR. GARRETT:

No.

Maybe your lawyer wouldn’t

want you to answer this too accurately, but would you

read the Executive Committee’s proposals as it applied
to you making a severe dent in the MAS that you now

supply, requiring you to give up some services that
you now provide?
MR. NOONAN:

I really could answer that no.

But we still feel so strongly about any attempt at

proscription on the profession as a whole that we feel
forced to speak even though we might be affected very
slightly.

MR. GARRETT:

I see.
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Thank you very much

MR. NOONAN:

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.
Mr. Auerbach.

MR. NORMAN E. AUERBACH:

Coopers & Lybrand.

Please proceed.

I am Chairman of

May I personally congratulate you

and your staff for the very excellent discussion draft
and issue identification document that you released in

preparation for these hearings.

MR. GARRETT:
MR. AUERBACH:

Thank you.
I am, however, concerned with

the degree of focus on the particular issues that we
are discussing here today.

To state it very simply, I believe all our
efforts and concentration toward improvement must be

directed to the basic reasons for the public’s concern

over the certified public accountant ’s performance.
The prevention of audit failures is the first problem.
The second problem is keeping pace with the public's

expanding expectations relative to the auditor's
responsibility.
Analysis of the failures leads one to certain

positive conclusions:

First, the causes were primarily

failures in judgment in the auditing area, much more than
in the accounting area.

Most often, the failure to

recognize the significance of certain events or
weaknesses that in one way or another were revealed

to the CPA during the course of his work.

The analysis

leads you down a certain path—we must have good

quality control in the firm, our people must be well
trained, and above all we must understand our client's
business.

I would emphasize, we must have on board

the special competencies necessary to deal with
specialized areas such as computers, inventories,
pensions, taxes, et cetera.

We are in a world of increasing sophistication
and complexity.

To think in terms of arbitrarily

limiting the competencies in the current environment
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would be like Bud Wilkinson, the new coach of the

St. Louis Cardinals Football Team, deciding he is

going to compete with the other teams in the league
but stick to the old single platoon of his college

coaching days—no two platoon concept, no special
defense team, no special place kicker, no special

punter, no kickoff team or kick return team, no
special line coaches, no defensive coaches, et cetera.

How would he do?

And more interestingly, what would

the public's perception of his team be when they

lose 16 straight games, which they would do.

MR. McCLOY:

It would change if he won 16.

(Laughter)

MR. AUERBACH:

Gentlemen, in a period when

we auditors are being challenged to step up to ever
broadening responsibilities, in the detection of

fraud and irregularities, in the internal accounting
control aspects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,

in the whole area of performance auditing as it breaks

ground in the government area, how can we conceive

of taking steps to limit the talent available to us?
One fact also comes through very clearly,
and it has been repeated many times.

There is no

evidence that performing management consulting
services has in any instance been shown to have

contributed to an audit failure; to the contrary,
I would speculate that the performance of such services
and the broader knowledge base which it provides to

the auditor and the greater skills available to deal
with problems have contributed to the prevention

of failures.

As the Chairman of my firm, I also believe
that we must be responsive to the needs of those

we serve.

We are in a service profession and have

been for 80 years.

In that period, we have performed

management consulting services for our clients,
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admittedly organized more formally today than before.

In the same way that the small accountant provides

an ongoing consulting capability to his clients,
so must the larger firm be responsive.

Coopers &

Lybrand has also performed actuarial services for
almost two decades.

We have twenty-three actuarial

partners and a total staff of over 250 persons, with
52 members or associates of the Society of Actuaries.

We have a volume of approximately 9 million dollars

in this particular area.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. AUERBACH:

Actuarial area?
Actuarial area.

We are

professionally competent, have never had any public

criticisms or lawsuits involving our performance,
and have been most helpful to our audit staff in an

area of ever-increasing concern to the public, namely,
the pension liability, a concern in both the public

and private sector.
In exploring the area of responsiveness,
I would like to take a few moments to discuss an area

in which there has been much flag waving, although

I am not sure it is very important when compared to
the focus which it has received.

That is Executive

Search.
How does one get into executive search?

Does one do it for the opportunity of great financial

rewards?

The answer is no.

It comes about as a result

of a desire to serve.

Our clients know we have an appreciation

of their needs.

They also know that some of our

professionals in public accounting want to go into
the private sector.
In sum, our clients recognize
our general knowledge of the marketplace and so they

seek us out.

At first we responded by asking someone

in the personnel department to see if they could help

our clients out, or the partner or the manager himself
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would scurry around and see if he could provide some

help to their clients.
We finally concluded that we cannot and
should not accommodate this need in less than a

professionally competent way, so we hired professional
search people who could capably match the needs of

our client with the qualifications of the candidate.
Were we trying to take over the search function in

the country?

Hardly.

There are about 25,000 search

persons in the United States, and our strategically
placed professional staff never exceeded ten in this

country.
The principal issue is independence, in the

sense that the candidate placed would favor us as

auditors if he were in a financial position.

I say

we must deal with that issue in the only way we can;

that is, with an independent audit committee.

There is also a concern that we would later
cover up for the employee on the theory that our being

involved in his employment constituted vouching for
his capabilities.

You are, of course, aware that a

search firm generally presents three candidates for
a position, from which the company selects one; so

we don't make an actual selection or the recommendation

of a particular person.
What is more interesting is the current idea
that auditors should be prepared to respond to audit

committees when asked their evaluation of the competency

of the financial management of a company, and this
notion is included in a proposed SEC release.

Are

we auditors to be precluded from giving such views

on the competency of a client’s employee on the basis
that once having given such an opinion, we would not

be independent thereafter with respect to that man
because we had already made a representation?

I

doubt whether we could so behave in today’s environment.
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Executive search is not really a gig issue.

think it should ever have been proscribed.

I don’t
We

shouldn’t retrogress to doing this job in less than
a highly professional manner; and I am fearful with
proscription that is what the result will be.

Gentlemen, we have submitted a detailed
paper to the Board.

My objective here is not to

read or attempt to cover that paper, since I am sure

it will become part of the record and you will have

an opportunity to focus on it.
I would like to just very briefly deal with
the six key questions which you asked.

We must agree that independence is a
fundamental issue, and we believe it is the only

key issue bearing on scope of practice.

On the question of the appearance of

independence, I find no factual evidence that audits
have been compromised; and as I indicated earlier,
the contrary is probably the case.

I believe that

a strong audit committee focusing on the relationship

with the auditor can assure the public that the
relationship is a beneficial one to the stockholders
and that they, being in the best position to judge,
are satisfied as to the auditor’s independence.

You

will never deal effectively with the appearance issue
until we have the auditor retained by an accountable

to the audit committee, not the management, even though
we understand that there must be a good working
relationship with management if an effective audit
is to be conducted.

The sole test, other than independence, is
that the service performed in a professional manner
with highly qualified personnel, provides meaningful

benefits to our clients, and is supportive and not
disruptive to the performance of the attest function.

I think there should be no arbitrary limits
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to the scope of our consulting practice.

It must

be responsive to a need, obviously, and if it

broadens our abilities to better understand our
client’s business, and if a committee of independent
outside directors is in agreement that it does not

affect our independence, the client and the public
will ultimately benefit.

Our own good business

judgment, and I want to emphasize this—our own

good business judgment and our consciousness as to

how the market views us and the importance of that
perception will act as an appropriate governor
on what we choose to do.
The effect on the business community

of performing a needed service in a highly
professional manner can only be positive.

Our

proximity and familiarity with the business and
its operations, the fact that we continue on the

scene, affords us the unique opportunity to be
constructive in a cost effective, and reasonably
undisruptive manner.

A proscription of advisory services would,
if one looks to the nature and character of the advice

given, probably hurt the small accounting firm in

a fairly significant way.

The smaller firm takes

pride in its hand holding, continuous type of
business consulting.

This service is needed, and

it should be permitted to continue.

The larger

firms practicing management consulting are involved
in the more complex, sophisticated areas, but then
so are their clients.

I prefer not to draw a distinction between
tax and other advisory services, although we are

all aware that one can do nothing in the area of
accounting that doesn’t carry with it tax
ramifications. To force any kind of separation

between tax and audit practice would be cost
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prohibitive, particularly to smaller companies.
The impact of any proscription on small firms would,

in my view, be devastating and clearly against
the public interest.

How about a proscription on

MR. McCLOY:

taxing?
MR. AUERBACH:

That's right.

Let’s analyze

the arguments for restricting service, not necessarily

in the order of importance.

The first argument is

generally advanced by the regulators and goes

something like this:

the auditing profession owes

its growth and strength to the various Securities

Acts and their amendments.

Therefore, the sole

reason for the existence of the profession is the

Securities Act.
This simply is not so.

Coopers & Lybrand

has been in existence for 80 years, long before
the Securities Acts came into existence; and over

these years, we have performed many valuable

services for our clients in response to their needs.
Furthermore, regulation is not the only means of
accomplishing social objectives.

I believe that

private enterprise would have found a substitute
for the securities laws to mandate reliable financial

reporting.

If we examine operations in other countries,
we find that indeed alternative approaches, relying

on the services of the independent accountant, have
developed and are flourishing.

The regulatory

argument tends to fall of its own weight.
A second argument is that an auditor,
in furnishing management consulting services, somehow
becomes inextricably involved in the client's actual

decision making, thereby undermining the objectivity
critical to the exercise of the attest function.

This is an invalid argument for two reasons:
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To

begin with, our consultants, as a matter of principle

and practice, do not make management decisions.
Second, the argument runs contrary to human nature

itself.

Management decisions are made by those

who have the responsibility to act.

A highly placed

executive is not willing to turn over to a consultant

the responsibility to make decisions that he himself
is responsible for.
The third argument has been tendered, namely,

that providing some types of non-audit services places
firms in the position of auditing their own work.

This question would arise, for an example, if an
auditing firm were engaged to derive, actuarially,
the amount of the contribution a client should make

to its pension fund.

Given this view, the fact that

the auditing firm’s staff made the original calculation
would somehow deprive it of the auditor’s "second look"

if the amounts were used in preparing the financial

statements.

I would like to expand a little bit

on this particular subject because I think it is

important.

Let me try and explain some of the issues
that relate to the concept of self-auditing.

In today's

environment, the independent auditor often uses the

skills of other experts—for example:

an appraiser,

an attorney or an engineer—to provide sufficient,
competent evidential matter to afford a basis for

the auditor’s opinion regarding financial statements.

What is the auditor required to do on those
occasions when he has used the work of other experts?
Must he audit the work, or can he use it without
attempting to apply procedures that go beyond the
other experts’ report?

The truth is that the auditor

takes a course which avoids both extremes.

Under

today's requirements the auditor’s education and

experience enable him to be knowledgeable about
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business affairs in general, but he is not expected

to have the expertise of a person trained for, or
qualified to engage in the practice of, another

profession.

Thus, the procedure that the auditor

applies to the report of a specialist is limited

to obtaining an understanding of the qualifications
of the specialist and his relationship, if any,
with the client, and an understanding of the scope

of the specialist's work, since it will form the
basis of a representation in the financial statements.

When the auditor uses the work of a specialist, he
has no duty to go further unless he has reason to

believe that the specialist’s findings were

reasonable in the circumstances.

Under these

rules, the auditor can appropriately use the work

in the same way as the auditor would examine the
client's other computations or calculations.

Because

we think independence from the client is critical,
we apply special rules when the specialist is
related to the client.

Under the present rules, the auditor is
prohibited from making reference to the fact that

he has used the work of another expert in conducting

his examination.

I personally feel that this

restriction should be changed, and I believe that

my view is supported by the findings of the Cohen

Commission.

I think if it were made clear that

we often to rely on the work of experts and that
we do not audit their work, there would be less

concern about the position of the actuary whose
work is treated in this way.
There is another way in which the auditor

could deal with the work of a specialist.

That it,

he could audit the work of each expert as he audits
any other bit of evidence which he obtains from the

enterprise's management.

A decision to move in
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this direction would inevitably increase the
reliability of the related financial statements.
What is the old saying?

one.
task.

Two heads are better than

We would have two performances of the same

It would also, however, also increase

substantially the cost of the auditor's examination.
Take, for example, the work of the geologist on

which the auditor relies.

If that work has to be

redone in the case of every oil company in
determining its reserves, the cost would be
significant.
is:

The fundamental question that remains

Is the expected increase in reliability of

financial statements sufficient to justify the

additional costs that would be imposed on the
enterprise and ultimately on the shareholders

and consumers of its products?
In reaching its decision regarding
treatment of the work of a specialist, the

accounting profession recognized that the auditor's

existing "social contract" mandates that increases

in audit costs should be forced on American business
only when it can be clearly shown that there will

be appropriate benefits.

Some of those who have explored the areas

of self-audit have not faced the problem squarely,

but perhaps they have not properly identified it.
The real issue is: Can the work of actuaries be
treated in the same way as the work of other non-

audit specialists; or, stated differently, can the
work of an actuary be distinguished from the work

of other specialists, for example, the appraiser,
the attorney or the engineer?

I don't think they can be or should be
distinguished.

I think the actuaries do comprise

a professional group.

They, through their various

organizations, have begun the work of establishing
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the framework of self-regulation.

Just as the

auditor deals with measuring the financial impact
of completed transactions, the actuary deals
with the measurement of financial implications
of expected transactions.

I share with them their

keen desire for full recognition in the family
of professionals.

To single out the actuary’s

work for treatment different from the work of

other specialists—appraisers, attorneys, engineers—

whose work we do rely upon, would, in my view, be

an error.

In this respect, the self-audit issue

is not a real issue as it related to the actuaries.
I believe the Cohen Commission’s report implicitly

supports my view.

The Commission further suggested

that, as a preventive measure, the auditor’s

standard of care be extended when he uses a
specialist who is an employee of his firm.

We

accept this concept, because we believe that the
same high standard of care that prevails in the

auditing environment should be extended, can be
extended, and is being extended to every
professional service that my firm offers.

When we, as Coopers & Lybrand, are
involved as the actuary, we take on a substantial

responsibility, because we are now responsible
for the work of the expert as well.

From the

point of view of the protection of the public,
we can’t get off the hook by a statement that we

were relying on the work of an expert to whom
we are not related and to whom we attribute the

failure if there has been a failure.

We are

on the hook, and therefore, from the point of
view of the public’s protection, the public is

afforded even greater protection perhaps than
they might otherwise be.
On the subject of competition, some
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contend that accounting firms offering a broad
spectrum of non-audit services are waging unfair
competition with other companies offering similar

I just don’t believe that to be the case.

services.

We are competing with others and the competition

is healthy.

Our clients and the business world

are fairly sophisticated when it comes to consulting
services, and that is an area that has become

very competitive.

It is very unusual in today’s

environment that the company will limit the
proposal opportunity to its accountants and auditors.

Competition is healthy.

The ultimate

beneficiaries are the stockholders in American
enterprises.

There is no reason to believe that

the results of competition in this area would differ

and have any other effect than from competition

in any other field.

Some of the areas under discussion here,
such as actuarial services, have long been associated

with accounting.

We consider ourselves co-professionals

with actuaries, and we have had many important links

with them.

This is so since the auditor, as I said

before, may be said to be the primary examiner of

the current financial implications of past events

while the actuary measures the current financial

implications of future events.

We are both very

much in the financial business of dealing with
figures.

There is a close relationship.

One of

the earliest professional institutions in the

world was the Accountants and Actuaries in Scotland,

under that very name; and Coopers & Lybrand, as I
have indicated, has offered actuarial services

for almost two decades.

Gentlemen, we do compete. We compete
with actuaries, we compete with other management
consultants, and we even compete rather aggressively
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with other accounting firms.

I think this competition

is appropriate and desirable.

There is no logical or ethical reason to
force us to divest ourselves of any part of our

Our standards are vital and

consulting practice.
rigorous.

Our auditors benefit by the association

with experts from other disciplines and thus broaden
their own capabilities.
My last comment, gentlemen, an important

point which cannot be ignored, is the influence that
the breadth of our practice has had on entrants into

our profession.

The green eyeshade days are gone,

and the young people sense it.

The diversity of

problems, the alternative career paths, the opportunity
to contribute to the profitability and effectiveness

of American business are bringing to us better young
people than ever before.

With proper training and

proper quality controls, the contribution of our
profession will be significant because we are a

people’s business; the better we are, and the more
talent we possess, the better shall the public be
served.

Thank you.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, Mr. Auerbach.

Are there questions?

MR. WOOD:
MR. STARK:

Mr. Wood.

I don’t have any.
I have one.

Do you agree with

the restrictions that are suggested in the Executive
Committee’s proposal with respect to actuarial

services, and would the application of those
restrictions have an impact on your firm?
MR. AUERBACH:
I don’t agree with the

restrictions; and yes, they would have an effect.
I can't give you the exact financial effect that
the particular revisions relating to insurance
work would have, but we do have a number of people
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involved in that area.

We don’t agree with the insurance work
restrictions.

We recognize, of course, that the

rules are established by the majority of the Executive

Committee.
MR. STARK:

In the pension benefit area,

you would continue to be able to function?

MR. AUERBACH:

We would be able to under

the proposed rules.
MR. WOOD:

In those firms, insurance

companies that you audit, and for whom you provide

actuarial service, is there in every case an in

house actuary or an in-house actuarial staff?
MR. AUERBACH:

I don’t know, so I couldn't

give you an answer whether in every case there is.
The way we function with management however does not

depend on whether they have an actuary or not.

They

are fully aware both how we propose to deal with
a particular matter, and what we propose to do.

When we present our recommendations, management is
then able to adopt an approach that they believe is

sound.

As auditors, we have to be satisfied, of

course, that the approach adopted is professionally
satisfactory to us.
MR. WOOD:

If you were auditing an

insurance company and did not provide actuarial

service, you indicated in your remarks you would

rely completely on the actuarial service of a
professional actuary that served that insurance
company.

MR. AUERBACH:
completely on it.

I didn't say that we rely

I think, as a matter of fact,

the existence of consulting actuaries within our

firm has made our auditors a little more astute
in respect of the appropriate questions to ask,

particularly when we use the work of non-independent
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in-house actuaries.

I think we are even just a little

better at asking the right kind of questions when

we are dealing with independent experts, and we do
recognize that under SAS-11 we rely on the work of

these experts.

MR. WOOD:

You go beyond reliance then and

you pose some questions.
MR. AUERBACH:

We are required to make

certain inquiries and we use the knowledge and
capability which resides in the firm.
MR. MANZONI:

Has that resulted in some

specific improvements?

MR. AUERBACH:
MR. MANZONI:

Improvements in?
Improvements in financial

statements.
MR. AUERBACH:

It is very hard to give you

specific instances where this competency has resulted
in a better end result.

We feel, however, that this

has been the effect, particularly in the case of

pensions.
MR. MANZONI:

If you were the actuary in

that instance, though, you wouldn’t have that ’’second
look," even though the second look isn’t required, as

I understand it, under the standards.

MR. AUERBACH:

second look.

In a sense we do have a

We get this through the quality control

procedures within the actuarial group itself.

We

satisfy ourselves that reviews have taken place by

two accredited professionals during the engagement
and that we can feel comfortable, recognizing the
exposure of the firm.

MR. MANZONI:

Would that be the same person

that made the determination in the first place?
MR. AUERBACH:

A different person.

MR. McCLOY: Do you accept the fact that
today the public is somewhat skeptical of the
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reliability of the accounting profession?

Is there something that this Board should
be doing something about trying to improve the
credibility of the attest feature of the accountants,
or is this something that you just let the marketplace

deal with?

MR. AUERBACH:

Oh, no, no, I think there is

a lot to be done in the area of credibility, and I
think you gentlemen, as part of your responsibility,

are going to be focusing on what I think are the key
areas—the areas of quality control and peer review,

the quality of the work that is being done, and
whether you are satisfied with the steps being taken
to maintain quality.
MR. McCLOY:

Audit committees and so forth.

MR. AUERBACH:

bit.

Audit committees, the whole

This is the crucial area.

What we are talking

about here is important only because as business gets
more and more sophisticated, we can be better auditors

to the extent we have greater competencies available
to us that we can draw upon—and we do draw upon them.
When you get specialized problems and
difficult inventory situations, we draw on our experts
who are better equipped to deal with them.

Certainly

the computer—I don't need to go into that—has been
the best example where sophistication is required;

and the development of the auditing process, through
the computer and the security that is required
surrounding the computer is such that special
capabilities are a must.
MR. McCLOY:

But you wouldn't think that a

proscription would help.

You know, you set up a

rule sometimes, and you have to wonder after you have
set it up, and the exception then becomes the rule.
I think the key test is that there is a benefit going

to the client, that you are qualified to do the
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service, and that you are satisfied that it doesn’t

disrupt or undermine your ability to be effective

in the attest function.

MR. McCLOY:

I am sure that is entirely a

subjective test.
MR. AUERBACH:

It is a subjective test, but

we are business people and I think we are pretty good
at applying that test.

MR. McCLOY:

But you have a public

responsibility.
MR. AUERBACH:

I think part of your function

of peer review and the other examinations of our

performance is to look for any evidence that we have
done anything to improperly impact on the public.
That would be very much a part of what any peer
review performance would entail.
MR. McCLOY:

I have this feeling—I am just

thinking aloud here because we are just new in this
abstruse question—that you fellows have been dealing

with, I am told, for the last 10 years.

There is

sort of the feeling, I think, around that you are

into everything that comes along, no matter.
Anything that will turn over another dollar, that
you are sort of a jack of all trades and master of

none.

You don’t have the professional focus that

you ought to have in order to maintain your reputation

as objective.
MR. AUERBACH:

But that is speculation.

actually hasn't happened that way.

We talk of

executive search, and that gets played up, but I
tried to explain to you how we get into that.
It
is not a dramatic thing.
It is really very, very

small, just trying to respond to a need.
We don’t do any plant layout.

I have

been trying to find the accounting firm that does
plant layout work, and yet I see in every bit of
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It

writing there’s plant layout all over the place.

I see these things, but they are not

significant.

Maybe in one instance somebody had a
"Well, if you changed the plant

situation and said:

over there, maybe the paper flow would be better."

I don’t know.

Maybe that is plant layout work.

But

I am just saying that I don’t know of any significant

area that we are involved in, that my firm is
involved in, that is not handled in a fully
professional way.

No service that we provide could

cause any embarrassment to the profession, or doesn’t

make good sense for us to be in, or would not be
easily understood by any one examining what we do.

I say that as long as we have the appropriately

qualified people it is appropriate for us to provide
that service to clients.
MR. McCLOY:

You are aware that the Congress

is very skeptical about this.
I am very much aware of what

MR. AUERBACH:

Congress has done.

I am also very much aware that

Congress came to the conclusions before they made the
study.

(Laughter)

MR. McCLOY:

They came to the conclusion

before we came onto the grounds.

But we are reaching

out to find out what the situation really needs at
this time in order to restore confidence.

MR. AUERBACH:

I get a little troubled

frankly, when people talk in terms of confidence.
I don't find as I deal with the business world that

businessmen are any less confident in us today that
5 years ago.

I will have to tell you I think they

are a lot more confident.

They think we are a lot

tougher, perhaps they wish we weren't so tough.

I think generally the confidence level in what we
are doing in the attest area is higher that it

has every been.
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I think the perception as to whether or not

confidence has eroded is coming initially from the
Congressman who says: "You have got to do something

about an Equity Funding."

Everyone is upset because

there have been failures.

There will continue to

be some failures because we are in a people business,
and there will be judgmental mistakes.

Our job is

to minimize them.

The important thing is not to try to narrow
the capabilities that reside in the firms.

We must

try to satisfy ourselves that we have the control

procedures within the firm, the checks and the balances
to be satisfied that we are giving the greatest
protection to the stockholders.

That is the key,

and to the extent that we can minimize the failures,

the confidence level will go up.

MR. McCLOY:

Keep your eye on the third

party suits, too.
MR. AUERBACH:

Absolutely.

They are

beginning to bother us more than ever.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I have two questions.

One, you have emphasized, as many of the large firms
and others, how much the proscription would hurt

the smaller firms.

Accepting the premise that there would be

some proscriptions, do you think you could
differentiate and say they should not apply to small
firms?

MR. AUERBACH:

The problem becomes one of

the ease with which you can define what is being done.
When the smaller firm provides consultation to a
client, it is on a very broad, informal ongoing
kind of basis. We set up a separate department,
and we begin to identify the particular departments

that provide specific management consulting services.
When you proscribe any service for a big firm, I
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don’t think you could say that a small firm can
perform the same service in respect of a public

client.

I just don’t think you can differentiate

that way, because then you get to the problem

of at what point does one become big and at what
point is he small.

I think the biggest problem is one of
defining what it is that the small accountant does.

I can tell you what the tendency will be.

The

tendency will be to pretty much ignore what the
small firm does in the sense of not bothering

with them, and maybe from the public point of
view that is all right.
I am trying to give you the practice

answer even with respect to proscription.

I think

the likelihood is that there won’t be too much

bothering with the small firms.

PROFESSOR CARY:

The other question I

had was the one I asked Mr. Vanatta, and I am

going to ask every major firm that is very widely
involved.
What is your reaction to proposals of

merger with Booz, Allen and McKinsey and major
geological engineering firms or what-have-you?
MR. AUERBACH:

I know one thing.

The

lawyers won't let us alone.
I would say again that you have to examine
each situation.

If, for example, we were to get involved
very much in replacement costs or fair values
and some of the similar determinations, and the

accountants are asked to take responsibility for

some of the evaluations that are going to go into
financial statements, somebody might convince me

that maybe I ought to have some appraisal competency
within the firm.
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PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. AUERBACH:

This may come.
It may come, and I say let’s

not try to decide right now what is appropriate.

I

think when the circumstances come up, if one concludes

that it makes sense from the point of view of being

responsive to a need and consistent with the
responsibility you are being asked to assume, we

may decide we need a new kind of competency on

board that is going to make us comfortable.

So I

say, I would want to deal with it in the circumstances

when the situation or the responsibility is presented
to us.

Then I want to say: How do I best respond

and deal with it?
MR. GARRETT:

Norm, isn’t there any need

to preserve some proportion in such situations?

I

mean, is there any danger in the attest function,
of the auditing becoming ancillary to the sale of

some other service?
MR. AUERBACH:

of that is very slim.

I would say the likelihood

I happen to believe that the

profession is on the threshold of tremendous expansion
in the auditing function, and I look particularly at
the government area because I think that is where

it will come first.
The GAO is sort of leading the way in
getting involved in performance auditing.

That is,

the auditing of government expenditures not from

the point of view of the accountability for the

dollar spent, but whether the purpose of the
expenditure as identified and prescribed was ever
achieved.

More and more, auditing is taking on a
perspective that is much broader than we here are

trying to define.

I think we have to respect the

fact that this is coming, and as one gets involved

in performance auditing you will need special
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competencies just as the GAO draws upon many

competencies to perform what it considers to be
a very important auditing task.

We are not there yet, and we are certainly
not there in the private sector, but in the government

sector we are going to see it, and it is going to come

soon.
MR. GARRETT:

So you are saying even if it

might be an evil for the audit function to be a

sort of throw in, along with the sale of other
services, the practical likelihood of that occurring
is so remote that we don’t have to worry about it.
MR. AUERBACH:

It is very remote, very

remote.
PROFESSOR CARY:

What you are saying really

is the attest function may become much broader.

Is

that it?

MR. AUERBACH:

That is correct.

I do believe

that.

PROFESSOR CARY:

On that premise, then, you

need persons on your staff to analyze performance in

a broad way.
MR. AUERBACH:

In a broad way.

I think that

is true.

PROFESSOR CARY:

That has not yet been quite

clearly articulated by anybody before, and I just

think it is an interesting thing.

Is the accounting profession, as a whole,
your Big Eight, for example, are you pushing toward

a performance audit?
MR. AUERBACH:

I will be honest with you.

The last thing the private sector would want—I am

talking about American industry—is to have the auditors

go around pushing for the opportunity to opine in
respect of their performance from that point of view.
I am not running after that.

(Laughter)
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But in

the government area, I think is the area in which

you have an entirely different situation.

You have got that third party out there,
the public, who is very interested.

And they are

going to look to the accountants, and the GAO is
not going to be able to do it for the whole country,

not at the state and local level.

They do it to

a degree at the national level, and even there they

are not competent, or capable, or big enough.
MR. WOOD:

There is one big difference

that Congress can’t fire the fellow who is wasting
the money; we can in business, and the accountability

factor in the private enterprise and the government
are just two totally different things.
MR. AUERBACH:
I respect that.

Two different worlds, and

That is why I say I think the avenue

and the direction come from the government area, and

there it is important.

MR. WOOD:

I just want to slow down my

friend, Bill Cary.
PROFESSOR CARY:

Their premise is performance

and if they start with that, then they say because

performance is gaining, therefore, we need all this

variety of skills, so I am trying to get down to
their logic because I am not for it at all.
MR. GARRETT:

What we really need is the

legal audit, Bill, you know that.
MR. WOOD:

(Laughter)

Back to the actuarial services,

are we really talking about MAS or MS when you are
providing actuarial services:

Is it advisory service?

MR. AUERBACH:
Sure.
MR. WOOD: Or isn't it management service?

MR. AUERBACH:

MR. WOOD:

No.

You go and tell an insurance

company what its reserves ought to be on either
casualty and liability claims or on life.
Isn't that
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a management service?

MR. AUERBACH:

No, I think I draw a

distinction in the sense that you will discuss with

management the approach to the determination of the
figure, and they will come to an agreement, but
overriding that is the profession judgment which

you, as a professional, have to exercise that you

are satisfied with the conclusion that has been

reached.

There is a difference.
MR. WOOD:

Thank you.

MR. GARRETT:

Finally, would you associate

yourselves with Mr. Vanatta's recommendation that

the peer review expressly include some examination

of the role played in the performance of management
advisory services?

MR. AUERBACH:

I would have no problem with

that at all.
MR. GARRETT:

You would agree that the role

could be such as to impair independence?
MR. AUERBACH:

MR. GARRETT:

I don’t quite—

All right.

The role is the

term that one of the other speakers used in this, I

guess Mr. Arnstein, in this respect, but that
management advisory services could become what Mr.
Wood was talking about.

That is, participation in

management or operation.
MR. AUERBACH:

I think as a matter of policy

we as a firm are very careful—
MR. GARRETT:

MR. AUERBACH:

I am sure you are.
—that management services

don’t become
MR. GARRETT: The suggestion was that that
is a danger area and peer review should look into it.
MR. AUERBACH:

I have no problem with peer

review looking into it.

I am comfortable as to what

they would conclude.
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MR. GARRETT:

Very good.

We are only a half hour late the first half
day.

Should we take an hour for lunch and convene
at 1:30?

(The hearing recessed at 12:30 o’clock.)
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THURSDAY AFTERNOON SESSION
August 17, 1978
The hearing reconvened at 1:40 o’clock with

Mr. Garrett presiding.
MR. GARRETT:

May we come to order, please.

There are several that are interested in the

transcripts, and what is going to be in them.

You should

know that people that have made statements will be
given an opportunity to correct the first copy of the
transcript before the official transcript is finally

settled upon.
Mr. Keating, will you please proceed.

MR. RICHARD C. KEATING:
Keating.

My name is Richard

I am an officer of A. S. Hansen, Inc.

A. S.

Hansen is a consulting firm with approximately 500

employees operating out of 22 offices.

We provide

actuarial services to about 3,000 pension plans most

of which are subject to the provisions of the Employees
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

We have previously submitted written comments
to the Securities and Exchange Commission in which we
asserted that there was a self audit involved in a CPA

firm providing actuarial services to its audit clients

which could present a conflict of interest and a threat

to independence.

In the comments we quoted certain

luminaries within the accounting profession who held

the same view.

There has been public concern about the
management advisory services provided by some CPA
firms.

This concern has been expressed by individuals,

by the media, and in the Halls of Congress.

Evidently

the concern has been serious enough and broad enough

to provoke these hearings.
My purpose today is not to repeat what we
have said but to comment on some of the reason or
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rationalization that has been put forth by persons

who would put no restrictions on the activity of CPA

firms, or at least no restrictions on what they are
presently doing.
An argument is that there is no hard

evidence of an audit being impaired by advisory

activity.

What this means is that if impairment

has occurred we don’t know about it.

An audit

impairment or a lack of independence is not something

we would ordinarily find out about.
extremely subtle.

It could be

It would have to be dug out.

Is

it necessary to wait for a scandal?

I believe that most businessmen, and
especially most businessmen charged with the
administration of pension plans, are honest.

I

believe that most auditors are honest and ethical
and competent.

I believe that most actuaries are

honest and ethical and competent.

The point is

that not all are—or we don't know that all are.
Even if there has been no impropriety there is
Hence the role and

opportunity for impropriety.

reason for being of the auditor.

What we have here is the old theological
concept of the proximate occasion of sin.

In the

old theology this is something to be avoided.

If we consider a firm offering the whole
panoply of MAS being offered by CPA firms (not all
by any one firm), where for a client the firm has

been involved in the recruitment of managers, design
of systems, actuarial valuations, marketing service,

etc., and then auditing the client we cannot picture
Ceasar’s wife as the managing partner of such a

firm.

For public acceptance, the appearance of

independence must be preserved.
There is the argument that the services
are in the public interest, that they can be provided
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with competence and efficiency.

For some services

But for many services the offering

this may be true.

of such service is not filling a social void.
is purely an expansion and diversification.

It

The

service is already being provided competently and
efficiently through other sources.

In the actuarial realm, there is the
argument of the close interrelationship of accounting

and actuarial work, that they are logical extensions

of one another.

I won’t go into that because I have

reason to believe that that will be discussed further

in subsequent testimony.

With respect to actuarial service it is
argued that the provision of such service is proper

provided that management understands the principles
and implications of all that is involved.

In the

general case such understanding simply doesn't exist.
To assume that it exists in a particular case is
highly questionable.

In my practice I frequently attempt to
explain to management the principles and methods

going into pension costs; not because I have to but
I think I ought to.

At times I bring a lecture to a quick end
because I realize the client doesn't want to be

bothered.

He has other things to do.

also arises as to what is management.

The question
If some

middle manager understands, this is not Management.

On pages 22 and 23 of the Notice of these

hearings are listed the Employee Benefit Consulting

Services that an audit firm may properly do.
These services impinge heavily on the legal
area as well as the actuarial .
The list depends upon the concepts that
actuarial service for pension plans is something
that one can do from time to time and then walk
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away from, and that management is responsible for

actuarial determinations.

Both of these concepts

became obsolete in September of 1974.

It seems to

me that the actuary in presenting his work has to
assume the responsibility or at least significantly

Under ERISA the

share in the responsibility.

position of the enrolled actuary is a continuing one—

even to the point that if the sponsor or administrator
changes the enrolled actuary he must give a reason.

A main point of ERISA is to take away from management
the right and responsibility of making actuarial

There had been

determinations for pension plans.

alleged, and some real, abuses that the Reform

Act was supposed to take care of.

I appreciate the fact that the concern
of the SEC is the provision of information to investors

and shareholders.

However, any policy and rules

must be embedded in a larger social context.

Part

of this social context is the law of the land.
Overlooking pieces of this can cause confusion
to shareholders as well as plan participants

and the general public.

I also realize that it

is presently not necessary to report to shareholders
the same actuarial numbers as are embodied in the

ERISA Funding Standard Account.

However, it seems

clear from Committee Report that concordance in

reporting was the intent of Congress.
can also be plan participants.

Shareholders

Conflicting and

confusing numbers can only lead to more reform
legislation.

I thank you for the opportunity to present
this statement.

MR. KEATING:

Are there any questions?

MR. GARRETT:

Mr. McCloy.

MR. McCLOY:

The first item you referred

to was the self-review, I believe.
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There are a

number of services which accountants render.

I suppose

the chief example is the tax situation, the tax area.

There seems to be very little, at least as
far as I can understand, objection at this stage of

our history to accountants becoming involved in the

income tax situation, the preparation of returns and

what-not.
To the extent they engage in that tax service,
aren’t all accountants self-reviewing their own work

when they take into account the work of their tax

service, the effects of their tax service and the
attest that they make?
MR. KEATING:
service.

I am not an expert in tax

I am not really cognizant with all that is

involved in this.

I think as with other services,

there is some possibility of self-review.
MR. McCLOY:

I just say self-review per se

is not necessarily vicious or not necessarily an
argument against permitting the MAS.

give the example of tax service.

I will just

Maybe another

example would be the computer services that they
render.

To an extent, there is an element of self

review in areas whereby almost by common consent you
have already said that the accountant should have
freedom of action.

So in itself it doesn’t

necessarily condemn the offering of such services
by the accountants.

MR. KEATING:

Self-review always in itself,

to my mind, in any form, does to some degree interfere
with the audit function.
MR. McCLOY: Would you say it is determinative?
MR. KEATING: That self-review is determinative
MR. McCLOY:

The fact that there is a self

review, once you find there is any element of self

review, would you then abolish, would you then
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proscribe, any advisory service which has that element

in it?

MR. KEATING:

I think any service which has

that element in it is questionable.
proscribe it or not?

Whether I would

There are certain other issues

involved.
You mentioned the tax service situation.

It

is entirely possible—I am not asserting that this is
true—but it has been held that this is performing a
social service, an essential service, that is filling

a void, that the accountants are tax experts, and it

is highly efficient that they perform this service.

That might be taken into consideration as
one point, but to get back to your question, unless

there are extreme safeguards involved, the concept

of self-review is incompatible with audit.
MR. McCLOY:

It isn’t entirely so, is it,

because there are a number of things that the auditors
can do, or the accountants can do, or are accepted

now as doing.

No one really can object.

You wouldn’t

go so far as to say no accountant could make out a

return for a client anymore?
MR. KEATING:

MR. McCLOY:

No.
In the case of the tax return,

isn’t there some element of self-review?

I don't want to press the thing too far.
What I am trying to get at is the most serious, the
most important objection that the actuaries have to
the furnishing of actuarial service by the accountant

firm.

I just question whether the self-review
element is the chief objection.
MR. KEATING:
I believe it is. The accountant
working, doing tax work for a client, he then does not
turn around and audit that tax work.
entirely different.
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That is something

MR. McCLOY:

His work is such an important

element in the accuracy or the fairness of the statement

that he is in a sense reviewing, and I just wanted
to get what the real gravamen, what the real substantial
objection is on the part of the actuarial association.

What is the chief defect in permitting the accountants
who are retained, who are presumably as well equipped
or reasonably well equipped as actuaries to do the
work in connection with pension calculations and what-not.
MR. KEATING:

I believe the primary thing is

the self-audit.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Just to rephrase Mr. McCloy’s

question, assume that the accountant certifies a balance
sheet with a large tax liability.

What is the

difference between that and certification, or

attestation with respect to a large pension liability
on the balance sheet?

Aren’t they comparable in every

way, in that in both these is the element of self-review?
MR. KEATING:

You are saying that the

accountant has done all the work in preparing this tax

liability.

He signs off and says this is, in fact,

the case.

I think that in my response to Mr. McCloy,
I believe that there could be a problem there in the

interest of self-review.
PROFESSOR CARY:

MR. GARRETT:

Equally.

I understand your premise also

to be that you think it more often than not, at least,
that the accountant or auditor performing the actuarial
function with respect to the pension plan would be,
in fact, making the decision for management?
MR. KEATING:
In fact, yes, he would be

making the decision for management.

There are certain

rare circumstances that it might be otherwise, but by
law the actuary is required under ERISA to make the

decision with respect to actuarial assumptions, and
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actuarial procedures.

This falls upon the actuary,

and it cannot be shifted off upon management.
MR. GARRETT:

So that if the auditor is

playing that role, the enrolled actuary for an ERISA
plan, by law the decision is the auditor’s and not
management’s.

Is that right?

MR. KEATING:

That is right.

By law the

decision, the responsibility, is the actuary's.

person is wearing two hats.

The

He is wearing the actuary

hat when he comes under the law.

MR. GARRETT:

We didn’t inquire of any of

the auditing firm spokesmen this morning, but I

gather from what you say that the auditors do play
that role if they are offering actuarial service

because they go so far as to become the enrolled
actuary.
MR. KEATING:

It is my understanding that

it is the case that the employees of the auditing
firm are the enrolled actuaries for certain plans,
yes.
MR. GARRETT:

If that is not true, I am

sure we will be straightened out.
MR. KEATING:

That is true.

MR. GARRETT:

If there are some people

that don't think it is true, I am sure we will hear
about that, too.

MR. MANZONI:

To what extent do auditors

now question your actuarial determinations or review
them?
MR. KEATING:

Actually, they do not

question our actuarial determinations to the point
of arguing with us about them.
I hope the

treatment becomes a bit more uniform.
questionnaires from auditing firms.

We receive

We receive

lists of data that we are asked to check and

respond.

Is this what was actually used in the
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calculation?

The lists vary by firm and ask some

very pointed questions.

First of all, is an enrolled actuary doing
the job?

What are his credentials and so forth?

And

then questions as to the method, procedure, assumptions.
We routinely answer these questions.
get further questions and we respond to them.

We
What

is done with all this information, I do not know, but
there is a review typically with respect to the content

of the figures we put out for funding a plan for ERISA

or also for reporting to shareholders under the P & L.
MR. MANZONI:

If auditing standards did not

require auditors to do anything other than determine
what your competence was and rely upon the work that
you did as an expert, would you have any problem with

auditors performing actuarial services?
In that context there doesn't seem to be

any review, so consequently, there couldn't be any
self-review.

They just perform separate specialized

service.
MR. KEATING:

I think there is the self

review, or the danger, as I mentioned, of impropriety
there.
MR. MANZONI:

you.

That presumes that they review

What if the auditing standards didn't require

an auditor to review the actuarial assumptions and
determinations in the first place but simply to audit

what the actuary did as an expert?

MR. McCLOY:

They may rely on their own

actuary in one case and they have relied on outsiders
in the other.
MR. KEATING:

We have the circumstance that

in reliance on an expert the auditor, as I understand

it, is supposed to satisfy himself with the competence

at least of the expert and he is satisfying himself
with the competence of his own expert.
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MR. GARRETT:

I believe that is it.

you very much, Mr. Keating.

Thank

We appreciate your

coming.
Next we have Mr. Boynton, Mr. Gustafson and

Mr. Latto all for the American Academy of Actuaries.

Gentlemen, will you identify yourselves for
the benefit of the Board.
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MR. EDWIN F. BOYNTON:

I am Mr. Boynton;

to my right is Mr. Latto and to my left is Mr.

Gustafson.
By way of background as individuals, Mr.
Gustafson and I are officers of the Academy in a

volunteer capacity.

For the past twenty-five years

I have been a pension consultant with a consulting
firm.

Mr. Gustafson's background is principally

in life insurance and is Vice President and Actuary

for a large mutual insurance company.
The Academy itself was formed in 1965 as

an umbrella organization to bring together into one
body the actuarial profession in the United States.
There are presently about 4,500 members of the Academy,
out of approximately 7,000 members of the four

national actuarial organizations that are under
the same Academy umbrella.

The difference in

numbers results from experience requirement to
become a Member of the Academy.
That sounds like a small number compared

to the American Institute of CPAs.

It is, but it

does represent a very substantial percentage of the

qualified actuaries in the United States.

We have filed a rather lengthy written
statement, and we have also prepared a summary
statement.

That is also too long to read, so I am

going to try to summarize the summary.
In our principal statement, Part I sets
forth our position that an independent audit cannot

be conducted where some of the items in the financial

statement being evaluated constitute or result from
work performed originally by an actuary who is

employed or affiliated with the auditor.

It is

the self-review question that you have heard so much

about today.
In our written statement, we deal at some
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length with the findings of the Cohen Commission.

In this regard, and in Part II of our statement,
we have discussed the practical application of the
AICPA prohibition against the auditor effectively
becoming part of management.

We think the concept

is a sound one, but the real question is in its

application.

It is evident to us that the central

application of this concept means that whether you

call a relationship advising, assisting or helping,
the proper test is whether the actuary, in fact,

repeatedly provides or takes a position on the
recommendation that becomes part of the management

decision.

This does not mean, of course, that

management should not obtain ongoing counsel.

It

is just we don’t think we should obtain it from

his independent CPA.
Part III starts from the premise, as

stipulated in the proposal, that CPA firms in SEC

practice would be limited to management advisory

services that call for the use of accounting and
auditing-related skills.

We take no position

as to whether such restrictions are necessary or
desirable.

If it is imposed, however, we believe

the proposal is in error in asserting that

accounting and actuarial skills are significantly

related.

We show in the third part of our statement

that while there is some partial overlap in certain
of the elementary subjects (introductory statistics

and statistics) there is none at all in the much

larger set of advanced subjects, the subjects that
are critical to professional qualification. So
the two skills, in fact, require almost totally

different education and training and are not

significantly related.
In Part IV we apply the concepts of self

review, management decision-making and related skills
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to specific services that are listed in the insurance
and employee benefit sections of the proposal.

I will comment first on self-review.

It

all boils down to the fact that it is difficult
for us to conceive how it can be claimed that any
firm could review its own work and assert that such

review is independent.

The position taken in the

proposal is parallel to the position taken by the
AICPA Ethics Committee in its accounting services

interpretation of the independence requirement, and

that interpretation has been rejected by the SEC
as not meeting the independence requirement.

The

Commission stated its opinion that an accountant

cannot objectively audit the books and records which

he has maintained for a client, since it ultimately
places the accountant in the position of evaluating

and attesting to his own record keeping.

We believe

that principle should be extended to the provision

of actuarial services in the same fashion, perhaps
even to a greater degree.

The proposal before the Board makes it

clear that independence requires both integrity

and objectivity.

In assessing the circumstances

that impose obstacles to objectivity, however,

the proposal pays attention only to relationships

between the CPA firm and the client that can have
such an effect.

Where the involvement then is

too close or too constant, or where there is a

financial relationship, objectivity is said to
be impaired.

What the proposal fails to recognize

is the classic principle that one cannot be
objective about his or her own work.

Even where

a CPA firm has been scrupulous in giving advice,

and only advice, and can ensure that all significant

decisions are, as a practice matter, made by
management, it is still the case that where the
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advice is taken and acted upon, or even been given

and rejected by the client, the independent

evaluation that the public has the right to believe

is an intrinsic part of an audit will be lacking.
The persons involved in the audit will know in

advance that a position on the determinations has
been taken by one of their colleagues and will
therefore not be capable of providing a truly

independent check.

It has been argued by some accountants
that an auditor, who has the necessary integrity

and competence, will in practice make a wholly
satisfactory evaluation of work done initially

by an employee or colleague.

It is also asserted

that there is no "evidence" whatever to the
contrary.

This misses the point entirely.

The

identical argument could be made to support
permitting auditors to have a moderate direct
financial interest in a client.

Of course,

integrity and competence are extremely important.
Experience has taught us, however, that objectivity
and disinterest are also essential qualities in

a person who reviews and evaluates the work of others.

And, the proposal is unequivocal in stating that
both independence and the appearance of independence

are essential to public acceptance of the auditor’s

work.

The effort to justify and reconcile self

review and objectivity appears to be contrived

and should be rejected.

I would like to comment also on the
statements that are being made that the accounting

firms do not really audit the work of specialists.
In the narrow sense, in the very narrow sense of

the word, "audit" that in terms of accounting for

the number of securities in the safe deposit box
and that kind of thing, that may be true.
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They

do not generally get deeply involved in "number

checking" as it relates to actuarial work.
However, in any reasonably broad sense

of the word, "audit," they certainly do get involved
in it.
As a pension actuary I have filled out

17 page questionnaires regarding actuarial assumptions

and the source of the assumptions for auditing firms.
We know of cases where auditing firms
have come in an independently done separate valuations

of a pension plan, even without the knowledge of the
client until after the fact.

assumptions.

They have challenged

They have come in and done what amounts

to a very thorough audit in some cases.
In the case of insurance company work, the

firm I work has a group or division that handles

the insurance company side of our business.

One

major part of that business is assisting CPA firms

who do not have their own staff actuaries in reviewing
the actuarial reserves of life companies.

So I think

it is very misleading to say that they do not "audit"
the work of the specialist.

It is a different kind

of review, but the fact is there is a review.

There

has to be a review because the auditor is responsible
for signing off on the bottom line.

He is giving

his opinion on the financial statement of the company,
and he necessarily has to take that responsibility.

The question of whether actuarial services
should be barred for other reasons requires consideration

of separate issues posed by the Proposal—specifically,

the issues of management decisions being made by the

audit firm and related skills.

The key to a

determination as to whether the audit firm is involved

in management functions is of course, a practice
question of the extent to which its recommendations,
by and large, over time, are sought or put into
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effect.

Also pertinent to this determination is the

interpretation of "continuous involvement."

For

example, in the typical pension plan there is an

annual valuation.

If the actuary employed by the

CPA firm carries out that annual valuation once

a year—that is, if he is responsible for all the
actuarial valuations—it seems to us that that is

a continuous involvement even though it may be done
on a more sporadic basis.

It has been pointed out previously, and

I want to emphasize, in terms of this management
decision question, that in the pension field, for
example, the Enrolled Actuary must give his opinion

that the actuarial assumptions represent his best
estimate of the long-range experience of the plan.

It is the Enrolled Actuary of the plan who must
approve and provide an opinion on the assumptions.
Management has the prerogative of firing that

actuary if he does not agree with him and them
must explain to the Labor Department why he did

so.

One might debate whether the actuary or

management has the final control over actuarial

assumptions, but it is clear that the actuary
making the determination of minimum funding
requirements under ERISA is deeply involved in
the management decision process.

He has a legal

obligation to do so under ERISA.

In addition,

if the actuary employed by the CPA firm makes

original determinations, which are then subject

to review in a firm audited in response to a SEC
firm, we again have a clear case of self-review.
With respect to the question of related
skills, we think that consideration of the

training requirements involved in qualifying
to practice as a member of the actuarial profession
demonstrates the significant difference in the
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skills used by actuaries and those by CPAs.

Actuarial examinations in the necessary disciplines

typically cover some 40 hours of testing, which

is almost twice as much as for a CPA, covering
9 examinations over a multi-year period, all of which,
save for some elementary material, is material foreign

to CPA exams.
The "bottom line" of the proposal comes down

to the application of certain principles enumerated
in the Proposal to six specific proposed services,

and we will focus only on the two which affect the
actuarial profession.
In analyzing the Proposal’s Scope of Services

criteria related to actuarial skills we have applied
the three tests.

One is the self-review concept;

secondly, the management decision-making concept;
and third, related skills.

We strongly endorse the prohibition on self

review by auditors.

We agree with the AICPA

admonitions against an auditor’s involvement in
management decision-making.

As far as the related

skills test is concerned, we take no position as to

whether or not this is a legitimate test of the scope

of services, but we will point out the implications
of applying this test to the provision for actuarial

services by CPA firms.
Our general conclusion, after reviewing the

list of actuarial services which the AICPA has
concluded as permissible for a CPA firm to offer,

is that most of the permitted services are in direct
conflict with the principles stated by the Proposal

that should guide the decision on services which

may be offered.

We have analyzed the specific

proposals made, and I won't repeat that analysis
here.

These comments deal with the details of why

we think many of the provisions for services are
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inconsistent with the underlying principles.

It appears to us that the list of permissible
actuarial services is for the most part a list of

current practices of CPA firms providing actuarial
services and is inconsistent with the basic principles
and state limitations on such services which are set
forth in the Proposal.

If the AICPA position regarding related
skills should be changed, I would modify our comments
to a significant degree because many of the services
that are under consideration would have to be rejected

by the related skills test.

We appreciate the opportunity to be heard,
and we will try to answer any questions you may have.

MR. GARRETT:
MR. McCLOY:

Questions.
I will put the same question I

did to your predecessor about the tax service.

There

the element of self-review is present but nobody really
seriously, I gather at this point, is suggesting that

the accountant should not be able to render the tax
service that they are now rendering or have been

rendering for the last ten or twenty years or more.
So that I raise the question again whether self-review

is per se an impediment or an obstacle here to

objectivity or independence.
MR. BOYNTON:

I guess I really can’t speak

for the Academy as far as whether or not CPA firms

should provide tax services.

It is not our bailgame,

but certainly the same principles, we feel, would
control, which means that if the CPA firm was deeply

involved in the preparation and determination of
taxes and then turned around and audited them, I think

they would still be subject to the same criticism.
MR. McCLOY: You want to proscribe it?
MR. BOYNTON:

Right.

I think the

fundamental thing is that self-review is hard to
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reconcile with the concept of independence.

How can

anyone review their own work and call it independence?

It just boggles the mind as to how you can reach that

conclusion.
There may be instances of minor things that
are not important enough to make an issue of, but we

feel that with respect to any material facts in the
statement you cannot claim to be independent when you

are reviewing your own work.
MR. WOOD:

point.

I asked a question on this very

Would not a CPA firm be much better qualified

to review the actuary’s work, assuming you did it for
the client, if it has on its staff experts in actuarial

practice?
MR. BOYNTON:

Yes.

Let me make it clear; we

are not saying that accounting firms should not employ

actuaries and use them in the audit function or use
them in other areas.

I believe where we would draw the line is

when the actuary is involved with the preparation of

material being subject to the auditor's opinion, and
the same actuary—or the same firm is involved, both

in the original determination and in the audit.
Then we think there is a violation of independence
requirements, but we have no quarrel with the concept,

that an accounting firm that, say, audits life
companies regularly would be well advised to have
actuarial competence either on their own staff, or
calling in other consulting actuaries to review their
reserves.

They must, "sign off" on the entire

statement .

MR. LARRY J. LATTO:

Just to amplify that

slightly, there are actuarial services which can be
rendered by an accounting firm to an audit client,

but where the nature of those services are such that
the results do not find their way to the balance
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sheet, there is no reason at all, dealing only with

the self-review concept, why there could be any
objection to that, and there is no objection to it

on the part of the Academy when dealing with the
question of self-review because those determinations

do not find themselves subject to review.
So it is useful to have that actuarial
capability.

No objection is made to that.

MR. BOYNTON:

I think there was a question

asked earlier by Mr. Manzoni, I believe, and I would
like to respond to it.

I think he posed a hypothetical

question as if there was total reliance upon the
actuary, and the accountant did not question the work

of the actuary.

If we assume he was allowed by SAS-11

or by AICPA Guides to rely upon the work of the

qualified actuary, we have no quarrel with the concept
of the accounting firm providing the basic actuarial

There is no review involved.

services.

It is an

acceptance of the work of a qualified actuary.
MR. MANZONI:

As a user of financial

statements, do you think auditors should audit
actuarial determinations, or should they be permitted

to rely on actuaries in that particular area?
MR. BOYNTON:

As a professional actuary, and

I am speaking for myself now, since I don't know that

the Academy has taken a position, I would like to see
reliance on the professional, yes.

MR. McCLOY:
MR. BOYNTON:
MR. McCLOY:

You would like to see?

Reliance.
Didn't Mr. Keating say that

the accountants generally did rely upon the actuarial

opinion in the case where there was an outside actuarial
judgment? That his experience was that the accountants

There wasn't an element of review in that

did rely.
situation.

MR. BOYNTON:
widely.

The practice varies rather

In any event, there is a review.
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The degree

of the review, the extent of the review varies widely.
Some firms will go through a pro forma kind of
questionnaire.

They send you a short letter.

Others go into a great deal of depth.

We have other

cases we know of where there has been great analysis

of the actuarial assumptions by the reviewing firm.
I think in Mr. Keating’s case and as

in my own case, we both work for rather large,

prominent, nationally known firms.

We are a lot

less likely to be challenged than will the small,
independent actuary.
MR. McCLOY:

But your point is that in

every case there is an element of review.
MR. BOYNTON:

There is an element of review.

The degree varies.

MR. McCLOY:
MR. BOYNTON:

It is only as to competence.

Well, in some cases it goes

well beyond just the competence area.
MR. McCLOY:

But that is an element of review

to review the competence, I suppose.
With this educational business, what
difference does it make how many hours the accountants

are subject to examination in distinction to the

qualification for the actuaries?

If the people that

are employed by the accountants are actuaries, they

have to pass that examination.

If they are actuaries, yes,

MR. BOYNTON:

but we were saying the basic—
MR. McCLOY:

I understand the position is

that they do have qualified actuaries.

The point is that the
educational program for actuaries and accountants is
MR. BOYNTON:

quite different.

Someone trained as a CPA is not—

MR. McCLOY:

I understand that.

MR. GUSTAFSON:

I would like to make a

comment on your question that you have asked several
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times, Mr. McCloy, on the Federal income tax and tax

services provided by accounting firms, and this is a
thought that has just occurred to me here at this

hearing.

Is it significant in the probing questions

that you have been asking that Federal income tax,

uniquely Federal income tax, is subject to an

additional audit through the IRS review itself?
That isn’t an identical

MR. McCLOY:

situation.
MR. GUSTAFSON:

That is not directly

comparable to some of the others.

PROFESSOR CARY: The IRS audit would be

years later when the statements will be out.
MR. GUSTAFSON:

But it is inexorable.

(Laughter)
MR. GARRETT:

But it also involves how much

you reserve against how much you are going to lose.
It is auditing judgment.

(Laughter)

MR. WOOD:

I have another question too, Ray.

Do you have any objection in the Academy
to a CPA firm providing actuarial services to a nonaudit client?

MR. GUSTAFSON:
MR. BOYNTON:
MR. WOOD:

None.

No.

No professional pride here.

MR. BOYNTON:

We try to be consistent.

MR. GARRETT:

You don’t like it, but you

have no objection to it.
MR. GUSTAFSON:

not like it.

(Laughter)
I wouldn’t even say I did

I have no objection to it whatsoever.

MR. GARRETT: Those were my words.
MR. WOOD: So then, in effect, your whole

argument here deals with an issue of the auditing
profession and the Congressional interest in it.

You are saying, in effect, that if it is a non-audit

client, then Peat, Marwick can come in and do a fine
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actuarial job, but if it happens to be an audit
client, oh, no.

So aren’t you really here giving

an opinion on an auditing issue?

You are talking about self-review.

know, that is your number one problem.

You

Continuity

of service.
The actuarial profession

MR. BOYNTON:

itself has looked at the independence question and
has its own guidelines which do not allow for self

review.

That is one reason we are here, because

the interface where this comes up most frequently

is with the accounting profession.

That it

actuaries working for accounting firms.

Tell me more about the

MR. GARRETT:

actuarial profession.

or are they?

They are not licensed,

Do you have to be qualified in some

official way, for example, to be an Enrolled
Actuary under ERISA?

MR. BOYNTON:

Under ERISA, yes, you enroll

before a Joint Board, which is a government board.
MR. GARRETT:

This is new then, isn’t it?

MR. BOYNTON:

Since 1974.

It is the first

statutory recognition in the pension field.
When you get to the insurance company side,
which is controlled by states, the NAIC standard
blank now requires—maybe Mr. Gustafson should
answer that.

MR. GUSTAFSON:
you are wrong.
MR. BOYNTON:

I will just stop you if
—that the statutory blank

have an opinion by a qualified actuary, and that
generally is defined by most states as a Member of

the American Academy of Actuaries or some other
person deemed qualified by the Commission of the
state.

So the two principal legal recognitions are

in the NAIC requirements for the statutory blank
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and ERISA for pensions.
Does the Academy administer

MR. GARRETT:

an examination?
The Academy itself does not

MR. BOYNTON:

administer an examination.

organizations does.

One of the affiliated

The primary educational and

testing body id the Society of Actuaries.

The Society

is a much older organization and it has long been
giving examinations.

They are the educational,

research, testing organization.
MR. GARRETT:
MR. McCLOY:

That is not governmental.

No state or government, Federal

government examination?
MR. BOYNTON:

There is now a Federal

government examination to become an enrolled actuary.

MR. McCLOY:

That is the 40-hour thing that

you are talking about?
MR. BOYNTON:

No.

The Joint Board exam is

a one-day affair just on pension mathematics basically.

The Society of Actuaries examinations cover a whole
field of life insurance, accident and health, pensions.
In addition, there is another organization, also
within the umbrella of the Academy, called the

Casualty Actuarial Society, which gives comparable
examinations in the casualty insurance field.
MR. GARRETT:

Does the degree of self

review vary significantly between, say, insurance
and pension plan services?
MR. BOYNTON:

Probably more heavily in the

insurance company area.
MR. GARRETT: Of course, an insurance
company would have to have an in-house actuary,

or would it?
MR. BOYNTON:
MR. GARRETT:

No.
Does not have to have.

The

NAIC requirement does not require that the actuary be
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an employee of the insurance company?
MR. BOYNTON:

Many of the consulting

No.

firms have very large departments or divisions that
consult with small life companies.

I don’t know

what the count is, but there are 1,800 life companies.

MR. GUSTAFSON:

About 300 of them have

their own in-house actuarial staffs.

The others use outside

MR. GARRETT:

firms?

MR. GUSTAFSON:

Yes.

Do some of them use accounting

MR. GARRETT:

firms for that purpose?
MR. BOYNTON:

Yes.

MR. MATUSIAK:

Did you say that the Academy

has an independence standard for consultants?

We are in the process of

MR. BOYNTON:

developing additions to our Guides for Professional

Conduct.

The profession had a study by a committee

which extended over a couple year period.

Mr.

Gustafson was a member of that committee.

It came

back with recommendations regarding independence of
the actuary.

The principles were adopted by the

boards of the various organizations, and now they
are in the process of being implemented by the

organizations.
MR. MATUSIAK:

Would it follow then that

any member of the Academy would have to prohibit

himself from doing what Mr. Keating said that he

often had to do, namely, make management decisions?
MR. BOYNTON: No, the independence
requirements do not get into the management decisions
category.

MR. MATUSIAK:

How is independence then

defined or could be defined?
MR. LATTO:

The circumstances under which

independence would be required will be different.
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There is no requirement, as there is not now, that
a financial statement be certified by an independent
actuary.

There is no suggestion that there will

be a requirement that an actuary must be independent

of, say, the company for which he is working or a

consulting actuary must be independent of a company
for which he is doing work.

There will not be a comparable requirement
as part of the independence rules of the Academy.
But it will be permitted to

MR. MATUSIAK:

make management decisions as Mr. Keating said he has

to do.
MR. LATTO:

There is no suggestion that

there will be any change in what is going on now in
that an actuary frequently finds himself involved in

management decisions.

Under those circumstances,

independence will not be required.
MR. GUSTAFSON:

May I comment on that, too.

The distinction that was made by this study group

based the distinction on the difference between an

initial actuarial determination and an actuarial

review.
We opined that independence is not required
for a determination; that is, a management decision—
the state of actuarial opinion that I append to my

company's financial statement.

But in the review

function where an actuary is asked to review another
actuary's work and that is done on occasions on life

insurance company statements, most especially in

purchase and merger situations, then we identify that

independence must be present in the review function,
so there was the distinction that we made.
MR. WOOD: Can Arthur Stedry Hansen's
partners own stock in the company through which they
are performing actuarial service?

MR. GUSTAFSON:

Unless they are involved
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in review.

I guess I don't know.

You answer that one.

There is no prohibition against

MR. BOYNTON:
it.

They may.

MR. LATTO:
MR. WOOD:

So if they decided to compromise

their standards and reduce the funding requirements

for their pension plan by 15 or 20 million dollars.

If they are not in the reviewing

MR. LATTO:

situation, they may be part of management.

They may

be employed—having a financial interest is no

different than being employed.

requirement in that case.

There is no independence

It is only when there is

a review.

MR. WOOD:

The CPAs don't let you own stock

in the company.
MR. BOYNTON:

The CPAs are in an audit

situation.

There is a distinction.

Most of my work

is directly with clients making original determinations.

We are not generally doing audit work.

MR. WOOD.

It seems to me the original

determination is more serious than the review.

There is no requirement that

MR. GUSTAFSON:

an accountant that is employed by a company be
independent of the company, and he makes the original
determination .

PROFESSOR CARY:

I have a question that is

total naive, but we run into numerous examples of

so-called busted audits, frauds and that sort of thing.
Are there any examples of gross mistakes
in actuarial determinations which have led to litigation

and the like?
MR. BOYNTON:

The case that pops in mind

immediately is the name just whispered to me, which
is Equity Funding.
It was not really a gross actuarial

mistake.

It was just deceit.
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The mistake was not an

MR. GUSTAFSON:
accident.

(Laughter)
PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. BOYNTON:

I didn’t think of that.

Nothing comes to mind, any

prominent case at all of that kind of situation.
MR. MANZONI:

Did Congress require enrolled

actuaries to get involved in pension plans.

Are you

aware of any legislative history that suggests there

needed to be some regulation there?
MR. BOYNTON:

We endorsed the idea of having

competent actuaries work with pension plans.
Mr. Manzoni:

I don't know.

Were there any

cases brought before?
MR. BOYNTON:

No.

In fact, when we were

discussing it with staff people, that was one response:
Everything has been running fine so far.

Why?

One

of the problems is that pension liabilities, long-term

cost, do not emerge for many, many years, and the growth
in pensions has really taken off in the last now 30

years.

But it takes so long for a pension plan to

mature and the growth has been so phenomenal the

last several years that mistakes—I will be retired
before my mistakes catch up with me, I hope.
MR. McCLOY:

There were some pretty bad

actuarial mistakes in connection with that Social

Security legislation.
MR. BOYNTON:

(Laughter)

I prefer not to comment on

that as President of the Academy.
MR. GARRETT:
I think we had better move
on.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

We appreciate

your coming.
Now Mr. Watson and Mr. Daskais.

of Actuaries in Public Practice.
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Conference

MR. CHARLES B. H. WATSON:

Good afternoon,

My name is Charles Barry Watson, and I am

gentlemen.

President of the Conference of Actuaries in Public
Practice.
Seated on my right is Richard Daskais.

Both

Mr. Daskais and I are members of independent firms

of consulting actuaries and have substantial consulting
experience.
The Conference did submit to you a written

statement and, as a matter of fact, I handed to Mr.

Matusiak this afternoon another version of it.

I can

assure you that this new version essentially corrects
typographical errors and amplifies a few points.

It

is not intended to change the tenor of the statement.
Mr. Daskais was Chairman of the Conference
Committee which drafted that statement, and he is here

today in that capacity.

Since you have received our statement, I

do not intend to read it or even to summarize it
in depth.

I would, however, like to comment on some

of the points which are brought out in the statement.

I might say first of all, just to establish
the background, that the Conference of Actuaries
in Public Practice is one of the actuarial organizations
in the United States which was referred to in the

previous statement as being affiliated with the
American Academy of Actuaries and which joined in
its founding.
We presently have somewhat over 600 members.

Nearly all those members are also members of the
American Academy of Actuaries, but we are a specialist
organization.

Our members are actuaries engaged in

public practice, and that means in most cases engaged

in the practice of giving consulting advice on pension

and employee benefit plans and to life insurance

companies.

Therefore, we have a very direct interest
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in the matters which are before you this afternoon.

This is why we have asked for the opportunity to

make a statement.
I might add that the statements of our
two organizations—the Conference and the Academy—
were developed quite independently.

For my own

part, though, having just seen the Academy statement
today, I find nothing inconsistent in that statement

from what the Conference has said.
Unfortunately, though, there is a certain
degree of repetition in the two statements.

I

apologize for this, but that is what happens when
separate statements are developed by groups with

similar concerns.
The major question which concerns us, as

it has concerned the two previous testifiers, is
the matter of self-review, or, if you wish, the

matter of independence.
We have been basically told, and we have
seen in the regulations and in the various

pronouncements of the AICPA and others, that much
of this concern about the possibility of self-review
arising when the auditor makes use of a specialist
who works for the auditing firm is removed or

alleviated if the client is able to appreciate
the significance of the advice given by that

specialist, if he is able to have an informed

judgment on what the specialist has done and therefore
in essence, embraces that work as his own.

So, therefore, the client makes the decision

and it is his decision, and this presumably eliminates
the question of whether there can be self-review,

because it is the client's decision that is being
audited.

It may be true that, for the purpose of
reaching a decision in the most elementary sense,
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it is sufficient that the client appreciates the

significance of the advice he has been given and

He may

the likely results of taking that advice.

look at the advice and say: ”I like the results;
I like what they do to my profit and loss statement,"

and accept it, or he may say, "I do not like the

results, and I don’t like what they do to my profit

and loss statement," and reject it.
It may be that this is the type of
elementary decision we are talking about, but

unfortunately, such a decision process says nothing
about the quality of the advice that has been given.
It is entirely possible for incompetent

advice to provide "good" results, and for competent
advice to provide "bad" results.

Sometimes the

competent adviser must be the bearer of bad news.
This is recognized, of course.

The

auditor realizes that it is not merely sufficient
that the advice be accepted.

The auditor is expected

to render a judgment as to the quality of the advice
which has been given.

This is where we get into

the requirement of SAS 11 that the auditor must

in effect review the professional qualifications

of the specialist and the way in which the specialist
has conducted his work.

It is assumed that this

review of the qualifications and of the scope of

work can be done in such a fashion that the
auditor can satisfy himself as to the competence
of the specialist.
The problem is that, as has been said

in your Notice, this review must be done objectively

if independence is to be preserved.

We argue that it is impossible for an

individual to render an objective appraisal of
the competence of someone who is a member of his

own firm.

I would certainly find it impossible
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to be completely objective as to the competence of

the work of another member of my firm, merely

because I know him too well.

I have built-in

biases because of the fact of his relationship
with me, and I must admit them.

In our statement, we did include perhaps
the novelty of a dissent to the statement.

One

of the members of our Committee which drafted the

statement is the employee of a CPA firm, and he
appended a dissent which represented essentially
his views.

We are happy to present them.
In this dissent, he commented on the

matter of self-review and independence and claimed
that it would be possible to establish certain

objective criteria—educational qualifications, years
of practice, etc.—as to whether the auditor would
accept the qualifications of a specialist.

It seems to us that such standards could

be extremely broad, and in fact so broad as to
perhaps go to the length that Mr. Manzoni raised

in one of this questions, i.e., accepting the
individual just on the basis that he is an Enrolled

Actuary.

If the standards were to be this broad,

I wonder whether this would really be in the best

interests of the public.

It seems to me that the

public should have a certain degree of concern

as to the qualifications of the specialist.

It

is in this case, when the standards become more

detailed, that I would argue that the issue of
objectivity comes in, and whether an auditor can

properly and objectively appraise the qualifications
of his own colleagues.
A second major issue which is raised by

your Notice is whether the actuarial adviser is
involved in the decision-making process of management.
Does the fact that one gives actuarial advice involve
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him somehow in management?

The Conference would argue that an actuarial
consultant has a certain degree of participation in

the management process.

The client presents a problem to his actuarial
consultant, and the consultant is asked to advise the
client on how to solve that problem.

The consultant

offers alternative solutions to the client and tries

to advise him as to the consequences of those solutions.
But then how broad is the range and scope
of alternatives offered?

If the scope is extremely

broad—if, for example, the consultant is telling
the client "Here is a buffet of facts and comments,

go and take what you want from this plate, and what
you want from that plate, and make your own decision”—
one could argue there really is no need for the actuary.

He merely dug out facts and laid them before his client.
He is not really advising the client, and not making
recommendations—which is the job he has been hired

for, as a consultant.
On the other hand, the scope of the
alternatives offered may be extremely narrow.

alternative.

One

Do this, or don't do this.

In reality, the range lies somewhere in
between.

Usually it is not a case of yes or no, and

not a case of take your pick.

It is a question of:

Here are several possibilities, and here are the

potential consequences of each possibility, as the

actuary sees them.

The client in this case does have the
decision, but the point is that the actuary has so

narrowed the scope of the alternatives available
to the client—has so restricted the universe of
possibilities from which the client can select—

that he has in a very real sense participated in
the decision-making process.
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This is the general situation.

There are

also within the actuarial field two specific areas
wherein statutory law effectively requires that the

actuary participate in management decisions.
One of them is ERISA, and we have heard
a great deal about that already today.

ERISA mandates

that the actuary, acting on behalf of the plan

participants, is the individual who must choose the

actuarial assumptions.
There are more things to be determined about
a pension plan beyond the actuarial assumptions but

I would argue, and I think that nearly everyone in
my profession would agree with me, that it is the
choice of the actuarial assumptions which ultimately

determines whether a pension plan will be soundly
funded.

Granted, there are different cost methods

that can be chosen.

There are different periods for

amortizing the past service liabilities.

Provided,

however, these choices are made from within the
legally permitted range of possibilities, then one
will end up with a satisfactory result provided,

and provided only, the actuarial assumptions are
properly chosen.
In the life insurance company area, there

is a legal constraint placed on the actuary who
signs the annual statement.

He is required to testify

on his own reputation that the reserves make good

and sufficient provision for the liabilities of the
company.

To my mind, anyone who can so testify

must indeed participate in the management process.

I might add this participation goes so
far that Best's Life-Health Insurance Reports often
lists the consulting actuary as one of the officers

of the company.

I have before me a page from Best's

on which Coopers & Lybrand is listed as an officer
127

of a particular life insurance company because they
Whatever this may mean

are the consulting actuary.

in fact, it at least gives the appearance that
Coopers & Lybrand participates in the management

process of that insurance company.

MR. MATUSIAK:

Are they also the auditors?

MR. WATSON:
It does not say, and I agree
that is a valid question. In any event, they are

listed as an officer of the company.

On another matter, your Notice raises the

question of continuity of employment.

It is stated

that, if one is continuously employed by a client,
then there is a danger that he will at least appear

to be involved in the management process, and such

an appearance can compromise independence.
Your Notice make a distinction between
periodicity and continuity which I find extremely

subtle.

It is part of the nature of the services

of an actuarial consultant that those services are
rendered periodically, and not continuously.

I

would argue, though, that if every time a client

thinks of an actuary, the words that immediately

spring into his mind are Peat, Marwick, Mitchell,

then this means that Peat Marwick is really acting
continuously as the actuary.

It is the only firm

that is doing actuarial consulting work for the

client.

It is continuously hired but only

periodically used.

Next, I come to the matter of scope of

services.

This is, I think, a very, very difficult

question for us to deal with.

Certainly it is not

for actuaries to comment upon how the accounting
profession wishes to limit the services that its

firms provide.

However, within the particular

parameters that are laid down by the Notice—the
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observations that the services should be accountingrelated or auditing-related—I do think that we as

actuaries have legitimate criticisms to express

of the conclusions that are drawn from those parameters.

Quite frankly, we view actuaries and

accountants as being very different.

This morning,

I heard myself described as a co-professional with

accountants, and although I do not take real umbrage
over this, I must confess it is the first time I had

ever thought of it.
From the actuary's perspective, we view

the accountants as basically looking backwards, while
occasionally turning their heads to peer briefly into
the future.

We see actuaries as gazing constantly

into the future, while once in a while looking

backwards to check where we have come from.
I think Mr. Auerbach expressed this

difference extremely well in this morning's session.

He said that accountants are concerned with the
current financial implications of past events, whereas

actuaries are concerned with the current financial
implications of future events.

I would agree with

this distinction.

To my mind, it is a distinction of type,
not just of degree, and I think it does make
actuaries and accountants radically different
creatures .

I have had some personal experience with
this difference when I was part of a committee of

actuaries working with the AICPA to develop

generally accepted accounting principles for life
insurance companies.
It became clear from the
beginning that our two professions looked at the

whole financial process in different ways. Put
very simply, the accountant believed that, when you
went from one year to the next, you were looking
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at two income statements, and the balance sheet was
merely the item which tied them together.

The actuary

on the other hand, thought always of two balance

sheets, and the income statement was the item which
tied them together.

To my mind, this is further

evidence that basically we are different professions.
I can understand a desire to allow a scope

of services which is very general, to say that any
activity which involves the collection and analysis

of data is somehow accounting-related, and to say that
any activity which draws conclusions from data and

makes evaluations based on it, is somehow auditingrelated.

This is, at least, how I read the parameters

as they are defined within the Notice.

In our

opinion such a definition is far too broad, and in
our statement we make a number of specific comments
upon the ways in which we believe that the extent

of services which the Notice suggests should be

permitted is far broader than it should be, given
the parameters of the Notice itself.

Finally, we would maintain that the public

has expressed no clear need for actuarial services

to be provided by CPA firms.

Although we agree that

the public is well served by competition, this

competition already exists outside the CPA firms.
We heard this morning that it is the

public’s expanding expectations of auditors’
responsibilities which leads to the desire on

their part to provide these sorts of services.

We

do not see the great pressure from the public for
this.

There are clearly other ways of having these

services provided.
We believe that it is important for the
accounting profession and for this Board to make

a judgment as to whether these sorts of services
should be provided by CPA firms on the basis of
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whether it is in the best interests of the CPA firms
and of the public.

Are these services truly

supportive of the attest function, or are they

diversionary?
Thank you very much, gentlemen, for the
opportunity to make this statement.

I would be very

happy to answer questions.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, Mr. Watson.

Do any of the Board members have questions?
MR. McCLOY:
MR. MATUSIAK:

That was very interesting.
If three consulting

actuaries from the Conference were selected by a

given client to perform the consulting services
and all given the same facts by the client, how
different would the results of the three actuaries

be.

Would they be similar, primarily similar or

would they be diverse?
MR. DASKAIS:

different situations.

Let’s talk about it as to

One is a pension situation

under ERISA where each one has to come up with his

best estimate, and then in the insurance company
situation, there is perhaps more latitude.
Both of us are pension actuaries, by the

way.
I would think that there would be significant

difference, but on the order of 10, 20, 30% would not

be unexpected as to the required contributions under
ERISA of three highly competent actuaries.

MR. MATUSIAK:

Does that speak for the

need for having a review by a consultant or another

consultant’s work?
MR. DASKAIS:

These differences would

primarily arise out of different expectations about

macro economics, basically interest rates and salary
increases which ERISA has made all of us experts
on, but we may not be quite as expert as the
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economists who I understand disagree from time to
time.

(Laughter)
MR. STARK:

While you were speaking, I was

looking at the appendix page 22 and 23 which set forth
the Executive Committee's proposal regarding employee

benefit consulting services.

I understand that is

the area in which both of your gentlemen are experts.

I notice that the Executive Committee's

proposal deals with many of the points that you made.

For example, you have made the point that the accounting
firm should not get into making management decisions,
and that is the very first point that the Executive

Committee makes.

You mentioned that the auditing

firms should not get into the position of continuous

involvement, and that is the second point that the

Executive Committee mentions.

You also mentioned

the necessity of assuring that the client has sufficient

comprehension to be able to make a management decision,
and that is the third point that is made.

I am not sure I understand exactly where
you would fault the Executive Committee's proposal.

MR. WATSON:

I would certainly not fault,

in any sense, the proposals that the Executive Committee

has made as to the criteria which should determine

whether these services be provided or not.

Our

problem is that we do not agree with the conclusions
that are drawn from the criteria.

Basically, we view, certainly in the case
of ERISA where one acts as an Enrolled Actuary, and
I would argue in many other areas, one inevitably
becomes in some fashion entangled in the management
decision.

We would also argue that, even though the

provision of actuarial services might appear to be
periodic in that the actuary only comes in once
a year to value the pension plan, that is effectively
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a continuing assignment which is done year after year,

and therefore is indeed a continuous assignment.
Thirdly, there is the question of whether
the client has the understanding to make the actuary’s

work "his own" for decision-making purposes.
is certainly arguable.

This

As I tried to make clear at

the beginning of my presentation, there is a distinction
between the client understanding the results and the

consequences that flow from them and the client
adequately appreciating what has gone into producing
those results.

That is where I believe the audit

function does become important.
By the way, you may have noticed from our

statement that we also support the principle that an
auditing firm should have available to it, either

on its own staff or through the services of an outside

consulting firm, actuarial expertise in order to
reassure the auditor, if he needs reassurance, that

the actuarial work has been carried out properly.
We do not disagree with the parameters, the criteria
of the Notice.
MR. STARK:

It is impractical to carry them

out.

MR. WATSON:

We just disagree with the

consequences.

PROFESSOR CARY:

It is practically impossible

on your part to carry them out on your part.

that right?

Isn’t

That is what you are saying.

MR. WATSON:
MR. STARK:

Yes.
I was interested also in your

memorandum which says that you would oppose auditing
firms providing actuarial services to non-audit
clients.

It seems to me that is a difficult line to

draw when your major premise is the difficulty in

relation to the audit clients.
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I can’t see that you can extend that

logically to the non-audit client.
MR. DASKAIS:

I think there we were

applying the criteria suggested in the Notice for

Hearing of:

Are the skills audit related?

We do not consider actuarial skills audit

related, and therefore, accepting that criterion,
we would say if that criterion is to apply to

non-audit clients, then it would not be appropriate
for auditing firms to provide actuarial services for

non-audit clients.

MR. MANZONI:

Would it be wise to have an

actuary on the staff of an accounting firm?
MR. WATSON:

MR. MANZONI:

Oh, yes.
Is that consistent with

actuarial skills not being audit related?
MR. WATSON:

First of all, I would

certainly maintain that it would be desirable for

an auditing firm, as was said a minute ago, to have
an actuary available to assist in all the actuarial
aspects of auditing and it would probably be very

desirable to have this actuary on the staff of

the firm itself for that purpose.
Secondly, I think that we have to make
the same caveat that the Academy did in our
objection to the provision of the actuarial service

of non-audit clients.

We were operating strictly

within the framework here.
If the provisions with respect to auditing-

related and accounting-related services were to
be relaxed, then we would have a different position
to maintain. We were doubtful as to the
desirability of providing any actuarial services
basically because of the restrictions there
provisions led to.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, gentlemen.
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I

really believe we had better cut this off now, or
we will get even further behind in our timetable.
MR. WATSON:
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you very much.
Let’s take a short standup

break of about five minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)
MR. GARRETT:

Let's resume, please.

Cardinal, will you proceed, please.
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Mr.

MR. ROBERT J. CARDINAL:

Thank you, Mr.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a statement.

Chairman.

Knowing the load of reading which you have had,

I would like to summarize it briefly.
First, I would like to thank you for this

opportunity to appear before you and present my
opinion and that of the company which I represent

on what we feel is a very critical issue.
In the statement I reviewed my background

and that of the company.

Very briefly, I have

degrees in engineering and management.

I am on

the staff of a graduate management school.

I

am a certified management consultant, Director

of the Institute of Management Consultants, and
have been in consulting for 12 or 13 years with
Lester B. Knight & Associates, headquartered here
in Chicago.

During that time I have headed up almost
all of our various areas of practice including being
the head of all of our management consulting.

I

am currently Executive Vice President.

In addition, during my career, I have
run companies and been a buyer, both management
consulting and audit services.

I have been on

both sides of the fence.
Our firm is a large one for our business,

with about a thousand professionals providing

management consulting and consulting engineering

services.

We have been in business for 33 years

and completed some 18,000 assignments in 53
countries.
Of the several questions which have
been discussed here, it would seem that the most
paramount issue is the one which is stated on page

7 of the Notice of the meeting, and if I may

quote it.

It is "Whether management advisory
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services furnished to an audit client either
compromise the audit firm's independence or create
the appearance of compromising its independence."

And I would emphasize that last portion.

There are other questions that have been
raised by many in my profession, and in my opinion,

they are either moot or belong outside the realm
of this Board and certainly of the government

controls that have been discussed.
I happen to believe, and my firm believes,

that CPA firms can hire people who are equally

competent as any of ours and are as capable of doing

quality work as are we or any other independent
management consulting organization.

There is a great deal of concern among
many in my profession regarding the apparently unfair
advantage held by CPAs in acquiring work.

I have to

acknowledge that this certainly has an advantage
in many situations, and I envy them.

I also envy those of my contemporaries who

do executive recruiting and place a key executive or
those who sit on the board of directors of a firm and

then do work for them, or who happen to play golf
with the key decision-maker and walk away with an
assignment.

But I don't think there is anything we
should do to prohibit these or any other form of
advantages in a competitive environment.

I think

that if we have a better product or service than do
the CPA firms,

(we being the independent management

consultants), then we should just get about our
business of trying to sell this to the public and
to management and informing them of what we have.

I don't think we should be looking for
regulation to control advantages in business or
crying on any government agency's shoulders.
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A lot of the selections are based on faith
and trust, and they are always going to be based on

personal relationships.
The independence of the MAS practice and
the influence of the audit practice on management
consulting services is another source of some concern

within my profession of management consulting.
However, I feel we have similar potentials
for conflicts of interest all throughout management

consulting.

We all have to be constantly aware and

police them.

I think the Institute of Management

Consultants has taken one step, and I think they have

provided a statement to you.

They require an

attestation of independence on the part of the MAS
practitioners in the CPA firms basically stating

that the MAS practitioner reports to an independent
MAS control and is not subject to undue influence,
but I think this addresses only the independence in

management consulting.

That is a private service

to a generally educated and aware clientele, i.e.,
the management of the firms and the associations.
I don’t think it addresses the central issue for this

committee which I would like to get back to, and

as I stated before, it is the influence the other

way around of management advisory services on the

public audit.

The certified public audit is created, as
we all know, by law, regulation, and it is essentially
a guaranteed market which is the exclusive practice

of CPA firms.

In fact, with the largest firms, it

is almost the exclusive province of the big eight

CPA firms.
They have a very specific trust.

They act

as middlemen or interpreters to represent the public
which provides the capital for the operation of these

firms.

They are held in such a position of trust
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that senior citizens when investing their savings
rely on that signature and the letter in the annual

report.

That is a unique position of trust.
I think we owe this public a certification

which is not only independent, but beyond any

suggestion of any taint or loss of independence
from any source whatsoever.
The public today, as we all know, has
lost a great deal of its faith in government and
business, and I think we should rebuild this faith

by not compromising our principles for the sake

of expediency or more revenue or a few more partners.
Many of the management consulting services
proposed by the CPA firms to remain a part of the

MAS practice, present opportunities for conflicts
of interest and certainly cast some doubt or give
reason to doubt the possible independence of the
public audit by the same firm.

Let me just pause for a moment and say
that the limitation of services that we announced

in the appendix of the Notice of this hearing is,

in our opinion, almost no limitation whatsoever.
The criteria are a limitation, but the actual

services from which they are limited is almost no
limitation whatsoever, and it would appear to us that
they would be continuing to perform essentially the

full range of management consulting services.
Let me cite some examples of the kinds

of services with which you are familiar that can

raise doubts as to the independence of a public
audit by the same firm.

One type is strategic planning and
organization.
It is a significant portion of management
consulting practice of most firms, and involves working

with top management as many of you have to devise
long-range or strategic plans and develop the
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organization necessary to carry these out.
It results in major changes in directions.
It results in new product lines, organization
revisions, acquisitions, divestitures, and major

investments in new programs.
Many of these have been successful, but

there are also many examples of unsuccessful
strategies.

Such as the number of companies that

we are all aware of that have gone into and out of

the computer business, and who have lost millions

of dollars in this business.
How independent can a public auditor be

when he is going through and auditing a company that
has just gone through a major change of direction

and strategy such as these but where that strategy
was developed and recommended by the partners and

principals of the same firm and where the audit
partner shares the professional liability for the

actions.

I am not trying to suggest that there is

an intentional misleading of the public, but rather

acknowledging recognized human frailties.
I know when I am auditing someone’s
else’s work I am much more critical and point out

shortcomings much more quickly, I think, than I do
when I am auditing someone’s work whom I have

directed or which was performed by someone whom
I personally know of with whom I have a relationship.

I think we tend to be blinded by our

friendship, our relationship with that individual,
our confidence in what he can do, and we lose

sight of what the facts show us.

Certainly there

is cause for the public to have doubt in these
situations.
Another area is financial and management

systems.

A major cause of poor performance of
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many companies is poor costing, poor pricing,

nonresponsiveness due to a lack of financial and

management information.

The design and

installation of systems to correct this usually
using computers is a major portion of the business
of many of the MAS practices of CPA firms.

This can be one of the major expenditures

facing any company, and what is more critical,
the results are a long time in coming, and they

are often very subjective.

It is difficult to

determine whether or not the investment is going

to pay off, and the information is going to be
valid.

It is no uncommon, as a matter of fact,
for one of our client to suggest utilizing the

services of a CPA firm to audit our progress
and the results of our programs in this area.

I have got to confess it does keep us
on our toes, and I think it is a proper role for
the CPA firms when they are not trying to compete
for the same business.

When a CPA firm designs

and installs this system, who audits and reports

on the progress and the results?
firm?

The same audit

Management literally is just replete with

stories of misguided systems programs, as I am

sure every one in the room knows.
We often come in to a client who has
had an aborted effort sometimes involving years

of time and millions of dollars.

The question is

how independent an auditor can be in reporting
on a systems installation when it is his firm
and his partners who are responsible for the

project.

These are not simple questions in the
systems areas because well designed systems often
lie unused and fail because management doesn’t
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support them or sometimes because of the inability

of the management team to use them, and a consultant

rightly or wrongly usually tends to share in some

of the blame.

We really question, and we think the public
would question whether an auditor can be sufficiently
diligent in reporting a shortcoming on a financial

or management system when his partners have done the
design and installation and he shares in their
professional liability.

Another service which is remaining in the

province of the MAS firms as we see the announcement
is facilities planning.

Somehow it has been determined

that this relates to accounting.

I must confess that

as a practicing registered professional engineer and

having done a lot of facility planning, I don’t see

that relationship.

This involves a complex set of

interrelationships between management plans,

industrial engineering, product design, manufacturing
processes, machining, inventory control, material

storage, et cetera.

These facilities often require

major long-term capital commitment.
relocations of families.

They can require

They oftentimes mean growth

or death of a community.
Many of our clients require detailed
appropriation requests.

They are subject to extensive

analysis and scrutiny by their internal and/or their

public auditors.
The increased sales, the reduced cost, the

improved productivity have to be projected to
justify these capital expenditures and then these
are usually audited after the fact to determine
whether or not they were obtained or were false
promises made.
Despite all the planning and analysis,

corporations, agencies, the government, all build
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white elephants.

do go wrong.

The facility planning projects

Some one has to find them.

We only

have to look in the real estate section of any
major city to find all the ones that went wrong.
Sales projections don’t develop as planned.

Labor problems develop.

The public has adequate

cause to question, in our mind, the diligence of
a public auditor in reviewing the performance

of a major new facility or a major capital investment
when, in fact, his firm through the MAS partners

received a handsome fee for doing the industrial
engineering or the planning of the facility and

possibly recommended that it be built.

Another example what we won’t discuss
in detail is acquisition and merger analysis.

A practice that is often performed by management
consulting organizations, this is not doing
brokerage or finding merger and acquisition,

but evaluating some or all aspects of a merger

or acquisition.
These are difficult questions.

They

are based on a relative probability and business

feasibility of some future action occurring.
Everyone has to feel they are getting a value,
so therefore, it isn’t some simple recommendation

or simple analysis.

You really need an independent

auditor to analyze whether the results of an
acquisition or a merger is successful.

It requires an outside hard look at these
things.

We have serious reservations that with

the significant dollars that are involved—I think
IC just paid 400 million dollars to get Pet—with
the significant size of some of these things, doesn’t
the investing public have a right to question the

independence and the objectivity of an auditor
who is reporting on a performance of a new
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combination, when, in fact, it was his firm that
made the recommendations and may even have helped

establish the price.

Again, the critical question in today's

environment of doubt is not if the auditor is
independent, but whether or not we have given cause
to the public to doubt his independence.

That to

us is the major question.

I won't go on with a long series of examples

but we think there are a lot more in the areas that
the CPAs are proposing to remain in, and we ask
that consideration be given that they not be allowed
to perform MAS with their audit clients.
Mr. Chairman, if there are any questions

for me, I will be glad to try to answer them.
What is the net result?

MR. McCLOY:

is the bottom line of your advice?

What

That they be

directly excluded from all MAS?
MR. CARDINAL:

audit clients.

No, just MAS with their

I am not one of those that believe

they ought to be kept out of MAS.

I think they

can do a good job, but I don't think they should
be doing it for their audit clients.

In other words, without

MR. McCLOY:

exception.
MR. CARDINAL:
MR. WOOD:

Yes, sir.

Professor Cary this morning,

if you were here, asked whether CPAs should involve

themselves in performance reviews.
It seems to me one of your principal
points of departure here is that a CPA firm would

be compromised because its MAS people had recommended

the installation, let's say, of a particular plant
or a strategic plan for the company, and the P & L

came up that the profits weren't as planned.
Are you recommending that CPAs conduct
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performance reviews?

It seems to me what they

are supposed to do is check the accounting system

and the inventory controls and so forth, the

quality of internal controls, and then certify
the results in the P & L and the balance sheet.
MR. CARDINAL:

You mean the performance

reviews of the projects or the individuals?
MR. WOOD:

Of the projects.

MR. CARDINAL:

Of the projects?

I think

I have seen them successfully utilized for that

when there are not any other conflicts.

management has said:

When

We would like an outsider

to take a look, and audit if, in fact, these
results are coming as planned because they are
difficult questions.

The numbers tend to get blended in.
The sales are up, but would they have gone up,

or is it the result of this program or not.

I

have seen CPAs used very effectively for that.
MR. WOOD:

For them to do it, if you

recommend that they should do it, then they should

have expertise in house to do just this.
MR. CARDINAL:

a financial one.

The expertise becomes

It is a matter of reviewing

the results and the numbers.

MR. WOOD:
results.

All right, reviewing the

The results are that this new plant

has produced a loss, period.

MR. CARDINAL:
MR. WOOD:

Right.

That is enough for management

to get busy and say, "What went wrong?"
MR. CARDINAL: Fine. That is what I am
suggesting.
MR. WOOD:

I don’t see anything wrong

with that.
MR. CARDINAL:

That is all that I am
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suggesting.

MR. McCLOY:

You are only suggesting that

management get alert again.
MR. CARDINAL:

MR. McCLOY:

One could say that.

De novo, when you start out,

would you eliminate all these MASs in the hands of

accountants?
MR. CARDINAL:

No, quite frankly, I think

what would happen would make my own life much more
difficult, but I believe strongly enough in the
principle to persist.

I suspect the answer, were

such a rule to come down, is they would probably
become an independent organization and relieved of
some of the restrictions that some of them do have

from their parents, and they would probably become
twice the competitors that they are today.
MR. GARRETT:

And they would spin off the

MAS departments?
MR. CARDINAL:

Yes, and then they would

really be tough, but I believe enough in the principle

of it that if that is the way it goes, so be it.
MR. GARRETT:

I can understand if management

decided they wanted an outside review in respect

to a particular project and the regular auditors
that participated in planning that project, that

review wouldn't seem very outside, but for the

ordinary attest function for ordinary financial
statements, why would the auditor be contaminated

in some way in reporting the results because he

participated in the planning?
MR. CARDINAL:

We are blinded by our faith

in the people we know, and if the results of a new
project are not going as planned, but we have at

the assurances of some known individuals, we think
this is going to come out all right.

Because we
planned it, we know it is going to come out all
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right, we tend to be more lenient, and I think the

critical question is beyond that.

Again, "does it

give the public cause to doubt the independent."
If, in fact, someone has spent 150 million dollars
for a facility, I think the public could have cause

to doubt the audit on the results of that performance
if it is done by the same organization who helped
plan it.

MR. GARRETT:

The audit of the results

of the project is something different from the audit
of the financial statements.
MR. CARDINAL:

But the annual financial

statement can be significantly influenced by the
results of these major capital expenditures of facility

plans, sir.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Not in the year of the

planning or not in the year of the activity.
MR. CARDINAL:

PROFESSOR CARY:

No.

It could be in years hence.

Therefore, you are assuming that somehow they will

be altering their audits over a period of years in
order to demonstrate that the project that they planned,

or whatever, or the facility or what-have-you, has
been successful rather than unsuccessful.
MR. CARDINAL:

I have been very careful

not to suggest, sir, that they have modified any

audits.

What I am saying is that the situation

arises which can give cause to the public which they
are intended to be representing to, that there was

a loss of independence and a conflict of interest,
and, in fact, they have been the recommender and a
party and share in the professional liability for

errors in the planning of a project and development
of a project, I think the public has a cause to doubt
the independence of the audit.

MR. WOOD:

May I ask a simple, silly
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question.
MR. CARDINAL:

MR. WOOD:

If there is such a thing.

How does the public know that

the audit firm performs an MAS for the client?
MR. CARDINAL:

aware of it.

In some cases they do become

I really don't know the public source

of knowledge.
MR. GARRETT:

They will from now on with

the new rules.
MR. WOOD:

Do we have to specify in the annual

report that the MAS was in a certain area?
MR. GARRETT:

We don't know yet, Arthur.

By type of service, but whether it would have to be

more specific than than, I think we will have to find
out.
MR. CARDINAL:

seem to me is:

The question, it would almost

Does the fact that we are not going

to tell the public unless they get in there and find

out, make it any lesser of a conflict, I suppose.
When people do find out, then it is almost like you

are keeping it a secret, because the information is
available if someone asks and looks.

quite visible.

It becomes

It is hard to hide who you are when

you are around these organizations.
MR. WOOD:

arguments here.

There are a lot of philosophical

It has been brought out today that the

accounting firms consider themselves to be just as
honest and competent and their standards of integrity

are as good as the consulting world or the actuarial

world or any other, and the appearance of independence
gets an awful lot of emphasis out there.

I think that I, for one, have a difficult

time in finding incompatible the integrity of an
accounting firm on its audit side with its service
side.

I don't like to see the government or the SEC,

for example, unless there are real factual grounds
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or bases for experience where there have been failures
where an auditing firm might be found to have given

poor advice and then covered it up, for us to inhibit

services where hundreds of small companies, for example,
can't afford to have separate consultants, they work

with accounting firms to perform all kinds of services,

and I am just troubled.

I need some help, I think,

on this question of appearances of independence.
MR. CARDINAL:

I think the appearance is a

very critical question in today's world, sir.

As I

said, I have been one of those within our profession
who has stood up and felt that the MAS groups can
perform as good a management consulting as any of us,

that their conflicts of interest on the management

consulting side versus audit is probably no more,
no less, than many of our own.

We have to police them.

I think when you get to the audit side,
however, there is a specific public responsibility.
You are not dealing with an aware, educated clientele

such as the management.

You are dealing with the

public, and I think the public has lost enough

confidence in public institutions these days that I

don't think we should contribute to it, and appearance
of conflict can be as important as conflict itself
in decisions affecting the public because you don't

often get a chance to prove your well meaning with
the public.
MR. MATUSIAK:

The Cohen Commission suggested

that the more knowledge that the public has about the

services performed by CPA firms, the less they are
concerned about the impairment of independence.
Therefore, the Cohen Commission suggested that perhaps
what was needed is an educational program on the

part of the profession to educate the public as to

what CPA firms do. How would you respond to that?
MR. CARDINAL:
I think any education that
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that you can do in that area is fine, but I still feel
that appearance of conflict becomes an equal problem

whether they are educated or not.

It might just make

them more aware to what Mr. Wood was saying of finding

out what other services they might have provided, and
they might start asking who were the consultants that

advised on this acquisition or this merger or who worked
on such-and-such a firm.

MR. McCLOY:

You might build up confidence

as they examine that.
MR. CARDINAL:
MR. GARRETT:

It might go either way.

They will begin to get educated

with the next proxy season.

One might wait and see

how that works out.
I can imagine that if the auditors had
worked in planning on a project and the project was
a turkey, that they might be a little late in
recommending recognition of the loss, and a big

writeoff and things of that kind.

You certainly

have got on the inside of firms in the course of
your profession, I am sure.

I wouldn't dream of

asking you to name anybody.

Have you actually seen

this or thought you have seen it?
MR. CARDINAL:

I won't say that I have seen

any instances where auditors have tried to cover that

up, no sir.

I have seen a lot of projects go wrong.

I have not seen instances of coverup.

MR. CARDINAL:

MR. GARRETT:

Be slow or whatever.

Someone might say, "We will

have to write it off this year.

It's a dud."

And

they say, "No, give it one more year. We will put
in another little gimmick and see what happens."
MR. CARDINAL:

I haven't gone looking for

them either, frankly.

MR. GARRETT:

there?

Lou, is there coffee back

We will take ten minutes.
150

(A short recess was taken.)
MR. GARRETT:

Please resume your seats.

Robert Mautz and Thomas Testman.
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MR. ROBERT K. MAUTZ:

Mautz.

My name is Robert

I am a partner in the firm of Ernst & Ernst.

I am accompanied by my partner, Thomas Testman, this

Tom is in charge of our management

afternoon.

advisory services on a firm-wide basis.
We appreciate the opportunity to meet with
We have already supplied

you and to express our views.

you with a paper, including a summary, and we will
try to help you get back on schedule a little by not
reading that paper or any part of the summary.

It may be useful, however, in view of some

of what has been said here today, to express our
views a little differently.

I will try to be

brief.
We think that the reasons offered for
restricting the scope of CPA services, as they have

been expressed so far, tend to fall into two groups.

One is the question of independence; the other is the

question of compatibility or image of status or
credibility or whatever.

We think the matter of

independence is a very real issue, and an important

one.

It is really an unavoidable issue in view of

the way the profession of public accounting is

structured.

But it is an issue not so much of

scope of services as it is one of source of fee.
As long as the independent CPA gets his fee from

the audited client, his ultimate independence is
bound to be questioned.

Because of that relationship,

and because CPAs recognize it and have been concerned

about it for a long, long time, we practicing CPAs
have developed a whole array of controls which
are designed to protect and assure our audit

independence. These include such things as the
way we recruit, our staff training programs, our
rules regarding financial interests, the divisions

of duties we have within the firm, the procedures
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we have for accepting engagements accepting clients,
our second partner reviews, the partner rotation

program that we will have now, intrafirm peer review,

external peer review, and now, as some one pointed

out this morning, perhaps the most important of all
is audit committee review of our independence.

All of these are designed to assure, as
well as we can, given the structure of the profession

that we are independent.

Some of these provisions

are quite burdensome and all of them are expensive.
In addition to this, we have the ever present threat

of litigation which gives us every reason to strive
to meet these requirements and to be as independent

as we can.

So we see independence, then, as something

about which we have taken a great many positive
steps, and we see restriction of services in any
way at all as not really helping with the basic

problem.

If we restrict any one service, about all

we are saying is that we are not really content with

the extent of our independence efforts.

We could

restrict services a long, long way, but unless we
restrict the audit service right out of existence,

we don’t get to the real basis of the independence

issue.

We see the restriction of scope of services

with respect to independence.

First as superfluous

because we already have a satisfactory array of
relevant controls, and second, as irrelevant to the
basic question.

With respect to compatibility or image or
status or credibility because we supply management
advisory services, we tend to think of this as not

important because market forces will take care of
it.
It is true that when we accountants are
authorized to provide the attest function, we are
given a very important and a very valuable authority,
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but no guarantee of any clients comes with that
authority.
The profession is guaranteed clients, but

no individual firm is.
profession.

Ours is a very competitive

Each firm must provide services that

clients want badly enough to pay for them.

We must

have sufficient credibility and status, on the

basis of whatever standards clients use, that we
impress them with the fact that we can meet their
needs which includes being accepted as independent.

Companies are free to choose their
independent auditors.

Differences among CPA firms,

including differences in the scope of their services
provide an opportunity for choice on the part of

companies.

We think that companies in search of

independent auditors will themselves discipline

the profession if its members engage in activities

which threaten their audit independence.
Mr. Cary has asked a number of people
and he has indicated he will ask us all today the

question of what would happen if an announcement
appeared tomorrow in the paper that Booz, Allen
& Hamilton and one of the major firms had merged.

I can’t speak for the clients of other firms, but

if they were our clients, they would be on the

phone immediately to ask what in heaven’s name
we were doing.
their auditors.

They have arranged with us to be
Are we changing our emphasis?

Are we changing the nature of our professional

commitment?

Do we want to become something we

weren’t before? That would be a sufficient change
that many, many of our important clients would be
very interested and would comment to us.

This is not to say, on the other hand,
that we would not be interested in merging with
some management advisory services firm somewhere
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if it had a degree of competence in something that
we were interested in and needed in that locality.

We would probably seek such expertise, but that does
not mean that we could ignore client reaction.

We

must always give thought to how our clients will

react to any activity that would indicate a major
change in direction.

Clients feel we have a commitment to them

just as we feel they have a commitment to treat us
honestly and fairly.

So we see the market system

taking pretty good care of this matter of
compatibility of MAS with auditing.

We view any

artificial limitations of the scope of services as

constituting an interference with the functioning
of the market system, and we tend to think that there

is too much interference with that system already.

May I add just two more thoughts before
we take your questions.

The first is that the total

range of services which public accountants engage
in isn’t nearly as broad as is often implied.

There

is a general consensus that we restrict ourselves

to a reasonable range that relates to our basic
audit function.

There are all kinds of things that

we would not do.
You have asked some people the question:

Are there any services you would not perform?
are a whole lot of these.
for you.

There

We wouldn't do an appraisal

We wouldn't give you investment advice.

We wouldn't plan an insurance program.

We wouldn't

conduct a fund raising program or an advertising

campaign. We wouldn't do anything for you about
public relations. We could run through a whole list
of these.

There are lots of things that we wouldn't

dream of doing.

There is really a fairly narrow range for
management advisory services, and there are only a
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few services that some firms perform that most of the

other firms do not.
The other point I would like to make was
brought up by the preceding commentator.

That is

this matter of how the public perceives our independence
and whether the public is really concerned about our
appearance of independence.

The question is whom are we talking about
as the public?

If we mean the little old lady in

tennis shoes, she doesn’t have the faintest idea

about things like this, and she is not interested.
If we are concerned about the skilled and qualified
financial analysts, they seem very unbothered by

the whole thing.

I don’t see any of them here to

make an oral statement or writing about this in

their professional literature, or really concerned
about it in any way at all.

Whatever ways they have

of determining whether or not we are satisfactorily
independent, they apparently are satisfied.

I tend

to think that the people who raise the independence

issue the loudest are academics who need something
to write about.

I can say this rather bluntly

because I spent a quarter of a century as an academic,

in some cases writing about the independence issue.
(Laughter)

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. MAUTZ:

What position?

I was very critical, Mr. Cary.,

and I could be because I had no direct interest in

it.

Some of my friends come to me now and they say,

"Bob, you have changed your position."
That is a very hard question to answer

fairly.

Yes, I have changed my position.

But I

have changed it over a period of some 15 or 16 years

during which the profession has also changed.

Many

of the present controls to protect independence didn't

exist that long ago.

I have changed my position
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because I know a whole lot more about the subject

now than I did then.

It is very easy to be critical

of that which you know very little about.

It is

very easy to sit in the comfort of a classroom and
talk to your students or write about those practitioners
and what they should or shouldn’t do without recognizing

what the impact of that can be not only on the firm
and its partner, but upon clients and their needs.

Tom

I didn’t mean to go on this long.

and I will be glad to try to answer any questions
that you have.

MR. McCLOY:

Do you see any field at all,

any area at all here, where we, the POB, could be
helpful in restoring the credibility of the profession
by way of any limitation of the MAS?

MR. MAUTZ:

One of the services we shouldn't

render is giving political advice and really this has
become a political question.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. GARRETT:

(Applause)

That is very good.

Why do you think we are lawyers

up here?
MR. MAUTZ:

I think it may be very, very

important politically that some kind of a concession

is made, but I think from a substantive point of view

that concession won’t mean a thing, and it will hold
the wolves off only for a very short time.

I recognize

it is very easy for me sitting here to say that you

should be courageous, take the right position, and

wait to see what happens.

If I were in your position,

I don’t quite know what I would do, but I can’t see

restriction of the scope of our services as any
kind of a lasting solution.
MR. McCLOY: You would put no outside

restrictions at all on MAS?
MR. MAUTZ:

No, I would vote for the free

market and let it go at that.
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Even at the risk of government

MR. McCLOY:

regulation instead of self-regulation of the profession?
MR. MAUTZ:

There is a very fine difference

between government enforced self-regulation and honest

to goodness self-regulation.

I think in this case we

may get regulation, but I would rather it were forced
upon us than we volunteered it because I don’t believe

it is substantive or effective or useful in the long
run.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I have a couple of questions.

One, I noticed that Ernst & Ernst doesn’t engage in

actuarial work.

Is that a matter of principle or don't

you think it is profitable, or what is the reason,
because you do engage in quite a variety of MAS types

of services?

MR. MAUTZ:
question.

I am not sure I can answer that

Sometimes there is a pretty fine difference

between principles and profits.

actuaries on our staff.

We do have some

We have been acquiring them

because we feel that we need them in our insurance

audits.

We are very heavy in the insurance field.

With such expertise available, I can see
where we might be led to render some client an actuarial
service.

You move from one step to another.

Once you

have the service available, your clients know you have
it available, and they may ask for it.

I wouldn’t

want to pre-empt the decision that will be made some

day as to how far we will go in offering actuarial

services.
It is a little hard to see the direction
in which auditing will develop. We have seen over
the last two decades an increase in the breadth of the

auditing service we are called upon to do, including
some kinds of things that at the moment we won’t
do.

I am sure we don’t do them now for a number of

reasons.

Whether we will offer that service in five

or ten years from now will depend upon the trends in
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the profession, what others do, how useful the service

is, and whether clients demand it.

PROFESSOR CARY:

That ties in with the

You are right.

question you referred to.

I was going

to ask about your merging with Booz, Allen or something
like that.

Your reply was:

Well, that it is a political

question, that what you would do, it would shock your

clients because you do it too fast, but if you merged
with one small actuarial firm and a very first class
young management consulting firm and so forth, in

principle this doesn't bother you.

This is a proper

proliferation of the roles that your firm can perform.

Right?
MR. MAUTZ:

If that consulting firm was

providing a service and had a competence that we thought
we needed to serve our client, I would see nothing

wrong in principle with us doing it.
PROFESSOR CARY:

geologists and appraisers?
MR, MAUTZ:

Then how do you go to

Why not those?

I guess there are a couple of

reasons I could mention.

One is that we have the

problem not only of providing the competence, but having

in our partner category the ability to manage that

competence and to supervise it.
We would be a long time developing that

supervisory ability in geology.

That is not to say

we couldn't but we would be a long time developing
it.

And then we come back to the point:

we in business for?

What are

We are in business to make

a profit, but not solely to make a profit.

We are

proud of being accountants. We are an accounting
and auditing firm. We want to be thought of as such.

I think there are a number of things that we could
do, services that our clients would accept but that
we just feel are out of our range of interest as a

professional firm.

Whether that would be geology
159

or something else, I don't know, but there are bound to
I think we have no intention of trying

be limits.

to be all things to all people.

PROFESSOR CARY:

There is much difference

between plant layout and geology in the sense that
they are both unrelated to accounting, aren't they,
would you say?

You can relate them if you try

MR. MAUTZ:

hard enough.

Let me try a little bit.

I won't try that.

Not geology.

You mentioned plant layout.

very concerned about internal control.
certainly accounting.

inventory control.

We are

That is

We are also concerned about

Internal control over inventory

has to do with warehouses and the physical transfers

of product, locked storerooms, records, and the like.
It might be that occasionally we would be asked by a

client to give some advice on how to improve internal
control over materials handling, and we would get into
some form of plant layout in that way.

That doesn't mean that we set ourselves up
as experts in general plant layout and that we would

start from scratch in designing a complete plant layout
for someone.

We may be drawn into those things by

our interest in internal control.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I was just trying to see

where you draw lines.
MR. MAUTZ:

as you know.

Some lines are very hard to draw,

The ends are very clear, but in the

middle it gets very fuzzy, and this is one of them.

MR. McCLOY:

Do you do executive recruiting?

MR. MAUTZ: The firm does, yes, sir.
MR. WOOD: At the outset you pointed out
independence and compatibility were the two principal
facets of this problem, two principal considerations

on MAS.
You used interchangeably, or you mentioned
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Doesn't image go to independence,

compatibility or image.

this appearance question, rather than to compatibility?
Where do you get image on compatibility?
MR. MAUTZ:

I thought the two terms had been

used almost synonymously this morning is why I used them,

but image is certainly a problem of independence, yes.
Especially the appearance.

I think it was used in a different

MR. McCLOY:
connotation.

I have a feeling that you have got a great

asset in the public’s mind and in your clientele’s
mind by the fact that you know your business.

You know

You don’t want to dilute that.

your main business.
MR. MAUTZ:

That is right.

That is a part of credibility.

MR. McCLOY:

If you get the impression that you are just trying to
pick up the bottom dollar wherever you can, then you

lost a certain standing.

And it is the sort of thing that

MR. MAUTZ:

the market test will do for us only on a very slow

basis over a long period of time.

That is part of the

difficulty.

The market will discipline the profession
for us, but it takes a while to react to things.

Mr. Mautz, will the market

MR. GARRETT:

encourage independence?
I have no doubt of that.

MR. MAUTZ:

MR. GARRETT:

more independence.

Is there a big market for

You get more clients if you are

more independent than if you are not?

MR. MAUTZ: Absolutely, but it takes a while
for the absence of independence to become apparent,
and it is not one of those things that is immediately
visible.
MR. GARRETT:

Is the absence of independence

often something that management has sought to achieve?
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MR. MAUTZ:

I wouldn’t accuse management of

it, but that is one of the possibilities, yes.
You can accuse them of it,

MR. GARRETT:

but I think they tend to like it, it seems to me.
When you get in trouble for lack of independence,
it is because you have been playing games with management

isn't it?
MR. MAUTZ:

One of the ways the public has

demanded more independence is through the use of audit

committees.

That is a great factor.

There might be a demand there?

MR. GARRETT:

MR. MAUTZ:
the independence.

Yes.

That is one way of increasing

I think, of course, our firm and

the other firms as well have been enthusiastic about

audit committees for that purpose.
You heard Mr. Cardinal's

MR. GARRETT:

statement, did you not, earlier?

MR. MAUTZ:

Yes.

With respect to the sort of

MR. GARRETT:

fear that he was seeing through engagement in projects,
particularly substantial projects, that would tend

to generate a corrupt desire to want to make them look
good or at least defer making them look bad and perhaps
not report deficiencies as early as might otherwise

be done, can internal procedures protect against
that, if it is a danger?

MR. MAUTZ:

I would say yes, they can.

I

think it would be a very, very short-sighted public
accounting firm management that would lean that way

at all in the long run.

We would lose far more than

we would ever gain.
I can imagine the conversation taking place,
but I can't imagine any agreement:

Well, let's try

it this year and see if we can't push this off.

are going to have to face it sooner or later.

We

If

we have made a bust, let's face it and get it over
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with.

Clients don’t appreciate us hiding our mistakes.

If we have made them, we have to face up to them.
The sooner, the better.
MR. WOOD:

Could I ask what review you as

the chairman or the senior partner or a couple of your

close associates have of the audit that is conducted
by one of your newer partners of the client engagement?

Do you require the partner who has completed
an engagement to appear before a committee of Ernst
& Ernst.

MR. MAUTZ:

MR. WOOD:

MR. MAUTZ:

Are we speaking of an audit now?

Of an audit.

We get away from MAS.

No, the partner in charge of the

engagement, whom we call the client executive, will have
the people assigned to him as staff complete the audit.

He will review the work papers and the conclusions and
approve them, and then we require a second partner review.
That is, another audit partner who has had no relationship

with that client is assigned to review the audit

memorandum which spells out the various audit decisions

that have been made and what we think are the sensitive
and crucial issues, and to examine any work papers he
feels necessary in support of the review memorandum
and audit opinion.

He will make that review, and if he approves
the work, that is the sum total of the review.

MR. WOOD:

Why do you have him do that?

Why

is that partner reviewed?
MR. MAUTZ:

There are a number of ways to

respond to that question, but one of them certainly is
to assure that he has approached these issues from an
independent point of view.

MR. McCLOY:

If there is disagreement, does

it go higher?
MR. MAUTZ:

Yes, sir.

We have a policy

memorandum—I mention this because I was just talking
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about it to an MBA group the other day—we have a

policy memorandum that provides protection for anybody
on the audit staff, from the lowest level on up.

If he has a dispute with his superior and his superior
does not give him a satisfactory answer, he is required

to take the question to the next level above his
superior, and it marches all the way up until we
ultimately get to the managing partner if necessary

to provide a satisfactory resolution for the person
raising the issue.
MR. GARRETT:

Would you see some disadvantage

to the reputation and the credibility of the profession
if it got too far out in advisory services with some
of the kinds that you say you wouldn’t want to do?
MR. MAUTZ:

Certainly.

I can see any given

firm might get itself so extended that it lost the
reputation for a tight focus on its specialty that Mr.

McCloy was talking about.
If that happened to any given firm, it hurts

the whole profession.

I don’t think it is likely to

happen.
MR. GARRETT:

But you think other forces at

least as far as self-regulation is concerned ought to

be allowed to handle that problem?
MR. MAUTZ:

I have, and our firm has, a great

deal of faith in the market system.

The market makes

mistakes and it is slow to correct them, but so does

regulation make mistakes.

With a profession that

is changing as ours is, and with a business environment

that is growing as ours is, regulations that appear
appropriate today may just raise the dickens with what

we ought to be doing ten years from now.
It is very hard to repeal a regulation, and

we can see that regulation could possibly prevent
us from acquiring competence that we will badly need

a few years from now.
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Do you see any harm in these

MR. GARRETT:

two situations?

One, your firm’s revenue from MAS

gets to be more than 50% of your total revenues, or

with respect to a specific client, your aggregate
revenues from MAS exceed your audit fee.

Do either

of those cause you any worry?

I don't think either of them

MR. MAUTZ:

cause me worry because of the other controls we have
over independence.

From an independence view I

wouldn't worry about it.

I think it is very unlikely

to happen.
MR. GARRETT:

You mean, no matter how

successful your MAS gets, do you think you could still

maintain your independent professional quality as

an auditor?
The way we are organized, yes,

MR. MAUTZ:

sir.
MR. GARRETT:
MR. WOOD:

That is all I have.

Just one further question.

The

previous witnesses, particularly from the actuarial

field, objected to a continuous service in MAS by
CPAs.

Would you care to comment on that point?
You might do that better than

MR. MAUTZ:

I can, Tom.
MR. THOMAS R. TESTMAN:

You are doing so

well, Bob, that I don't think we should change.
MR. WOOD:

In the actuarial field, for

example, and it is in the appendix here.
MR. GARRETT:

Committee proposal.
MR. WOOD:

It is in the Executive

That continuous service in the

actuarial field would be objectionable.

a comment on that?
MR. TESTMAN:

Do you have

I won't respond to it as it

applies to the actuarial field because we are not
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providing that service.

The continuous service that

I think is being referred to has to do with whether
or not we are assuming a management role.

We do

not get ourselves postured so that we are involved

in a management role.
We have a number of clients that we perform
a large number of MAS projects for during a given year—

thus we may be involved for several months with this

client.

We have other instances where a single project,

particularly if it is a systems engagement, may well
run for several months or even a couple of years.

For these same clients, we may do very little consulting
in subsequent years.

I don’t believe that is what

is meant by continuous consulting.

Again, in no case

do we assume a management role.
MR. McCLOY:

What is your chief field in the

MAS area?
MR. MAUTZ:

I am not in the MAS area.

I am

on the audit staff.
MR. McCLOY:

MR. TESTMAN:

I mean your firm.
We are heaviest in the systems

area and in accounting, cost, budgeting, and financial
planning and control.

We have a number of individuals

that have skills and disciplines in management science,

industrial engineering, marketing (although not many
in this area), organization and personnel and the

like.

We have a multi-disciplinary practice.

MR. GARRETT:

How do you tell when a

recommendation that you make on a systems project is
your decision as against management's decision?
The suggestion was made that an adviser can
produce recommendations that are tantamount to the
decision, depending upon a variety of things, and I

think we are all familiar enough with how that can

be done.

How do you know when it really represents
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a conscious management decision as against circumstances?
In our guidelines to practice,

MR. TESTMAN:

we make quite a deal out of the fact that we do not

want to undertake an engagement unless we are satisfied
that the client can successfully implement the engagement.
MR. GARRETT:

What do you mean by that?

MR. TESTMAN:

To implement an engagement means

that they have to understand it.

competency and skills.

to make it work.

They have to have the

They have to have the organization

It would not behoove us to go in and

design a system if there was no one on the other end to
make it work successfully.

We have to live with our

recommendations.
You don’t operate the system?

MR. McCLOY:

We do not operate the system.

MR. TESTMAN:

However, if it doesn’t work, it obviously is going to
be a reflection on our work.

Therefore, we make every

effort to assist the client in successfully implementing

the system.
MR. MAUTZ:

In many of our MAS engagements,

I think our practice is to help the client get to where

he can make a decision.

We advise him what kind of

information he needs, tell him how to gather it, tell

him what he has to do, and show him the way to go
about it rather than come to him and say:

Here is

our recommendation.

MR. GARRETT:

At some point don’t you get

told to come in with a good system?
MR. TESTMAN:

I would not say so.

Obviously

there are technical elements of a system that perhaps

management is not in a position to make a sound
judgment on.
In that sense they might rely on us.

However, management is the one that makes all of the
significant decisions impacting the management function.
MR. GARRETT:

If it is a financial control
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system and the time comes in your management letter

to comply with SAS-20 on significant deficiencies,

who makes the decision whether to report a deficiency
in control within your firm?
MR. TESTMAN:

That would be the partner in

charge of the audit engagement.
MR. GARRETT:

Would he have had anything

to do with the work in recommending the system?
MR. TESTMAN:

responsibility.

He would have an oversight

Before we would undertake any work

with a client, we would have reviewed and conferred

with that partner in charge of the engagement as to
the appropriateness of providing that service.

He would then on a continuing basis want
to be satisfied that we were being responsive to that

client and doing the kind of job that we said we

would do.

Generally, he would be not involved in

any extensive way in the assignment itself.

MR. GARRETT:

What I am getting at, of

course, is the suggestion that if you had recommended
the system, you would be reluctant to point out the
deficiencies that otherwise should be pointed out.

MR. TESTMAN:

I could not accept that.

One of our arguments and our clients see it as a

real advantage in systems work, is that we are
very concerned and very responsive to the need for

good internal control and good audit trails.

I

have seen other non-accounting organizations provide
systems work that are not too attuned to that aspect.
I think you will find a significant difference in

this respect.
MR. McCLOY:

You mentioned a number of

things that tended to insure your independence.

Can

you mention any that you didn’t mention before that
you think could be added to insure this element of
independence other than eliminating MAS?
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Are there

any other things that you can think of that this

Board might recommend that would insure independence?
Beyond what you are doing now.
MR. MAUTZ:

I think the audit committee is

a great development, but I fear that what we are tending

to do now is perhaps overrate it, and there aren’t
enough trained people.

I don’t know that it would be

your problem, but it would be very useful if we had

some way of training audit committee members, teaching
them their responsibility.

MR. GARRETT:

How do you train a generalist?

PROFESSOR CARY:

How about retired senior

partners of accounting firms?
MR. MAUTZ:

That is happening, yes.

Our

retired managing partners are on a number of audit
committees already, and I think there will be more of
this.
MR. GARRETT:
MR. MAUTZ:

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you very much.
Now Mr. Henry Gunders of

Price Waterhouse.
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MR. HENRY GUNDERS:

Gentlemen, thank you for

the opportunity of making a statement on the issues
which have been so well exposed in your Notice of

your hearing.

I am Henry Gunders, a partner of Price

Waterhouse & Co. and its Vice Chairman of Management

Advisory Services.
I have been engaged in providing advisory

services since 1951.

During these twenty-seven years

of practice I have seen much of the evolution of the
MAS segment of the public accounting profession;
further, I have twice served on the MAS Executive

Committee of the AICPA, once from 1960 through 1963,
and again from 1974 through 1976.

The scope of services offered by independent
accounting firms has been a source of debate for more

than twenty years.

Some critics of the profession

continue to allege that the mere performance of certain

services, not considered traditional accounting and
auditing services, impairs the auditor's independence.
Several independent investigations into

this issue have been undertaken; we are aware of no
evidence that has been uncovered to support these

criticisms.

But the criticisms continue.

We

believe they result in large measure from a lack
of understanding of the real nature of the services
performed by independent accounting firms and of
the ways in which those services do—and do not--

affect a client's decision-making process.

Further,

the measures that accounting firms themselves have

taken to safeguard their audit independence may not
in the past have been adequately communicated.

We believe strongly that the public concerns
surrounding this issue must be resolved.

We have

serious doubts, however, whether this is an issue
that the profession should resolve itself through
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joint action.

We recognize that the members of the SEC
Practice Section have worked hard to attempt to identify

those services that have been the cause of most concern.
Moreover, they have set forth criteria that should be

used, in their view, to judge the types of services
that accounting firms should be permitted to provide

to their audit clients.

But we find ourselves in

disagreement with the approach taken in the Section’s

report, in two fundamental respects.
First, we do not believe that it is either
practical or in the public interest to make the

profession’s ability to provide services depend upon

how those services are characterized—that is, as
related to either "accounting" or "auditing."

The

scope of services offered by auditing firms should

not be limited by some abstract idea of what is
deemed "appropriate" for an accounting firm to do.

Independence should be the sole test; only where audit
independence would in fact be impaired should a service
be proscribed.

Further, we seriously question whether the
profession itself should attempt to limit the services

offered to the public by its members.

Any limitation

on the scope of services offered by independent
accountants would narrow the range of services

available to the public.

Moreover, our attorneys

have advised that, if such a limitation comes about
as the result of an agreement among firms that would
otherwise be competitors in offering the restricted

services, the antitrust implications are serious and
cannot be ignored.
Because of the significant dangers posed
in this regard, we believe that, if a limitation on
the scope of services offered by accounting firms is

to be imposed, it must come from outside the profession.
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The AICPA has for many years worked closely

with the SEC in developing specific examples to guide
in performing advisory services, as related to the

issue of independence, and should continue to perform
that supportive role.

These examples are available

to and understood by members of the profession.

As

a result, the SEC is sensitive to the concerns of the

day, and is able to deal effectively with the
independence issue as it pertains to scope of services.
Given these circumstances, it is abundantly clear

that the SEC has both the needed background and the

ability to set forth appropriate, enforceable
guidelines for independence as they relate to scope
of services.

Indeed, we believe that the continued public
concern over the scope of services offered by the

profession results in large measure from the fact
that the SEC has not faced up to this issue.

In

September of last year, the SEC called for public

comments to consider whether the provision of nonaudit services impairs the auditor’s independence.

It did not decide that issue, however, or even

establish guidelines for others to make the decision.
Instead, in its recent rule, ASR-250, the SEC shifted

the responsibility for making that decision to
individual boards of directors or their audit

committees.

ASR-250 requires audit committees to disclose
whether they considered the possible effects on
independence before permitting the auditor to perform
non-audit services for the corporation.

That portion

of the rule was not even in the SEC’s initial

proposal and, thus, was not exposed for public

comment. Moreover, while it purports to be simply
a procedural rule of disclosure, ASR-250 may well
have a devastating substantive effect—spilling
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out the baby with the bath water.

Audit committee will obviously be reluctant,
in the face of ASR-250, to state that they have not

Thus, ASR-

even considered the issue of independence.

250 is, in practical effect, a mandate to audit
committees to consider in advance of the engagement

of an accounting firm whether the provision of any
non-audit services will impair the firm's independence.

But how are audit committees to make that determination?
What specific guidelines should they apply?
has failed to establish any.

The SEC

Yet at the very time

the SEC is asking the profession to consider whether
the provision of non-audit services may impair

independence, it has in effect required individual
audit committees to make that factual determination

in advance, without any standards to guide their

decisions.

Let me make it clear that we do not oppose
the disclosures of advisory services to audit
committees, investors, or the public.

To the contrary,

we strongly support the disclosure of all services
performed by the principal accountant.

We encourage

audit committees to monitor closely the manner in

which we perform those services to assure that our

audit independence has not been impaired.

Indeed,

we believe that complete disclosure is critical

to enable the public to understand the steps we

have taken to safeguard our audit independence to
ensure that it is never compromised.

But, as I have mentioned, ASR-250 is far
more than a rule of disclosure.
It places what seems
to me to be an impossible burden on audit committees,

requiring them, in effect, to make a factual
determination in advance of an engagement without
any facts or any standards to guide in their decision.

It requires them to make their determination in a
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vacuum.

I do not think the SEC can fairly expect

this of audit committees.

There is another reason why ASR-250 is

fundamentally unfair.

Accounting firms have been

providing non-audit services to their clients now

for many years.

Any limitation on the ability of

accounting firms to continue providing a particular

service must be based on a comprehensive review of
the years of existing experience and the determination

that the service has in fact impaired independence.
No matter how capable they might be, individual

audit committees simply do not have the tools
needed to undertake that review.
Evidence is already accumulating that

ASR-250 will have an overbroad and "chilling" effect.
Audit committees are reading ASR-250 as evidence

of the SEC’s hostility to the provision of nonaudit services.

Rather than risk criticism for

making a "wrong" judgment, and having no standards

to guide their determinations, audit committees may

simply rule out the provision of any such services

by the firm that audits their financial statements.
As a result, firms may be barred from offering
services to their audit client even though they are

best able to provide those services and even though

no threat to independence exists.

In short, by

avoiding the issue, the SEC may well have decided

it—and done so in a way that is contrary to the
public interest.

The scope of services issue raises

important and difficult questions.

The SEC has the

responsibility to face those issues directly and

to resolve them, not simply to finesse them.
In coming to grips with this issue, the
SEC must keep firmly in mind that any restriction

on the scope of services to be offered by the
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accounting profession is anticompetitive.

It limits

the services available to consumers and restricts

the number of firms competing to provide those

services.

If such an anticompetitive restriction

is to be imposed—from whatever source—it must be

based on the finding that audit independence will, in
fact be impaired.

Absent such a finding—absent

proof that the provision of non-audit services
presents a real threat to independence —there should
be no bar to independent accounting firms providing

services to meet consumer needs.

And that should

be so whether or not the services are normally
considered or characterized as "accounting or auditing"

Any bar not based on evidence that

services.

independence would in fact be compromised would be
anticompetitive and detrimental to the public interest.

Making the profession’s ability to provide
services depend on what someone at some future time
might consider "related to auditing or accounting,"
would place the profession in a strait jacket, and may
well deprive the public of exactly those services that

auditing firms are best and most economically able to
perform.
Let me add a personal note here.

Based on

my more than two decades of experience in this field,
I believe that the characterization of services as
either "accounting" or "auditing" is simply irrelevant

to the critical issue—whether audit independence may
be impaired.

When would—or could—a non-audit service

threaten the independence of the principal accountant?
Certainly not because the service is rendered by someone
with expertise in a field other than strict accounting—

for example, in engineering, mathematics or computer
technology.

Nor is a threat posed by the fact that

the service bears on activities that take place
outside the client's accounting department, let us
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say, in the manufacturing plant, the warehouse, or
the sales office.

The threat arises not from the type of service

performed, but from the nature of the accountant's
relationship to his client while providing the
service.

Recommending that a client's management

take an operating decision—to build a new plant,

market a new product, or acquire a new facility—these
are the types of activities that would involve an

auditing firm in the role of management, and may pose
a potential threat to its independence.

It is not how the service is characterized,

or even the type of service, but, rather, the accountant's
involvement in the role that can only be management's

that poses the threat to independence.

What are needed,

in my view, are not arbitrary proscriptions of
particular services, but clear definitive standards

that will serve as guides in performing all services,

to assure that independence is not compromised.
Moreover, I must emphasize again that, when
the SEC examines this issue, it will not be writing on a

clean slate.

As I mentioned before, accounting firms

have been providing non-audit services for years.

A substantial reservoir of experience exists that may
be drawn upon to determine whether the provision of

any particular service has in fact impaired audit

independence.

Any restrictive regulation by the SEC

must be based upon this extensive experience, and not
upon surmise or speculation.

For example, in the notice of these hearings
you raised the question of the possible impact on
independence that might flow from the performance
of tax services.

And, you asked whether a distinction

should be drawn between them, and other advisory
services.

The rendering of tax services to clients of
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our firm is the responsibility of the Tax Department,

and, therefore, I cannot reply with the same
background of experience as is the case with

management advisory services.

But I believe that

tax services may perhaps provide the best example

of the need to examine the experience of which I have
spoken.
Bear in mind that the one main feature of

tax advisory services that distinguishes them from
other advisory services is the existence of an
external and independent review mechanism unrelated

either to the auditor or the client.

All tax

advisory services are conducted within the context
of rules, regulations, and interpretations established

by the particular taxing jurisdiction, and the
results of actions taken by a client in response
to tax advisory services are subject to adjustment

based on an external government review.

This special

feature, in my view, virtually eliminates any threat
to the auditor's independence.

More important here, however—that view
is borne out by experience.

As the Cohen Commission

Report noted, whatever potential conflict might

appear to exist is contradicted by the years of

actual experience.

After 60 years of experience

in providing tax services, no independence problems
have occurred.
To set my comments today in the proper
context, I believe it is important to mention the

limitations Price Waterhouse has imposed on its own

practice. Let there be no misunderstanding here—
we are not advocating caution in limiting services
because we at Price Waterhouse want to offer the

widest possible variety of management advisory

services to the public.

Far from it.

Seven years

ago Price Waterhouse adopted perhaps the most
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restrictive policy of any of the major independent
accounting firms with respect to management advisory

services.

We do not undertake any assignment that

would place any responsibility upon us for making

or recommending commercial decisions to management.
Moreover, we do not engage in actuarial services,
market analysis, product analysis, plant layout,
or product pricing.

We imposed these limitations

upon our practice because we believe they are
appropriate for Price Waterhouse.

In summary, we believe it is inappropriate

for the profession, or for the Public Oversight
Board on behalf of the profession, to limit the
services to be provided by independent accounting

firms.

The decision to proscribe services must be

made, if at all, by the SEC, and only on the basis
of its own factual determination that a particular
service has in fact impaired audit independence.

Moreover, we recommend that the Public

Oversight Board, and the Institute, petition the
SEC to withdraw that provision of ASR-250 which,
in effect, requires audit committees to determine
in advance whether the provision of non-audit
services might impair independence.

We urge the

SEC to come to grips with this issue itself.

MR. GARRETT:
MR. McCLOY:
MR. GUNDERS:
MR. McCLOY:

Thank you, Mr. Gunders.
Who are your lawyers?
Arnold & Porter

Maybe we ought to retain them.

(Laughter)
MR. GUNDERS:
MR. GARRETT:

might try Milbank.
MR. STARK:

Conflict of interest.

If we can’t get them, we
I was going to ask if your

lawyers have prepared a memorandum on this topic that
would be of interest to the POB that you would want
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to submit?
MR. GUNDERS:

Just a comment that I would

wish to submit; I believe that antitrust was a
consideration which was given to our position with
respect to the Metcalf inquiry.
How would the SEC be any better

MR. McCLOY:

equipped to decide this question than the audit

committee?

MR. GUNDERS:

For a number of reasons.

The SEC has had a constant stream of specific inquiries

such that if we do this, for example, if we maintain
a computer service bureau, will that allow us to

remain independent or not.

It is a methodology which

I will call making case law.

You will be relieved

that I am not an attorney, but I do believe that is

in tune with our system of jurisprudence in this
country.

I for one think it has served the profession

well.

Were that not to be the case, in the

litigious climate of today, it is strange that there
would have been no third party litigation.
MR. GARRETT:

I am beginning to wonder

who voted for the Executive Committee proposal.
you happen to know?

Do

(Laughter)

MR. GUNDERS:

Yes, I know.

MR. GARRETT:

Those other guys, whoever

they are.
Any other questions.
PROFESSOR CARY:

I take it this is consistent

with Price Waterhouse’s position and the Metcalf

Committee in that you believe fundamentally in
government intervention more than leaving it to
self-regulation.
MR. GUNDERS:

Not so, sir.

PROFESSOR CARY:
are suggesting.

In a sense this is what you

This is short of government intervention
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i.e., via the SEC.
MR. GUNDERS:

This suggests no legislative

action.

PROFESSOR CARY:

No, but it does suggest

movement.
MR. GUNDERS:

This suggests the translation,

if you will, of the case law made by the SEC with

respect to independence provisions into a set of

standards.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I don’t think they would

yet say that they have made a clear cut sort of set of

standards via case law yet, so therefore, it would have
to be, it would seem to me, a set of rules, you might

say, rule making.

MR. GARRETT:

They haven’t in this area.

I presume they imagined it was a little too sensitive.
In some other, they have, as you know, restated a
series of interpretations into the guidelines that
have been published over the last couple of years,

but those perhaps probably fall short of what some

of the more stringent ideas are within the Commission,
and it doesn’t seem suitable for that treatment right
now.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Is there any evidence that

leaving this, as you have pointed out, in the hands

of audit committees via ASR-250, has actually already
had an impact on, shall we say, a decision by those

committees, and therefore by their companies, to shift

from one auditing firm to another because it is
engaging in management services?
MR. GUNDERS:

Yes; that evidence is limited

because the final rules are hot off the press, so to
speak.

But, as Mr. Garrett has pointed out, the

audit committees are themselves making case law
because it is necessary in their proxy statements

to set forth what prior consideration they gave to
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the engagement of their principal accountants in
rendering their audit services; so, under those

circumstances, each and every audit committee

whose accountants have performed anything defined
as non-audit services obviously must deal with the

problem, and deal with it now.
MR. WOOD:

That is, effective with annual

reports, sir, September 30.

MR. GUNDERS:

yet.

September 30 is not here

But the drafting is hard upon us.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Therefore, in theory,

at least, the companies will be moving toward your

firm and one or two others one could mention because
they have most scrupulously avoided a broad range
of management advisory services.
MR. GUNDERS:

be conjecture.

Isn’t that right?

I think that would have to

I really can’t say.

PROFESSOR CARY:

It seems to me if they

have moved from somewhere, they now have to move
to somewhere else.
MR. GARRETT:

Would you drop the firm
It could be either.

or just drop a service?
PROFESSOR CARY:

In other words, they

could drop the service in respect of that company.
That is right.

MR. GARRETT:

Unless the contamination

is beyond that kind of treatment.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. GUNDERS:

this respect.

That is right.

Let's examine the issue in

I think both colleagues and competitors

sitting back of me would readily agree that a great
many management problems which will yield to
solution with better accounting data are not

diagnosed by the client.

They are diagnosed by

the accounting firm. They are diagnosed by the
accounting firm to the extent by which the accounting
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firm is able to penetrate the facts at hand, and

in a sense, flush out the problem.

To some degree, the interplay which I
foresee, broadly, and have specific evidence as yet

very narrowly,—I can count the cases on the fingers

of one hand at this point—run something like this.
Usually the authority for engaging an accounting

firm to render management advisory services will
be located within the management advisory services

will be located within the management structure,
setting aside those circumstances where the size

of the engagement would throw it into the purview
of the audit committee or the board of directors.

Under the provisions of the ASR-250, two

interesting and potentially far-reaching new issues
fit into this particular picture.

The first

involves a statement with respect to the need
for a particular service such that that need becomes

known to the audit committee.

This is an extremely

legitimate area of concern and one with which,

I repeat, we have no difficulty whatever.
It is our considered view that the
appearance of independence or, if you will,
noncompatible services, to the extent that an audit

committee member can deal with a particular issue

with understanding and prudence, will yield only

to education because appearance is in the eyes
of the beholder.

MR. McCLOY:

You said the audit committee

had no equipment to deal with this.
MR. GUNDERS:

I think, sir, by and large

the audit committee does not have equipment to

do it.

I will define such "equipment" as being,

first, a series of do’s and don'ts if you will,

and second, as having a broad base of past

experience.
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The latter can be gained by case law over

a period of years as it develops in a given company,
and by a retrospective view of what has, in fact,

been done by the accounting firm over years past
in evaluating whether that did or didn’t threaten
independence as proven out by the facts in the

intervening years.

The first, we recommend, should

be the standard setting, as a responsibility of
the Securities and Exchange Commission.

MR. WOOD:

It seems to me that your

position opposes self-regulation.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. WOOD:

That is my view, too.

That is what we are here for,

it seems to me, and what you are saying, in effect,

is that the industry, your profession, should not
regulate itself on this question of services.

It

should be controlled by standards uttered by the
SEC.

MR. GUNDERS:

Might we not regard what

I have said in a somewhat different context?

The

SEC would determine, as it consistently has done
in the past what, in fact, constitutes a threat

of a loss of de facto independence.

I go no

further.

The profession would regulate itself,
having those standards available for interpretation,
and then subjecting the practice of each and every

firm to peer review, and all of the other mechanisms
which the SEC division of firms contemplates; so

I draw a line, if you will, between the promulgation
of an interpretation of when an accountant is, in
fact, independent, and the monitoring of that

independence.
PROFESSOR CARY:

Except that the SEC

generally makes its rules by cases, and therefore,
it has to take action in order to generate those
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cases, and therefore, you are assuming the way

you are approaching it that it is likely to be
that it will not only be just setting up a rule
but also taking positions in court and what-have-

you in order to develop that set of standards.

That is the way the SEC certainly has
operated as you well know recently in improper

payments and what have you.
MR. GUNDERS:

I am not certain that we

have a perfect analogy as between the improper

payments issue and the independence issue.

Maybe

the SEC independence rulings which we read about
in the profession deal with a particular set of
circumstances that some practitioner has brought

before the SEC; thus, he might say, "Under these
circumstances, if I render these types of

services to a client, will that endanger or threaten
my independence as principal accountant?

And the

SEC then takes a position.

It seems reasonable that one could distill
principles from the case law that has thus been

created over so many, many years.
MR. WOOD:

If I follow you correctly,

you disposed of appearances of independence and
came down that only fact, only history, case,

facts on the compromise of independence should

govern the SEC, or govern the establishment of
proscriptions of services.

Am I correct so far?
MR. GUNDERS:

The SEC has in the past

provided advisory comments which are based on a set

of factual determinations placed before it.
The second part of your statement in which

you refer to, I believe, individual scope is one
which we would feel could be appropriately determined
by each particular set of the parties of interest,
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having in their possession these standards of independence.

MR. WOOD:

But getting back to this question

of appearance, the SEC has indicated in what I have

read that appearance of independence is very important.
How can you hope that a petition by the AICPA and this
group, the POB, to the SEC is going to detour their

thinking or rearrange it, so that they will come down
only on the side of the factual records?

They are

already on record as saying that the appearance of
independence is threatened—I mean, they have imlied
that.

Perhaps the Chairman hasn’t come down that way

yet, but it seems to me that you ought to face that

question before you resolve it so clearly that it is

up to the SEC to do.
MR. GUNDERS:

I have Chairman Williams’ remarks

very closely at heart, all of them, including the most
recent ones, and I suppose I would have to echo what

Bob Mautz said a few minutes ago.

In dealing with an

issue of this nature, one can deal with it in terms
of how one perceives reality; or one can deal with

it in terms of appearance, and also in terms of
political, or if you will excuse the expression,
cosmetic aspects.

I would hope that it could be dealt with
in the former regard only.

MR. WOOD:

In real terms.

MR. GARRETT:

To say that restrictions

would have to be based upon a factual finding of loss

of independence is really saying that there will

never be any restrictions except in perhaps the most
extreme cases.

It seems to me to resemble very much the
development of the profession’s attitude about

independence and financial interest, and that one
of the statements that we received I think described

this in summary fashion very well, and the argument
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was early made that if independence is a state of
mind, that is something ultimately known only to

the person whose state of mind is material, and it

certainly isn’t determined by whether he does or does

not own a hundred shares or a thousand shares of

stock or has some other little interest in the
company, he is still quite capable of being

independent.
The profession didn’t buy that for pretty

good reasons.

In fact, it perhaps overbought the

opposition by taking an extremely strict view with

respect to what kind of financial interest

contaminates or impairs independence, at least,

under the rules, not in fact in terms of what is
in the person's mind.

There are plenty of people

that are capable of ignoring the effect of their

actions upon the market value of 100 shares of
stock.

Congress has trouble understanding this
with proof of government appointments, too, but it

seems to me that if there are to be any rules in this
area, they really cannot be based upon a finding

of specific cases in which you can demonstrate through
direct causal effect the provision of a management
advisory service and a loss of independence.

You won't know about the loss of independence
until you see something else that has gone wrong,

namely, that the auditors in some way have been
deficient, and even then, you won't know whether
it was really caused by the management advisory
service or not.

If that is cosmetic, I think if

anything is to be done in the area, it really has
to be done on a conviction that certain things
would appear to create, as one of our earlier

speakers said, the proximate occasion for sin or

something of that sort, something that ought to be
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eliminated in a prophylactic way because the
temptations are too great and the experiences bad,

just as you say you can’t own 100 shares of stock.

If you are saying that the present standards
are all right, there is more regulatory type law here

than we know about through a collection of these

interpretive opinions that have been received on
particular cases by the staff, maybe those could be
codified or at least made known more broadly, and

out of those we could construct a sort of a restated

common law of management advisory services as they
relate to independence, and that is perhaps enough.
Maybe it is.

I don’t know what we would

get out of all of those opinions because I don’t

know what is in them.

Certainly the political case

is that something more needs to be done.

What we

are trying to decide is whether we agree with it.

MR. GUNDERS:

I think that is certainly

MR. GARRETT:

It is different now than

the case.
on previous occasions because not many people have

gone to the staff to ask whether they could pay
a bribe or not.

A few have.

MR. GUNDERS:

To your knowledge, Mr. Garrett,

has the SEC undertaken a searching inquiry to determine

whether some standards of independence can be

distilled from all of these opinions that have been
promulgated throughout the years?

MR. GARRETT:

I do not know.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I would like to ask one

other question.

In view of the fact that this is totally

in another area, but in view of the fact that Price
Waterhouse over the years has carefully, as you have
pointed out, avoided many areas of what fall within

the category of management advisory services, can you
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give any rationale for it.

Does it carry so far

as to raise a question whether these other firms
should be engaged in it?

MR. GUNDERS:

I think that question was

probably dealt with in the Metcalf testimony as well
as I could deal with it here; in that testimony
we made a rather strong statement that we felt

under no circumstances should that scope of

services which we have chosen ourselves become any

sort of a standard for the profession.
The reason that we have restricted our

scope as we did is based on our own perception of
the kind of enterprise that we want to be, and the
kind of services that we choose to render.

There is a great deal to be said in any
enterprise for being very clear about what function
one wishes to serve, and trying to be as competent

as one can at rendering that function, and that

function only.
MR. GARRETT:

If, accepting for purposes

of argument, that the Board should advise against

any limitation on services based on the concept
of compatibility or accounting-and audit-related

skills or areas, and recommend that the problem
be addressed only as a question of independence,
is there anything that could be achieved in a
constructive way by way of guidelines by which

peer reviewers might examine with respect to the

reviewed firm for the furnishing of services and
the possible effect on independence?

Is there

anything in that area that would be helpful?

I can see two possibilities.
One which you mentioned earlier, which would be the
MR. GUNDERS:

best possible set of statements with respect to
indicia of independence which must be present,

culled from past SEC experience, and the other one
188

would be possibly something similar to that which

we accountants have insisted our legal friends

provide to us in connection with an audit, and that
is an "independence" letter.

MR. GARRETT:

An independence letter from

the lawyers?

MR. GUNDERS:

No, from the accountants.

Saying what?

MR. McCLOY:

What does it say

today?

MR. GUNDERS:

It could set forth a scope of

services which is consistent with independence as

stated by the SEC.

You haven’t got that statement

MR. McCLOY:

from the SEC yet, have you?
MR. GUNDERS:

No, sir.

MR. GARRETT:

Obviously, the SEC doesn’t

know what it thinks or it would have said something.
There is considerable debate as to what its current

views are.

Now, what is has said it has collected from
Certainly for the last decade

past interpretations.

or so they are available.
MR. GUNDERS:

Yes, they are.

MR. GARRETT:

Has anybody done that sort of

job, a restatement job on those letters?

I suppose

some firms have on particular areas.
MR. GUNDERS:

I suppose as an intellectual

exercise it is something which holds some promise of

being useful, yes.
MR. GARRETT:

I have some hesitation about

glorifying that kind of expression from the staff
into law, but maybe it would be helpful.

MR. GUNDERS:
MR. GARRETT:
MR. WOOD:

Or rules.
We know what the rules are.

May I ask a question.

Does ASR-

250 require an audit committee to approve, before
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the services are rendered, MAS services hereafter?

MR. GUNDERS:
MR. WOOD:

Yes.

Or only to review MAS services

that have been performed, let’s say, in the preceding
year.
Mr. Wood, the initial

MR. GUNDERS:

September,

'77 proposed ruling which went out for

public comment and exposure, called only for the latter.
In other words, it was incumbent upon an audit committee
to satisfy itself as a matter of review that the

services of a non-audit nature performed by the
principal accountant did not endanger that accountant’s

independence.

The final rules, which were issued without
comment, revised that in two respects.

One, which you

have named, is that prior approval is now required.

The second one requires that prior approval be
provided in each individual instance.

As to that

second part, I must say I have some personal difficulty
as to its practicality because many audit committees

meet perhaps only once or twice a year.
MR. WOOD:

You put your finger right on it.

They would have to meet whenever.

Management would

have to alert the audit committee that it was proposing

to accept a new service from its auditing firm, and

that would require lots of attention to a new subject.
Thank you.

I will adjust my schedule as

an audit committee member.
MR. GUNDERS:
is 3% of the audit fee.

MR. GARRETT:

As you know, the down-stop
That is a rather fine mesh.
Obviously, you should increase

the fee.

I don’t think that is the
solution our clients are looking for, Mr. Garrett.
MR. GUNDERS:

MR. GARRETT:

I think we had best move on.

Thank you very much, Mr. Gunders.
Mr. Seitz.
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MR. JAMES E. SEITZ:

My name is Jim Seitz.

I am the partner in charge of the Los Angeles office
of Touche Ross & Co.

Prior to this assignment I spent

a great deal of my professional career in the management
advisory services area of our firm.

By way of background, I have served on the
Board of Directors of the AICPA for a period of four
years.

I served on the Management Advisory Services

Committee for a period of four years.

of that Committee for two years.

I was Chairman

In addition, I served

on the Scope and Structure Committee of the AICPA, which

produced an excellent report.

If you gentlemen have

not had the opportunity to review that, I would urge
you to do so.

I think it deals directly with the

subject at hand.

MR. McCLOY:
MR. SEITZ:

What is the report?
The report on Scope and Structure

for the accounting profession.

Because we have submitted our written report,
and in view of the time of day, the lateness of the

hour and the issues that have been raised, I will
deal with issues that I think are paramount to your
interest as I have heard expressed today.

Of course,

I will respond to any questions that you might have.

Mr. Garrett, we were one of the firms that
voted for Amendment B.

MR. GARRETT:
MR. SEITZ:

You are very welcome.

As I understand it, 13 of 21

members of the Executive Committee did so, and we were

one of those 13.

MR. GARRETT: That is close.
Do you have any more insight as to who was
for and who was against, big and little, national,

regional?
MR. SEITZ:
I think the real answer is only
a partial insight, and I don't think that is appropriate
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to report on that at this point in time.
We have been told all that

MR. GARRETT:

sort of thing is available to us.

MR. SEITZ:

I am sure it is.

I think what’s most important for you
gentlemen to understand is that we voted for this

because we thought it was perhaps the most

realistic, pragmatic solution available to the
profession at this point in time.

Interpreting

that another was is that we don’t like it, but

we like it better than what we thought were
available alternatives.
Mr. McCloy, I gathered from your

questioning this afternoon that in a sense you
are seeking some advice and counsel from us as to

what this Board should do relative to this whole
sticky issue, and at the risk of being presumptuous

I will give you my point of view on that.
I think that the only safe road is to

have a conceptual framework which is logical and

rational that people can live with.

I think the

only thing that I haven't heard today which to

me is very important is that management services
in CPA firms is not like a conglomerate.

We

don’t get the next best available service that

looks as though it has marketability and then

bring it into our home and make a profit on it.

As a practical matter, the way a
professional firm evolves, is that you start with
a core service and then you add adjacent services

to that as the marketplace, the economic conditions
and the time and place warrant.
Within the public accounting profession

over the last 10 or 15 years, we have had a
propensity to add two types of services, those

that become more quantitative and those that become
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more qualitative as the marketplace demands.

Each

service tends to, if you will, open up new vistas

and new requirements, and you get a fan effect
from your core service on each side, quantitative
and qualitative.

The important fact is that there is a

servo mechanism that stops us—stops any firm—from

going beyond, to extremes that do not have a
rational cause, and although that servo mechanism
is hard to describe, it is very important.
Mr. Auerbach, for example, said he had,

if I recall correctly, 9 partners in executive search
in his firm.

I don’t know the exact number of people

in Coopers & Lybrand in the U.S., but I would suspect

it is in the neighborhood of 8,000 to 10,000 people.

Now, why does he have 9 as opposed to a

hundred or five hundred.

I am not being presumptuous

I just want to use this as an example.

The way a CPA firm behaves in this day
and age is that there is a need for 9, but there

is not a need for a hundred.

A hundred would not

find a comfortable home in that environment.

Their

home would be more comfortable in other environments,

so you have a mechanism that allows for that.
Similarly, if we brought bookkeepers into

our firm, they would become very uncomfortable in
the firm because they would not be part of the group.

They would not be in the nucleus and the hub of

what we do, and they, too, would fall out.
This is very hard to describe to Congress.

It is very hard to describe to audit committees.
It
is hard to describe to people who haven’t lived with
the function, but it is a reality, and somebody

hopefully some day can articulate that so that
an informed public will understand.

Let me relate this concept to the Amendment
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We think this amendment is based upon

we endorsed.

the realities and the exigencies of the day, thus,

we voted for it.
With respect to both the fact and appearance

issues of independence, I can no longer deal with
appearance.

I don't know how to deal with it.

It

is a witch hunt.

The proscriptions that are placed upon us
are very real.

They are legal and marketing

proscriptions.

If we do something wrong, we are

going to get sued, and if we don't do something

well or if we are not as good as our competitors,

we are not going to have a place in the market.
I think that is terribly important to

recognize, and I would really urge that this
thought be emphasized in all of your deliberations.
Another thing hasn't been said.

Those

of us who live with the audit partners know they
are living in a very tough world these days.

If

you assume they are Mr. and Mrs. Average American,

they are not going to be intimidated by something

that will cause them to impair their independence
because the buck stops there.

If they are wrong,

they will go to jail, and we have to recognize
that.

So as a practitioner consulting within a

CPA firm, I can assure you I speak for all of my
partners.

Our audit partners are nonintimidatable,

as far as I am concerned.

Will you have a rotten apple in the barrel
as Krushchev said? I suppose we will.
I don't
think we are going to be a perfect profession, but
I think the pressures that have been placed upon

us these days are very healthy and I am happy
with them.

As to the quality of audits, I think all
of you gentlemen would agree that we are under
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pressure to improve, and we cannot improve by
eliminating the things we need.
The way the GAO audits has previously
been discussed, I think that process is a forerunner

of what is ahead of us in the private sector.
One of the questions you asked is what

are the probable effects in the business community

if management services went away.

think three things would happen.

Basically, I

One, business

would be short of a supplier of professional services

that they have shown they want.

Two, to reiterate,

I think the quality of audits would deteriorate over

time, and three, most importantly, over time,
probably within the next ten years, you would see
a general diminution of the quality of the people

that enter the public accounting profession.
For those of you who haven't been on
campuses for a number of years, I can assure you
that the things that the top, young, bright leaders

of tomorrow want is to work in an environment that
is challenging, that is not restrictive, that it
not sterile, that permits them to open their

horizons.

The more you contain disciplines, the

more you attract mediocrity, the less attractive

I would rather have a

the profession will become.

full scope service and take the risks that go along

with it than have a limited scope service and do
a poor quality job over time.
choice we face.

I think that is the

We have trade-offs that we have

to make.

Your last inquiry about the distinction
between tax and MS was almost an unfair inquiry
as it is so difficult to answer.
I think if you
listened, as I have, you got no answer so far

on that particular issue.

to answer it.

We don't know how

Taxes are an acceptable part of
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the accounting profession.

It has a formal structure.

People don’t even want to ask the question.
becomes embarrassing.

It

But, when you relate it to

other advisory services, then you either have to

throw the baby out with the bath water or say the
logic has to be applied in a different way to other
advisory services.

I would concede and concede totally that
the format of the tax structure, the review by IRS
and so on, do make it somewhat different, but in

the final analysis from a conceptual point of view,

I think there are very strong correlations.
In closing I would like to suggest this.
It seems to me today is not your concern, but rather,
it is important that you be sure that five and ten

years from now we have the right mechanism in the
accounting profession.

So you might have to swallow hard, make
some tough decisions, but to be certain that ten

years from now we have the auditing profession we
need in this country.
MR. GARRETT:
Seitz.

Thank you very much, Mr.

Gentlemen.
MR. McCLOY:

I don’t know that I have any

How deeply are you, Touche Ross, in the

questions.

MAS business?
MR. SEITZ:

In response to your question,

it represents approximately 15% of our dollar volume.
MR. McCLOY:

Do you do executive recruitment?

We did, sir, and within the
last six months to a year we eliminated that from our
MR. SEITZ:

activities.
MR. GARRETT:

MR. McCLOY:
MR. SEITZ:
as Mr. Mautz reported.

Would you tell us why?

What are your main areas?
We are not at all unlike E & E

Basically, we concentrate in
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the areas of financial planning, organization,
administration and control, systems activities and

derivatives thereof.
Do you do engineering in any

MR. McCLOY:

form at all?
MR. SEITZ:

Engineering is a very broad

word, Mr. McCloy.

I am talking about layouts.

MR. McCLOY:

MR. SEITZ:

I would suggest this, sir.

The

engineering that is typically done in 99% of CPA
firms is really in the field of industrial engineering

and since industrial engineering and accounting are
so closely related these days in the college
environment, it is very hard to separate the two.

That relates to such things as:

how the

job gets done, inventory control, production control,

these kinds of things.

Productivity improvements,

if you will.

MR. MATUSIAK:

Would you explain to us

the actuarial services that Touche Ross renders?

MR. SEITZ:

As a practical matter, we have

not been in the actuarial field very long.
MR. MATUSIAK:

There is a group called

Touche Ross Stennes?

MR. SEITZ:

That was a joint venture.

That

has been disbanded, and we are in the process, as
I think E & E reported, of auditing in-house actuarial

talent at this point in time.

Again, part of this

spectrum of requirements we feel we have to have.
MR. GARRETT:

One of the problems that

keeps arising with respect to the Executive Committee
proposal, I am sure you know, has to do with this

auditing-and accounting-skills related question

and some challenge of its relevancy as a matter of
logic and reason. Others would say: Even if it
makes sense, it is so open ended that it isn't
197

really a control at all, if an audit-related skill

or some sort of skill is useful to you in the conduct
of an audit.

Do you have any helpful answer for us?
MR. SEITZ:

I have some thoughts.

I don’t

know how helpful they will be, Mr. Garrett.
I remember many years ago there was an

article in the "Journal of Accountancy" by Herman
Bevis.

This article could have been written ten or

fifteen years ago.

You might recall it, Lou.

The

thrust and essence of the article was the accountants

requirements and ability to deal with economic data.

Let me editorialize from that point on.

If you really look at what we are trying

to do as accountants in this society, it seems to
me that what we have is a common language of business
which we ought to be very proud of because it must
have been an enormous breakthrough to come up with

something like that.

That language of business has

now become a translator of economic data, all kinds

of economic data from the floor of the shop, from the
advertising department, from the research department

into a common denominator we call dollars or money
or whatever the case might be.

Frankly, I don't

want to try to suggest that I am a semanticist and

know exactly what auditing skills and accounting
skills mean, but from a deep set of convictions
and from a long history of dealing in this field

in my judgment you cannot deal effectively as

accountants unless you are able to deal with economic
data of all types and translate it properly.
It
seems to me that if all we have in the accounting
profession are translators as opposed to understanders

of economic data, we have nothing at all and we end

up to be a bunch of eunuchs.
MR. GARRETT:
I understand that.
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I have

two questions.

One of them is commonplace in the discourse,

but I still want to put it.
most often is:

The one that I hear the

Well, if you need actuarial skills in

order to effectively audit a company that has actuarial

elements in its financial statements including pension
plans, and thatjustified having actuaries and actuarial

services, why isn’t the same thing true with respect
to geologists or oil and gas engineers if you are
auditing an oil company, and move on from there to any

sort of company you want to select.

Secondly, granted, if it is true that you

need to understand actuarial science to some degree to

audit an insurance company, why does that mean you have
to sell it as a separate service?
MR. SEITZ:

Let’s deal with the first question

first, geologists and so on.
Again it seems to me, and I think I will

pattern an answer after one Mr. Gunders made, that it
is totally contingent upon the firm that you have
decided to be the services you have decided to render
and the industries you have decided to serve.

If, for example, one decided to set up an

accounting firm that dealt solely with the oil and
gas industry and they were going to be the experts in

that field, there is probably a more prima facie case
available for having those skills that relate

specifically to the industry expertise, be they
geological, or whatever the case might be.
From our point of view, we would have

absolutely no rational business reason for putting
those types of skills into our organization if we
didn’t have that kind of clientele.

I think you

have to take specifics and deal with them, and I
would reiterate that you have to get back to the

concept of a spectrum of services that make sense
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for the marketplace that you are dealing with.
MR. GARRETT:

The only difference you would

draw between actuarial services and oil and gas

engineering would be the nature of the concentration

of your business?
MR. SEITZ:

No, sir, I think there is one

other basic distinction, and that is that the data and

the type of data you are dealing with and its direct
total impact on financial statements of actuarial

services is, in a sense, in this day and age, a bit
different than the geological data that you are

dealing with as it related to reporting on oil
companies .

I think there is a direct one-to-one
correlation right now which is not quite existent

in the other examples that you make.

MR. GARRETT:

Because of the intellectual

faculties necessary to understand?
MR. SEITZ:

Because of the nature of our

balance sheets right now and what is required to be

reported on down the line.
I think there are subtle differences there,

quite frankly.

I don’t pretend to be an expert in

the oil industry.

MR. MANZONI:

In adding actuarial services

or starting to add actuarial services, was that done

because you feel that it is necessary to do something

other than rely on the competence of the actuaries
performing actuarial services for clients whom you

audit?

MR. SEITZ:

I think the answer that does

depict our policy in that regard has two parts, one
of which is that we are developing a very good sized

practice in the insurance industry, and secondly, as

a result of that, we want to do the best job for the

industry we can and that includes having in-house
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actuaries and understanding it as well as we can.
MR. MANZONI:

So is there something to the

argument that there is a self-review if the auditors
actuaries, perform primary actuarial services?

MR. SEITZ:

I think the answer is yes, but—.

The review that the auditors would make of the actuaries

is a different form or review than the actuaries would

make themselves.
Secondly, I think it might be appropriate to

answer a question which you didn't ask which related to
the quality control services within our own firm as was

asked of another firm.

We, too, have a general services partner who

is in charge of each audit engagement.

There is an

outside second partner who reviews the work.

We have

a professional standards review function within each

office or within each territory that independently

reviews the work.

We have regional technical centers

located around the country.

When any issue comes up

that is debatable, it is passed through the technical

center.

We have an appellate court procedure within

the firm which begins with the partner on the job and

goes to the managing partner of the firm.

Thus, this

whole review process even as it would relate to actuarial

services at this point of time, would be touched by
those mechanisms if such mechanisms were required.
Therefore, I would suggested that simply using the

word "self-review” is maybe not quite adequate.
MR. MANZONI:

It seems that what you are

saying is that you have such good procedures that you

ought to be able to perform all sorts of management
services whether they are advisory or whether they are

primary because you have very good control procedures
internally.
MR. SEITZ:

Be definition and design, all

the services that we perform in that area are advisory.
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What about actuarial services?

MR. MANZONI.

MR. SEITZ:

I think if you recall the points

made in, I think it is appendix B of your document,

we have subscribed to those precepts in that context.

Do you perform actuarial

MR. MANZONI:

services for ERISA plans?
MR. SEITZ:

Yes.

We were told earlier when you

MR. MANZONI:

are performing actuarial services for the ERISA plans,
the actuary has to make the determination rather than

management.

Could you elaborate on that a little bit?
MR. SEITZ:

You are asking the wrong man

very technical questions in an area I really don’t

feel equipped to comment about, quite frankly.
MR. McCLOY:

questions.

I will put just a couple more

Is there anything that you can think of

that we might recommend?

I won’t say proscribe—that

we could recommend which would better insure the
independence of the accountancy firm that are not now

being applied?

That is one question I have, and the

other is I would like to have you tell me whether you

have a set of principles in Touche Ross which prescribes
the conduct of the accountants in their relations with
the corporations.

Do you have an ethic in the form of
principles in terms of your relation?

You don’t own

stock in the particular companies, do you?
MR. SEITZ:

No, like all other public

accountants, we don’t own stock in the companies we
audit.

MR. McCLOY:

Is there a set of rules that

you apply as to joining the same clubs?
gifts can you accept?

MR. SEITZ:

What kind of

Do you have any such principles?

Neither a lender nor borrower

would be one precept.
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Can you join clubs?

You betcha.

You know,

we are only on this earth one time as far as we know,

and we are going to enjoy it in that process.

I think

we would be just absolutely foolish to become monistic
What are our principles?

in this whole process.

Unless you could find a club

MR. GARRETT:

where you didn't have any clients.
MR. SEITZ:

(Laughter)

Those are hard to find these

days, but Mr. McCloy, we talk with the audit committee
these days about everything we are doing and why we are

doing it and how it stands, and we do that on anything

significant quite clearly.

So, I think the name of

the game these days is open and above board.

Putting

the cards on the table.

MR. McCLOY:

There is no other principle you

think we could endorse that would be helpful toward the
maintenance of the objectivity and the independence of
the accounting firm?

MR. SEITZ:

I could suggest that the better

the people you get, the more independent you are, these

kinds of things.
There is no mechanic?

MR. McCLOY:
MR. SEITZ:

I can't think of one offhand, no,

sir.

Thank you very much,

MR. GARRETT:

MR. SEITZ:

Mr. Seitz.

Thank you

MR. GARRETT:

Professor John 0. Mason.

We are glad you could stick with us, Mr.

Mason.

Please proceed.
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PROFESSOR JOHN 0. MASON, JR.:

I appreciate your

letting me appear at this late hour.

I am John Mason.

I am a Professor of Accounting

and Information Systems in the School of Accountancy

at the University of Alabama.
I have been a professor for a number of years.

In addition to being active in the academic community,
I am active in consulting work, participating on

cooperative engagements with several local CPA firms,

both in Alabama and in West Virginia.

I also consult

in my own name.
I am active in the Alabama Society of Certified

Public Accountants and have served as Vice Chairman of
its MAS Committee.

I have also served on one of the

MAS subcommittees of the AICPA.
Some consultants might refer to me as a
moonlighting consultant.

On the other hand, some of my

academic colleagues, hopefully tongue in cheek, refer

to me as a moonlighting professor.
In addition to my relationships in academia

and in practice, I am Chairman-elect of the American

Accounting Association’s MAS Section.

The American

Accounting Association is the umbrella association
for professors of accounting.

It is actively supported

by members of the public accounting profession.
The MAS Section is a special interest group

within the American Accounting Association, and it has
approximately 400 members.

Though I am an academician

and serve as Chairman-elect of the MAS Section, I

cannot speak for all academicians or for that matter
the 400 members of the MAS Section.

The views I express here are mine alone.

They do not necessarily represent those of the American

Accounting Association or its MAS Section.
MR. McCLOY: Only academicians belong to

this American Accounting Association?
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PROFESSOR MASON:

No, some practitioners

belong to the American Accounting Association, but I
would say that for the most part it is run by

academicians.
One of my primary purposes in being here is

to put in perspective some of the academic comment
that has come forth in the last several years relative

to public accounting and management advisory services.

But let me return to Public Notice 78-1, in
which the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice
Section has proposed two criteria for management

advisory services:

One, independence; the other,

skills relating to accounting and auditing.

Although I agree with the committee’s
independence criterion, yet I disagree somewhat with
its juxtaposition of "appearance of independence" to
MAS, I strongly oppose the proposed criterion that

the SEC practice member will "not undertake an

engagement for its audit clients registered with the
SEC where...the skills required are not related to

accounting and auditing."

The reason I am opposed

to this criterion is that I don't think it is
practicable.

The old adage: "Beauty is in the eyes of

the beholder" applies to the Executive Committee's

accounting and auditing related criterion.

What may

be "accounting and auditing related" in one person's

view may not necessarily be "accounting and auditing
related" to another person.

For example, some

individuals might make the case that any decision

process leading to the authorization of a transaction
of any type is accounting and auditing related.
Therefore, any advice that a CPA would contribute
to such a decision-making process by management would

be accounting and auditing related.
one end of the spectrum.
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This would be

At the other end of the spectrum stand
those who insist that accounting and auditing related
services are those dealing with the design of an
accounting system.

Therefore, I think that, in

practice, we would find that this second criterion,
’’accounting and auditing related,’’ would prove to be

ambiguous.

This remark leads to my major concern

and one of the reasons that I am here.

I think if the accounting and auditing
related criterion is adopted, it would lead to an
erosion of many management advisory services that are
presently conducted by CPAs for audit clients.
The rest of my comments relate mainly

to the second criterion, although some of them do
relate to the independence issue and to the origins
of the practice of public accounting.
First of all, I would like to make a

comment with respect to a sentence on page 3 of

Public Notice 78-1.

This sentence states that ’’the

practice of public accounting has its origins in
the attest function.’’

It is my belief that the practice of public

accounting has its origins in bookkeeping and advisory

services.

To emphasize my belief, I have provided

with my comments a copy of my article which appears

in the Proceedings of the 1978 Southeast Regional
Meeting of the American Accounting Association.

In

this article, which I will not read to you, you can

see that advisory services can be traced to
'Eighteenth Century Scotland, which strongly indicates

that our profession is really based on bookkeeping
and advisory services.

Tax and attest services

are relative newcomers to our profession.

We have a rich tradition of providing

business counsel and advice to our audit clients.
I am amazed that the Executive Committee of the SEC
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Practice Section and also the Public Oversight Board,

without benefit of hard data, would embark on a course

of eliminating this rich tradition of CPAs providing

business counsel and services to their clients.
MR. GARRETT:

Professor Mason, I suppose

that I ought to interject as a matter of clarification.
We haven’t embarked on a damn thing except to develop

views in response to a request from the Executive
Committee that we advise them on their proposals.

PROFESSOR MASON:
MR. GARRETT:

Okay.

Otherwise, we wouldn’t have

come close to this problem.

They laid this on us

and said: "Now you tell us what you think of it,"
and we are trying to figure out what we think.

(Laughter)

PROFESSOR MASON:

That’s fine, but it depends

on how one defines the word "embark."
MR. GARRETT:

All right.

PROFESSOR MASON:

A second point I would like

to make, and this one deals with independence, is that
hard data does not exist to support the notice that

the area of services provided by public accounting
firms to their audit clients results in a diminished

independence or appearance of independence of the
By hard data I mean specific instances where

auditors.

independence was compromised as a result of an MAS
engagement.

What we have is soft information, that is,
unsupported allegations, information that relies

almost exclusively on opinions, predictions, estimates,
and subjective evaluations.
We have seen over the last several years
three or four studies conducted by Professor Titard,

Professors Hartley and Ross, and others; and these

studies imply that as a result of advisory services,
the auditor identifies with the point of view of
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management.

I just don’t buy that.

In fact, if we take

a look at the Standards of Professional Conduct and
Practice of the Association of Consulting Management

Engineers (ACME), we see an emphasis on objectivity

by the consultant.

For example, Rule 1.1 of this

Code states: "We will at all times place...or serve

them /our clients/ with integrity, competence and
independence.

We will assume an independent position

with the client, making certain that our advice to
clients is based upon impartial consideration of all

pertinent facts and responsible opinions."
Rule 2.7 states: "We will not serve a client
under terms or conditions that might impair our

objectivity, independence or integrity, and we will

reserve the right to withdraw if conditions beyond
our control develop to interfere with the successful
conduct of the engagement."

Management consulting literature is replete
with the need for consultants to be objective and

independent; and yet, at the same time, we hear that
because we are consultants, because we are providing

management advice, we are not independent.

Herein

lies an obvious conflict, one involving what consultants
profess to be an ethical code as opposed to unsupported
opinions with regard to a CPA’s supposed lack of
independence when providing advisory services.
Further, I have reviewed the studies on

MAS and auditor independence; and they seem to present
a mixed bag of results. For example, if you take a
look at the Titard study, you will note, for example,
that one of the key areas where the respondents
felt that advisory services would impair independence
was business acquisitions and mergers.

Yet if you

look at the Hartley and Ross study, you will see that
their results indicate that this is one of the areas
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where respondents felt that independence would not

likely be impaired.
In another area, plant layout and design,
Titard found that his respondents foresaw little

impact on auditor independence, whereas Hartley and
Ross learned from their respondents that audit
independence would be significantly impaired by such
We have obvious

concomitant consulting advice.

conflicting results here.

Another aspect of audit independence we
keep hearing about it the common stockholder, the

common stockholder's confidence in the public

accounting profession, and the common stockholder's
view of the independence issue.

I am not so certain

that stockholders, the general stockholder, the Mom
and Dad who happen to own 200 or 300 shares of AT & T,

view auditor independence as an issue.

In fact, when

they look at the auditor's report, I sometimes think
they look upon it as an insurance certificate.

If

something goes wrong with the corporation, they
can sue the auditors and perhaps recover part of their

loss.

But to return to a point I made a few moments

ago, at best such notions about the lack of independence

are unsupported allegations.

At worst, they are

biased viewpoints, in my opinion, expressed by personnel

agencies and non-CPA management consultants for the

purpose of removing CPAs from management consulting
and thus decreasing competition in such fields as

executive recruitment, marketing analysis, and plant
layout.

I doubt that this decreased competition
would prove beneficial to audit clients, their creditors

or shareholders.

I think we are dealing here with

an issue of who is goring whose ox.

I think some

of these individuals who represent or own personal

agencies, or who represent or own management consulting
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houses, think their ox is being gored because they
don’t have as close a relationship with clients
as CPAs have with their audit clients; and I think

they would like to have a bit of a turnabout so

that the CPAs can’t provide management advisory
services for their audit clients.

Limiting CPAs

to auditing would give consulting houses and

personnel agencies a clear advantage.

Another point I would like to make is
that MAS capabilities within a CPA firm can enhance
the audit function.

We have already seen such

enhancement with respect to information systems.
As a result of providing clients with information

systems skills and services, CPA firms have been
better able to develop techniques for computer
controls, computer controls evaluations, and computer

auditing.
The same holds true, I believe, in the
areas of marketing analysis, plant layout and other

non-accounting fields of MAS or what some have alleged
to be non-accounting fields of MAS.
For example, I believe that in the areas

of plant layout and marketing analysis, the CPA’s
expertise, the in-house expertise possessed by CPA

firms, can assist the firm in making audit decisions

involving realization of assets.
Further, I point out that there is no

evidence that the performance of these services has
compromised any auditor.

Quite the contrary, the

performance of such services generally assists the

CPA firm by providing its representatives with greater
knowledge about the way its clients operate, the
industries in which clients operate, and the quality

of client personnel.

In my opinion, such knowledge

can only enhance the performance of the audit function.
Finally, two additional points:
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One, any

conclusion reached by this Board to recommend ending

certain advisory services provided by CPA firms
for their SEC audit clients will effectively curtail
the performance of these services for non-SEC audit
clients.

Two, curtailment of advisory services by

CPA firms may have a detrimental effect on accounting

education.
Let me elaborate further.

With respect

to the former point, the ultimate impact, in my
opinion, will be that many small and medium-sized

business firms will be precluded from obtaining
competent business counsel and advice.

I say this

because, given the legal environment in which CPA
firms now operate, it would be extremely difficult
for the profession to support two sets of standards,

one set for SEC audit clients and a second set for
non-SEC audit clients.

Thus, any action, and by action I mean
recommendations made by this Board, could ultimately
cutoff small and medium-sized businesses from
management advisory services of CPAs, which could

prove detrimental to these businesses; any, in my

opinion, these detrimental effects would filter
down to their creditors and shareholders.

I say

this because clients precluded from procuring services

from their CPAs may do without such services altogether

or, under certain circumstances, receive inferior
services.

This last possibility concerns me the

most.
I work with a number of local CPA firms

in Alabama and in West Virginia, and I have seen
what I refer to as the "disco inferno" that is played

for many small and medium-sized clients by hawkers
of computer systems.

I believe we are going to see

more of this peddling of computer systems to small
and medium-sized clients between now and 1985; and
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if you cut these firms off from business counsel

by their CPAs, you will see more disastrous computer
acquisitions in the future than you have seen up
to now.

Finally, as an accounting educator, I
feel that curtailment of advisory services by CPA

firms may have a detrimental effect on accounting
Though accounting graduates enter into

education.

public accounting, business service and government
service, many departments or schools of accounting

gear their curricula to the public accounting career
track.

If these departments or schools of accounting

perceive that public accounting consists only of

auditing-related services, they might effectively
remove the field of business from accounting

Such a move would set accounting education

education.

back 20 years, to a time when most of our courses
dealt with how to record debits and credits for
retail stores, for manufacturing firms, and
for hotels.

In the last ten to fifteen years we have

been able to include a considerable amount of business
education in accounting.

If we effectively remove

management advisory services from the field, or if

we give a signal to the universities and colleges

that we are proscribing or limiting advisory services
that can be performed by CPA firms for their audit

clients, we will also signal them to begin removing
non-accounting business courses from the accounting

curriculum.
As one who maintains that a good auditor
must have a keen understanding of business and how
it operates, I am gravely concerned that any action

by this Board or the Executive Committee to curtail
significant advisory services will, in the long run,

adversely affect accounting education.
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I do foresee problems.

I am not a Pollyanna.

One of the problems I foresee is competence—one of the

cornerstones of this profession.
aspect of competence by CPAs.

There is the collective

Competence insures public

confidence in all of the services that CPAs provide.
I recommend, therefore, that instead of looking at the

appearance of independence issue, that this Board look

at the competence issue, and that certain standards
of competence should be designed before a CPA firm,
whether local, regional, or national, be able to

offer services in a given area.

I think competence is the key, but how do

CPA firms become competent to offer advisory services?
Do they accomplish this through hiring of personnel,
formal education, examination?

As far as I know,

there are no examinations required for CPAs before

they can offer certain types of advisory services.
Another means of acquiring competence is

experience, and still another is continuing professional
education.

To insure competence in management advisory
services and thus maintain the public's confidence

in all services that CPAs provide, I recommend that

clear standards be established for competence before
CPA firms can offer management advisory services.
In conclusion, I recommend that this Board
not act without regard to hard evidence, and that
in the absence of hard evidence the Board not

recommend the curtailment of services which are
beneficial both to business firms and their auditors.
Further, I hope that this Board keeps in mind the
impact that its recommendations could have on accounting

education.
Again, in terms of recommendations, get

some hard data.

Since SEC Practice Section firms

are going to have to submit to peer review, one might,
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to insure both independence and competence, extend
beyond auditing services to management advisory

services engagements and then try to draw conclusions

about whether or not such MAS engagements compromise
the audit process.

Moreover, conduct extensive interviews.

If

we are going to rely on soft information, I would much
rather see the Board rely on extensive interviews
rather than the more impersonal questionnaires.

The

questionnaire technique presents, more or less, a
binary choice situation; for example, does the
respondent feel that such a service might impair

independence or might not?

From the questionnaire

we have no idea as to how hard and fast the

respondent’s convictions are.
Secondly, the questionnaire doesn’t tell
us very much about cause and effect.

Even in situations

where respondents reported no confidence in CPAs,

eliminating management advisory services does not

mean that we would upgrade their responses from

"no" to "perhaps" or "maybe?"

We don’t know from

the questionnaire technique why the respondents

voted "no confidence."

For this reason, I recommend

that research be conducted through in-depth interviews
rather than by questionnaire.

Those are my comments.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, Professor Mason.

I am sure you still teach the basics that debits
are toward the door and credits are toward the
window.

PROFESSOR MASON:

I basically teach in the

auditing area, systems area, and operations area.

Therefore, I really don’t become involved with
debits and credits to any great extent, although
I appreciate their importance.

MR. MANZONI:

I just have one.
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One of the

commentators—it wasn't today—it was in the written
comments—talked not so much about having a competitive
edge on the inside track, but talked about auditors

having access to trade secrets through auditing

information and such.

I think the comments were

from an EDP group.
Is there any merit to that sort of argument?
Are there trade secrets that an auditing firm can obtain

by doing an audit of an information system?
PROFESSOR MASON:

I don't think you would
I think you could build

learn any trade secrets.

an extensive data bank of experience relative to

information systems, and I think that would be
extremely helpful.
MR. MANZONI:

So that auditors in effect

then, they do have a better chance of gathering

information through a means which other EDP people
don’t have an opportunity.

PROFESSOR MASON:

CPA firms have an

opportunity to develop hands-on EDP expertise and
maintain a data bank on this expertise.

Should they

run into a problem, and the chances are that someone
in their organizations has probably run into a similar

problem elsewhere.
for assistance.

They could contact that individual

There are certain economies, you know,

that are brought about by size of firm and diversity
of client base.

MR. MANZONI:

This is not largeness.

This

is having an opportunity to go in and audit everyone

else’s system.
PROFESSOR MASON: That is acquired through
being a large auditing firm, I would think.
MR. MANZONI:

A data processing company that

was very large but it wasn’t an auditor wouldn't

have the same opportunity.
PROFESSOR MASON:

Well, an auditing firm
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probably has devoted a great deal of time to considering
controls that ought to be there; and therefore, that

should give a firm a significant edge, I would think.

I would think that many of those in EDP

who do not have an accounting background do not place
the same emphasis on controls as do CPAs.

MR. GARRETT:

Mr. Mason, at this hour of the

evening the idea of embarking on a program of research
through interviews is not terribly enticing.

(Laughter)

But maybe it will be in the morning.
The idea of a lack of hard data and clear

evidence keeps coming up, and I keep coming back with
the same question.

How would you ever get it, and we have never

got it with respect—
PROFESSOR MASON: —I think—
MR. GARRETT:

Let me finish the thought because

I think they are somewhat parallel.

We have never gotten

it and don’t even ask for it with respect to independence
based upon financial interest, and it is well established
in the profession and in the regulatory views also that

if you own stock in the client, your independence is
impaired, and nobody says that to establish that we have
to show that you deliberately or because of that did

not audit carefully or participated in something that
was improper in the way of financial reporting.

But

when it comes to MAS and independence, everybody seems
to want to say that we have got to find a smoking
gun before there is a case.
I suppose somewhere there might exist a tape

some day in which some idiot says:

"I am going to

blow this audit because I can sell them my actuarial
service if I cooperate," but I don’t really expect

ever to find that.

If any principles in this area have

to be based upon that kind of data, then of course,
it is an argument leading you to do nothing because

you will never build that kind of case.
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Interviews conceivably, we might.

agree with you on the questionnaires.

I quite

All of us were

laughing at this Streichman questionnaire that Haskins

& Sells sponsored and passed around.

That was with

respect to whether MAS can impair auditors'

independence, the lawyers as a category—and they
have several categories if you have seen it—came up

with the highest score adverse to independence.
is because the question was:

That

Do you think that the

providing of MAS might impair independence?

lawyer is going to answer that yes.
is only one possible answer to that.

Any

I mean, there

Of course, it

might, and I agree with you, but I do think in
criticizing the Section on its addressing the problem,
we have to accept the fact that the kind of hard data

that you think you want is just not going to be
attainable one way or the other.

PROFESSOR MASON:

But I am also reminded

of the numerous court cases that came about during
the Sixties and Seventies where everyone from lawyer

to SEC to CFAs to financial executives, conducted

an autopsy of every corporation that turned belly

up, and they came with many reasons like:

"The

auditor was too close to management;” but I have

yet to see a case at this close scrutiny where one
even suggested, except perhaps for Professor
Briloff,—

Mr. GARRETT:

You may be right about that.

PROFESSOR MASON: —that the CPA did not report
fairly or did not conduct an adequate examination and
prepare a proper report because of an MAS engagement
conflict.
It would seem to me that every possible

allegation of compromise of independence was suggested
during these autopsies of those cases that went to

court.

I have not examined, and therefore I don’t

know, whether the auditors for those clients conducted
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MAS engagements; but no one was able to come up

with any relationship between an MAS engagement
and the alleged poor quality of the audit.

That is an interesting

MR. GARRETT:

observation.

I had not heard that before.

MR. McCLOY:

I join you, Mr. Garrett;

I don’t place a great deal of importance on the fact

that we haven't had a nice all fours case here.

I think there are cases that one could find where
too close an association did tend to prejudice
the objectivity of the report.

I wouldn't want

to quote particular instances from my experiences,

but I do think it is a concern.

I am not comforted

by the fact that so many people have testified

that after years of years of investigation of

this and not a single case came up.

I don't

think that means that there weren't cases where
the association distorted the result.

PROFESSOR MASON:

Perhaps it is a type

of negative assurance!
MR. McCLOY:

I don't think I have got

anything more.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you very much for

coming and giving us the benefit of your views.

It was very interesting.

PROFESSOR MASON:
me to appear.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you for permitting

We meet again at 8:30.

That is what Lou Matusiak's schedule says.
(The hearing recessed at 6:00 o'clock.)
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FRIDAY MORNING SESSION
August 18, 1978
The hearing convened at 8:30 o’clock with

Mr. Garrett presiding.
MR. GARRETT:

Ladies and gentlemen, let’s come

to order for the morning.
For those of you who were not here yesterday,
there are a couple of bits of information I could add.

This is a hearing for the purpose of educating the Board.
We are grateful to all of you that are willing to share

your views with us.
Our immediate remedial purpose is to respond to
the request of the Executive Committee of the SEC Prac

tice Section who have issued proposed rules in the area

of scope of services--rules for the SEC Practice Section
and have requested our views on these proposals before

taking any further action.

This Board itself does not take official action
in the sense of adopting rules or repealing them.

role is advisory.

Our

Nevertheless, in the posture in which

this particular problem finds itself, we expect our views

will have some influence.
On administrative matters, with respect to the

transcript, it will be a publicly available document.
Those persons that are making presentations will be given
an opportunity to correct the transcript before it is put
in shape for any broader distribution, and anybody wishing

to get on the list to obtain a copy should get in touch
with Lou Matusiak either during today or write or tele

phone him when you get back to your offices.
Copies of the submissions that have been made
in writing are also available.

These can be examined at

Lou’s office in New York City where copies are available
upon request for a nominal charge determined by Lou to

approximate the cost of reproduction.
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With that, is Mr. Moss here?

Henry Moss of

Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser is our first witness.
Good morning, Mr. Moss.
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MR. HENRY S. MOSS:
MR. GARRETT:

Good morning, Mr. Garrett.

Indeed I should also explain we

have allotted a half hour to each witness.

Whatever

you do not spend in your prepared remarks, I suspect will
be taken up with questions, but you are free to proceed

in any way that you wish.
MR. MOSS:

Thank you.

Gentlemen:
Thank you for affording to me the opportunity
to discuss possible limitations of MAS as they may apply
to the scope of practice within our profession.

I wish

to point out that I am not directly concerned about these
limitations as they may impact upon "national firms"
and their publicly held (i.e., SEC clients).

I am sure, have provided to you

Those firms,

their insights,

experiences, and thoughts regarding the future, far
more thoroughly and with greater relevancy that I could

hope to achieve.

However, I am deeply concerned that

judgments which you, the Public Oversight Board, render
with respect to constraints upon service scope for SEC

clients will inevitably impact (and impact adversely)
upon the very large segment of the U.S. economy—the

small business enterprise, which I might say are the

type of clients that we in our firm handle.
I speak to you this afternoon as a CPA whose

area of professional practice is limited to providing
management advisory services therefore not as either

a partner of Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser although

my partners are in agreement with these remarks or as
a representative of any group of CPAs or CPA firms.
I don’t speak to you as a representative of any group
of CPAs or CPA firms, although I have reviewed my

remarks with fellow members of the MAS Small Business
Subcommittee and I can report to you that they are in

full agreement with these remarks.

To help you view

my remarks in context, the following describes some of
my major exposures within our profession.
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I am presently, and have been for the past ten years,
the partner in charge of management advisory services for

Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser.

located in Chicago.

We are a single office firm

I might add parenthetically that we have

had at least one full-time MAS practitioner for more than
thirty years.

I am a member of the Illinois CPA Society, and

former Chairman of its MAS Committee.
I am a member of the American Institute of CPAs and
a former member of both the MAS Executive Committee and the

Technical Standards Subcommittee.
I am presently Chairman of the AICPA MAS Subcommittee
on Small Business Consulting, Codirector of the National MAS

Training Program and Chairman of its Steering Committee.

I speak to you from this background of experience

gained over time and through such exposures to a relatively
broad spectrum of our profession and its members.

First, let us address "Will limitations placed upon
SEC practitioners impact upon smaller CPA firms providing ser
vices to privately held clients?"

In my judgment, any artificial limitation imposed

upon the segment of the profession consisting of approximately
500 practice units must, of necessity, filter through to all

of the other 20,000 practice units.
We all hold ourselves out as Certified Public

Accountants and most of us (as members of the AICPA) do, in
fact, represent to our clients that we meet its high practice

standards and do observe very rigid ethical practice and
restraints.

Therefore, to legislate that one class of CPA’s

may perform certain services and that a different class may
not is to deny both the rules and realities of our profession.
This is not to say that we all practice with similar client
bases, or provide a homogenous mix of services. Some prac
titioners provide solely tax assistance, others solely finan

cial advisory services, others maintain books and records for

222

their clients and others a broad mix of audit, accounting and

other related services.

But it is the personality, and skills

of the practitioner, and the demands of the, clients of the
firm that shape scope, not an imposed rule.

Thus, when any

CPA, regardless of the size of his firm or his clientele, per
forms a service, that specific service is provided to the best

of his ability in accordance with standards established for the
entire profession.

Indeed, it would be difficult, if not im

possible, to provide two sets of standards which a practitioner
must follow, which depend not upon the nature of the service

or the client, but solely upon some other aspect, such as how
broadly the client’s stock may be held.

Therefore, I conclude a limitation upon a few of us
will, in fact, become (soon) a limitation upon all of us.
The only alternative to this approach of consistency will, in
my judgment, be the fracturing of the AICPA into two complete

entities, i.e., those practitioners who choose to provide
services to publicly held clients in the one, and those practi
tioners who provide services to privately held entities in

the other.

Such a schism would inevitably both reduce the com

petitive choices available to business entities and impair

the quality of services provided to each client segment.
I will now address the impact, of MAS scope limitations,

on our clients.
Our clients are typically part of that large segment of
business, the privately owned, closely held, owner-managed

enterprises, which usually do not have in its organization any
depth of professional business skills.
According to statements I have recently seen, 96% of
all of the U.S. business entities, some 9,000,000 units, have

these characteristics.

223

A privately held company, of the type with which I

am most familiar, will typically select as his independent
accountant the firm or practitioner that he feels will be most

responsive to his total perceived needs.

Thus, in terms of

the fees he pays, the audit may represent the largest segment

by far, but in terms of his satisfaction with his CPA, the

audit may often rank far behind the general and specific
advice he solicits and receives in business management and tax

matters.

He wants a trained practitioner to provide guidance

in such matters as tax planning, product cost, plant expansion,

sales commission plans, acquisition and utilization of a com

puter and, specific assistance in such matters as cost accounting
systems, computer programming and in recruiting controllers,
bookkeepers, data processing personnel and the like.

Let us

look at the impact upon the client if some of the talked about
restraints were placed upon us.

Typically, the advice type of

questions, which now are handled over the phone or at lunch,
are not now discussed by the client with anyone other than his
CPA.

If he were to utilize some other consultant, it would be

at significant cost, because he (the consultant) did not have

the continuity of understanding of that particular business

that is inherent in the CPA's relationship with his client.
Let us look for a moment at a specific service area, the question

of executive recruiting from the client's point of view.
If the client has need for staffing assistance in
his accounting function, he normally comes first to his CPA.
He can do this confidentially without unduly alarming the

existing personnel.

He will be presented with several candi

dates whom the CPA considers to be technically qualified for his

final selection.
If the client were to receive a comparable ser
vice at comparable cost through other qualified sources, he
would still in most instances request his CPA to help define the
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position, to interview the prospective candidate, and evaluate
his technical qualifications.

This redundancy of work effort

would, of course, increase the total cost to the client.

So thus we have a situation whereby if recruiting
services were prohibited, the client’s needs might be met only

at increased cost, and with no assurance of a better quality

of service.
Finally, I would like to consider the impact of scope
limitations upon the very important and needed "attest" function

of our practice.

We are a large single office firm, and yet

we are not large enough to maintain on our audit staff, fulltime capability in such quantitative areas as electronic data
processing, statistical sampling, and the current techniques

of resolving discounted cash flow and present value problems.

Our MAS staff are continually striving to upgrade their skills
in these functions.

Thus, the cross-pollination for continuing

improvement of our audit skills is enhanced by the MAS function.

Scope limitations which might cause us to reduce our MAS staff,
and thus lessen our ability to attract and retain qualified
specialists because of lessened opportunities for advancement in
a smaller environment must therefore, of necessity, ultimately

impact adversely upon the quality of our remaining MAS practi
tioners.

This, in turn, would reduce their ability to support

the auditor, and thus the future quality of our audit service

may be diminished.
I

have not addressed myself to the elusive specter

of potential impairment of independence through MAS activities

because I understand others have done so. However, I do wish
the record to show that in my judgment our clients consider them

selves well served if, as they request, we provide service
with integrity and objectivity. That is what they are paying for
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and that is what we strive to provide.

If as the current

Institute pronouncements indicate that such qualities truly
define independence vis-a-vis MAS, then the question of
theoretical impairment is moot.
If the definition of independence for MAS is to in

clude all possible aspects of appearance in addition to in
tegrity and objectivity, then it should only be so changed if

there is a demonstrated need based upon factual presentation.
I am not aware of any such presentation.

But I am well aware

that our clients have needs for these services and continue
to request that we provide them.

I will be pleased to respond to any questions you

may have.

Again, let me thank you and wish you well in your

deliberations .
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MR. GARRETT: Gentlemen.

MR. McCLOY:

You say you have a rule in your execu

tive recruitment that you proffer three or four candidates
rather than one?

MR. MOSS:

Multiple, sir, and always two, hopefully

more.
MR. McCLOY:

Why is that?

MR. MOSS:

Because we never want to be in a

position of providing only one alternative to the clients.

The

client must make final decision.

MR. McCLOY:

If you did provide one alternative,

would that impair, in your judgment, the independence concept?
MR. MOSS:

sir, yes.

I think it would relate closely to it,

If we present a recommendation to a client of any

type whether it be executive recruiting or selection of a com

puter and say there is no other alternative, we are, in effect,
putting ourselves in the role of management, and we try very

hard to shy away from that.
MR. McCLOY:

Can I ask how large a part of your

business is executive recruitment very roughly?

MR. MOSS:

We have an eight-person MAS Staff.

We probably spend less than one full-time person, or the equi

valent of that.

In essence, in terms of dollar revenue to us,

it is a very small portion.

In terms of the contacts

at the

top level of a client, it becomes a very significant portion.

Mr. McCLOY:

You are constantly being, I suppose,

telephoned or called up and they would say, "Do you know a good

man here or there?"
MR. MOSS:

That automatically, but for example, it

just so happened yesterday one of our clients who happens to

be based in Milwaukee was on the phone three or four times with
me yesterday, arranged for a data processing manager candidate
from the Minneapolis area to come down to our offices yesterday

afternoon.

One of our managers and myself spent two hours with
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him, and then I brought that candidate out to the client’s

house in the northern suburbs yesterday evening.
That is not unusual that our clients want that type

of close contact.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. MOSS:

Do you always charge for that service?
We always charge for our time, sir, so

that it makes no difference how we spend our time.

If we are

spending it productively for the client, then we charge for it.
MR. McCLOY:

Outside of your tax service, what is the

other main MAS that you engage in?

MR. MOSS:

The vast bulk of our services are related

to a computer in one form or another.

We will make computer

feasibility studies.

I got another phone yesterday authorizing us to make

an operational audit of the efficiency of one of our larger
client’s data processing department.
We, in some cases, will assist clients in actually

programming their computer.
MR. McCLOY:

Do you do any actuarial work?

MR. MOSS:

No, sir.

MR. McCLOY:

That is all.

MR. GARRETT:

Bill, do you have any questions?

PROFESSOR CARY:
May I ask Mr. Moss, taking the
average client—that is rather difficult to pick the average

client—but on the average, what would you say the revenue
for you in respect to the attest function versus the other
functions that you perform is?

MR. MOSS:

What is the relationship?

I don’t know if I can quite state it

in terms of the average client, but in terms of the total firm

revenues, it is approximately 85% audit, 10% tax and 5 % MAS.

I may be a few percentage points off.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. MOSS:

And the balance is MAS.

And the balance is MAS.
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So that in a sense the notion that

PROFESSOR CARY:

if we throw tax into audit because at least some of us have
this notion that tax is an absolute essential role of account

ing firms, historically, and therefore probably today, if we
throw that out, there will be very little evidence that the
amount you do in respect to MAS would interfere with the

independence that you would exercise in respect of audit.

Isn’t

that correct?

I would certainly concur.

MR. MOSS:

PROFESSOR CARY:

You would concur.

That is where you

come out?
MR. MOSS:

Right.

Our posture regarding MAS is not

that it is a money maker for my partners and myself.

Our

posture is that it is a service necessary to support the
client relationships, to give the client help in those areas

which he requests, and we feel it is very good both from

a

business attraction and a business retention standpoint even
though it does not materially affect our revenues.

PROFESSOR CARY:

You don’t have many cases in which

the MAS side of it is more than, say, 25% of the total fees
from the audit firm?

MR. MOSS:

In some instances, some very few instances,

this may happen if we are assisting a client in, let’s say,

a rather large computer installation.
PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. MOSS:

One shot.

Then in the one or two years that that

takes we may get larger fees than the audit, but over the
life cycle of a client relationship, the MAS fees tend to be
very small compared to the total audit fees.
PROFESSOR CARY: Thank you.
MR. MATUSIAK:

is an 85-10-5% breakdown.

A question of clarification.

This

Does the 5% include only formal

MAS engagements that are subject to separate billing, or does

that also include the day-to-day consulting on operational

matters?
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MR. MOSS:

point.

I think your clarification is a good

I am breaking our fees down in terms of the people

who are in each of the departments.

There is no question that my audit partners

do

frequently, either without me or with me, will spend time in
conference with the clients discussing their broad business

matters.
MR. MATUSIAK:

That is accounted for as auditing

fees?
MR. MOSS: We don’t segregate. That is why I
can’t give you an exact breakdown, but it would be listed

in our time sheets as conference time.

Most of the con

ference time would be what we are calling advisory services

here, so from that standpoint probably our advisory function is
more like 10% than 5% of our total revenues.
MR. McCLOY:

On your recruiting business, may I inter

vene again, sir, if you were making a recommendation, say, for

an accounting officer to the client, do you ever recommend an
accountant from competitor of yours?

MR. MOSS:

I would say the vast majority of the

people whom we recommend who have had public accounting ex
perience are non-AM & G alumni.

The AM & G alumni that we help

place probably amount to less than one person a year.
What happens is that most of our alumni who are

very competent go into smaller CPA firms.

They tend not to

go into public practice on their own.
MR. GARRETT:

Mr. Moss, we have heard from you and

from others including Professor Mason yesterday afternoon on
the stimulating effects, so to speak, of the MAS aspect of the
public accounting practice both in attracting students into the

profession and also attracting graduates of schools into parti
cular firms.

But one thing we have neglected to ask, and I

certainly don’t know, is the extent to which these MAS services
are performed by CPAs.
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I wonder how stimulating it would be to have an

actuarial capability if it was all done by actuaries who

weren’t CPAs and sat off in a different office and were not
part of the normal career development.
Is your MAS staff

How does it work with your firm?

all or predominantly CPAs?
MR. MOSS:

Right now of the

I am sorry to say no.

eight of us, I am the only CPA.

I might mention I am trained

primarily as an industrial engineer, and when I got into this
profession, I felt it important to become a CPA, but I can also

say to you that of the eight, six are in school in the evenings,
and if you were to hold these hearings a year from now, I hope

I could make a much more positive statement.
In our firm we do put, if not pressure, we certainly

hold out an enticement or carrot saying:

We want you very much

to become a CPA and be a full part of the profession.
MR. GARRETT:

But the MAS experience, I gather from

your response, is not part of the normal career path develop

ment for someone looking toward leadership in a CPA firm?
MR. MOSS:

No, in a firm such as ours, typically

the senior partners and typically the fastest track to
partnership is through the audit function.

We have been unable in our firm to attract men
and women for MAS, from the audit staff, because they see

that if they were to do that, they would perhaps be coming

in at the bottom end of a department while they already
have progressed quite well within the audit functions.

MR. GARRETT:

One other question.

Have

you had a chance to examine the Executive Committee's pro
posals that are the specific subject of this hearing and
measure your own MAS services against them?

MR. MOSS:

Yes sir.

MR. GARRETT:

And do you think it would
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affect

what you are now doing if they were to become Section rules?

Don’t give away the store if there is something

you are going to want to argue about, but some ideas.
MR. MOSS:

If you are asking me:

What do I feel

vis-a-vis our own firm's practice, I can answer fairly speci

fically.

As I mentioned before, I am trained as an industrial
engineer, but we long ago decided that we were not going
to do industrial engineering work or plant layout, time

study or whatever it may be because it didn't fit into our
perceived areas of the services we wanted to render, not

that we felt that it was inherently wrong, but we as a firm

just chose not to enter into that.
The same thing for the marketing and the actuarial

services, perhaps because we never had a large enough demand.
I know of no way that we can stay in business as

CPAs and not provide assistance in recruiting bookkeepers,

accountants, controllers, because we get the phone call that

you mentioned earlier:

"Do you know somebody who can help

us in this area?" or "I am thinking of hiring this person
as my controller.

Will you talk with him.

out their references?"

Will you check

Whatever it is.

These calls have been in existence since we as a

firm have been in existence.

We just don't know how to get

out of that business and still meet the very needs of our
clients.

MR. GARRETT:

But your other businesses, your other

services, would seem to come within the standards set out in
these proposals, auditing-and accounting-related skills?
MR. MOSS: I certainly consider anything having to
do with a computer today related to accounting and auditing.

I don't know how to distinguish between them even though
some applications we work on in the computer area, for in

stance, sales history or inventory management are not specifi

cally related to the books of account, but they flow from or

to the books of account.
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MR. GARRETT:

Anything else?

PROFESSOR CARY:

I would just like to follow through.

Certainly one of the basic reasons why there is a rationale for

MAS in an accounting firm as another function is a point I
think you have brought out, namely that it helps in the

auditing today.

I mean it is almost a necessary ingredient I

take it.
Doubts were raised in my mind when you say you are

the only CPA, and therefore, the rest are not.

How do you tie in the MAS role, computer under
standing and so forth with the audit function in your firm?
MR. MOSS:

We perform no MAS services without re

viewing the project in advance with the audit partner and

manager.

We make no recommendations to the client without

reviewing those recommendations with the audit partner
and manager, and generally, half way through, let’s say we
are designing an accounting system, a fairly standard sort

of thing, then we will review the design and concept with
our audit people to make sure that the controls and checks

and balances are there.
Also, as I indicated in my prepared remarks, we
provide assistance to the audit staff in such matters as

internal control systems, EDP audit techniques, statistical

sampling and present value analysis.

I might also say that our people by and large on our
MAS staff are either trained as or are training themselves
through formal education as accountants, and they speak and

lunch with and are a part of our in-house training programs.
They just have not passed the exam, but they hopefully will do
so fairly soon.

MR. MANZONI: You mentioned that there is heavy
emphasis in your firm on computers.

Do you do what has been referred to as turn key
arrangements ?
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MR. MOSS:

We will not use that word because a

turn-key to us implies that the client waves a magic wand and

everything is ready.
We will do nothing unless the client participates

very actively, but we will provide services in a broad spec
trum from systems design, program specs, programming, testing

and training of the people, but we expect the client, and
will not touch a job to have an executive working with our
project team every step of the way and will not touch such

a job without such an assurance.

MR. MANZONI:

You mentioned that in one of the

cases you were involved in you actually did some programming.
MR. MOSS:

Yes sir.

MR. MANZONI:

To what extent would the client have

been involved in that process?
MR. MOSS:

The client will review the program

specifications, will review the test results.
MR. GARRETT:
MR. MOSS:

Thank you very much, Mr. Moss.

Thank you, sir.

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell

& Company.
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MR. STANLEY R. KLION: Good morning, gentlemen.
I am Stanley Klion, Vice Chairman of Management
Consulting of Peat, Marwick & Mitchell Company.

I

am Chairman of the AICPA MAS Executive Committee.

By way of background, I have been with my

firm since 1955, always in the MAS department, and like

Henry Moss who preceded me on the stand, I am also an
industrial engineer and a CPA.
During all of my career, I have participated

actively in Institute and State Society affairs, and
I guess I have participated in a good deal of the

professional writing that has been referenced in all

of the documents that come before your Board, including,

I might add, SAS-11 to which reference has been made
frequently.

Rather than read my testimony, which I

submitted to Mr. Matusiak several weeks ago, I would
like to highlight, if I may, a few points which I
think are particularly relevant and then engage in

such dialogue as the Board might require.
I am very grateful for the opportunity to

come here as is my firm because I believe the judgments
that derive out of this Board will be particularly

significant to our profession.

Mr. Garrett observed early on this morning

that you do not stand the test of law, but sir, I
would suggest to you that your opinions may have more

than just a little bit of weight, and you will not
only affect our scope of practice, I think indeed,

you will affect the vitality and the viability of
or our practice and everybody will be so affected,
practitioner, many of whom will be before you, the
clients whom we serve, the Federal government and

society at large.

I do not believe those are

separable; I think they all relate one to the other.

I am sure that many of my predecessors to
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this table have some and spoken about the single criterion
which so many of us believe is the only yardstick

against which we should measure the practice that we
do, namely, independence.

Independence, of course,

depends upon role and that is a word I am sure you have

your fill of, but let me speak for just a minute about
what most of us believe role to be.

It means careful

control of not participating in management decisions.
That is not something that is unique to the CPA

profession.

That is indigenous to quality consulting.

It is interesting that the role of the CPA

firms, of which I know, which have standard manuals

and most of the non-CPA management consulting firms,
of which I know, including the major ones whose names

are familiar, all stipulate quite clearly that they will
not engage in management decision making, and they
measure their performance against that rule.

The effort to define scope of practice in

terms of functions or the technical content of work
that is being done, has simply failed to be effective.

To put it another way, I can be just as contaminated
in terms of independence by doing accounting-and

auditing-related work as doing non-auditing-and
accounting-related work.

It simply depends on whether

or not I am a participant in management or I am a
counselor to management.

I would agree that that is not an easy
line to draw.

That is the skill of the consultant.

It is in the client's self-interest to see that the

consultant maintains that role, and the adherence

to that role is absolutely crucial to an understanding,
it seems to me, of the definition of scope and the
constraints that may be placed upon it.

To repeat, I can be just as guilty or just

as pure by doing accounting-and auditing-related work
as nonaccounting and nonauditing-related work.
That is not the criterion against which my
237

independence should be measured because it isn’t relevant
to my independence.

Mr. Cary commented to the previous witness

as to the support that the auditor gets, indeed, must
get from MAS services.

I am sure many have said to

you before that the existence of MAS activities becomes
increasingly more attractive to the young people whom

we attract to this profession and on whom all professions

depend wholly.
I think there is a clear correlation between

the quality of person that enters the accounting

profession now, who is discarding the old green eye
shade stereotype, if you will, that many of us have
considered as accountants heretofore, and the diversity

of activities which the accounting profession renders
to its clients.

We are charged by the public and by the
government, to know the businesses we audit, to know
the business, not just deal with "the figures," and

that requirement to know depends upon a broad array
of professional skills.
Chairman Williams of the SEC has said quite

clearly that we are going to have to report on the
internal controls of our clients.

accounting is here upon us.

Current value

Prospective reporting

is something that all of us are asked to speak to.
Our responsibilities to the public increase,
and in my view, properly so.

It is ironic, indeed,

that the GAO, the Congress’ own accounting arm, has
more than half of its people in non-audit activities,
in what we would call MAS skills, because the GAO

perceives the need for such talent, and the very
same Congress, through some of its representatives,
is trying to say to us that we should go the other

way, that we should narrow the skills that we have.

It simply doesn’t stand the test of logic.
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I would argue, as so many have argued before, that the
presence of MAS assists in making better audits,
and the converse of that is equally true—the absence

of MAS will make poorer audits.
Finally, let me observe that as again I am

sure many have, that there is simply no evidence that
has ever been presented to suggest that the practice

of MAS clouds our independence.

In my briefings last

evening and this morning, I have been told that the

Board considers the absence of a "smoking gun" not
particularly relevant.

in some measure.

I might share in that view

But there is hardly a subject that

has gotten more research than the potential compromise
of independence of MAS services.

It has been the

subject, I suppose, of more doctoral theses of schools

of accounting than almost any other you might think
of, and if a "smoking gun" were there, the Lord knows
somebody would have found it by now because an awful
lot of people have looked for it.

it just doesn’t exist.

The fact is that

It just doesn’t exist.

We would argue my firm—I personally, and
a great many of my colleagues—that society becomes

the poorer from the service of accountancy if we are
not permitted to render competent services which are

generally described as MAS.

I should say, of course,

that competence and due care is a presumption.

If

you do not have that, then all of the other arguments
Then you simply shouldn't practice your

go aside.
profession.

Now may I serve the Board in any other way.
MR. GARRETT: Gentlemen:
MR. McCLOY:
I think I am one of those that
have probably been quoted as being a little bit

skeptical about this talk about no case ever having

come, no smoking gun having ever been found.
I think I know out of my own experiences,
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of cases where there has been too close an association
between the accountant and the management which has

not been conducive to good results.

There does seem to be a substantial amount
of opinions, that have been quoted, I guess, a
significant minority who felt that this area did

in some way compromise independence.

It is a little difficult to analyze and to
put your finger on it.
Let me start out by asking you, out of your

great experience, what, if anything, should we be
doing that we are not doing now to help insure the

objectivity and the independence of the accountants?
Is there any area that you feel would really be
relevant that we might look into to enhance the

probability of objectivity that we are not doing
now?
MR. KLION:

Yes, sir.

I would like to

answer perhaps one comment you made as well as your

question.

I don't doubt for a minute that there are

cases where accountants and management have been
perceived to be too close together and indeed even

having actually having been too close together.
I submit that problem is not a function of the

particular activities they were practicing, but
rather a function of the relationship of two people.
One can compromise one's independence just as

easily doing audits as doing MAS work.
MR. McCLOY:

say about that.
MR. KLION:

I am interested in what you
I think there is one enormously

important thing that this Board could do, and that
is to bring this discussion to the beginning of its

end.
I think accountants have labored under a
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cloud relative to MAS activities for virtually as

long as I have been practicing, and that is 23 years.
In the late Sixties we went through a burst
of time not unlike this.

As my testimony suggests,

the late Manuel Cohen made observation about some of

the concerns that he had, and I would observe with
some comfort that his Commission, which he chaired

so brilliantly before he passed away, came to the
conclusion that no restriction was necessary.

We

have invested enormous time and enormous costs and

more importantly credibility, I think, with the

public, and we seem to be dealing solely with
As to the "significant

perceptions or possibilities.
minority" sir,

to which you refer, I think the same

source comments that the more familiar or the more

sophisticated the observer is with the (MAS) service,
the less concern he or she has.

I think it is time to bring the subject to

an end, and I think the opinion of this Board will
be enormously important in so doing.

I made the case in my testimony that,
recognizing very clearly that my Chairman also serves
as Chairman of the SEC Practice Section, I believe
the amendments which are really the principal subject

of this hearing are excessively restrictive.

I do

not think they stand the test of logic, and my

testimony, with his very clear approval, says that.
We are quite prepared to live with that
testimony in spirit and in letter, and indeed, we

have adjusted our scope at the moment to accommodate

everything that is there. That doesn’t represent
very much of an adjustment for us, but whatever was
necessary, we have done.

We have done so in the hope that this will

be the end of this cloud, that we will be permitted
to practice our profession soundly and competently
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and under the constraints that we impose upon ourselves.
I know of no profession that has put stronger

constraints on its behavior than the accounting

profession has.

So, despite the fact that we believe

this amendment is excessive, we believe it is important
to get this matter behind us, and Mr. McCloy, if this

Board does nothing more than assist in that activity,
I think it will help the accounting profession to re

establish its credibility beyond anything else.

That is sort of a long-winded answer to
your question.
MR. McCLOY:

you put on this Board.
thing.

That is quite a responsibility

We are new boys in this

After all, as you say, there have been 20
We have only been seized with

years of discussion.

this question for the last couple of weeks.
I understand your point on that, but I

was reaching out, I think, for something else.
can understand that is a negative position.
this thing to bed.

I

We put

That is fine.

Is there anything affirmative in addition

to that which we could do that would tend to insure
or help insure, enhance the atmosphere of
independence?
You can’t legislate independence.

can’t legislate that.
MR. KLION:

You

I am perfectly clear on that.

Legislating morality, and that

isn't a doable thing.

Mr. McCLOY:

You can't do it, but there are

things that can be done.
A number of people testified yesterday
about pointing out a number of features that were
conducive to the concept of independence.
I just wondered whether out of your

experience you think there is anything that we should
stress on the positive side.
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MR. KLION:

I think the existence of the

Board is a positive manifestation of the things that

have been done.

The profession has, in fact, put

its stewardship under the surveillance of a distinguished

panel of five non-accountants.

questions of peer review.

You have dealt with

You have dealt with

questions of sanctions against misbehavior, and I

think all of those things are fine.

I might add that while peer review at the
moment relates only to audit activities, my own firm,

and most of the large firms of which I know, provide
internal quality assurance procedures involving all

three departments under the same type of review.
I have in my bag now the results of our
own internal quality assurance program which is an
around-the-clock, constant thing.

Indeed, one of the

persons present in this room now who is one of my
partners, is a member of what we call Professional

Practice Review Committee.
It is a major job of reviewing our own

performance, and I think the establishment of this
Board is a way of doing that for the profession as
a whole.

This quality assurance is indeed a very

positive step in that regard.
MR. McCLOY:

Does your firm do executive

recruiting?

MR. KLION:

MR. McCLOY:

Yes, sir, we do.

Do you have this rule that

you never make a proposal unless it is multiplied?

MR. KLION:

Yes, sir, and for the reasons

that Henry Moss spoke because if you offer only one
person, you are making a management decision de
facto if not de jure.

MR. McCLOY:

But if you did offer only

one man, do you think that would impair the objectivity
or the independence of your position?
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MR. KLION:

I don’t think it would impair

it in fact, but it might impair it in appearance,

and that is one of the reasons why we don't do it.

I might add, sir, that providing executive
recruiting services as those of us who do, under formal
rigorous professional constraints, in my view, is a

great deal sounder than having the permission or the
ability "to refer some one known to us," to quote the
amendment.

If ever there is an opportunity for the
appearance of a lack of independence, it is clearly
that.

Which is preferable—"I have a friend, and

wouldn’t you like to hire him?" or "would you like
to pay me for the service of really researching

whether these candidates meet your needs?"
I don't have a great deal of problem in
deciding which one appears to be better.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. KLION:
MR. GARRETT:

The one is more professional.
Absolutely.

Mr. Klion, after that, what

is your attitude or your views toward the Executive
Committee proposals?
MR. KLION:

Well, sir, as I tried to set

forth, Mr. Garrett, I believe the amendment that is
the subject of this hearing is based on incorrect

criteria, because it is trying to define independence
in terms of function or technical content.

MR. GARRETT:

auditing skill?
MR. KLION:

You would drop the accounting,

That criterion, I do not believe,

is relevant.
Let me say quite clearly that the impact

of that amendment as it presently stands is deminimus

to my firm.

It costs us some modest amount of business

and we are quite prepared to dismiss it.

What is wrong about it, in my view, is the
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fact that it is fallacious in its reasoning and it
is susceptible to expansion on equally fallacious

grounds.
MR. GARRETT:

Do you see no room for a

compatibility concept or even a dignitary concept, if

you wish?
MR. KLION:

Yes, sir, I think compatibility

is a perfectly rational thing.

I think dignity, which

is another way of saying the same thing, is fine.

I

just don’t believe that proscribing what I do is a
function of my independence.

It is a question of my

relationship with my client.
MR. GARRETT:

That may be true.

I don’t

know that the Section’s rules have to hang on scope
rules on independence.

You have urged that that be

the only thing.

MR. KLION:

As I understand it, the

limitations that the amendment seeks to place on
scope is to establish beyond doubt the independence

of the accountant and the totality of his relationship
to his client.
MR. GARRETT:

That is the way it is presented,

and you are saying compatibility or auditing-related

skills have nothing to do with independence.
MR. KLION:

No, sir, I don’t think I said

compatibility had nothing to do with it.
MR. GARRETT:

MR. KLION:

No, you didn’t; I did.
Auditing-related skills are

not the criterion that I would use.

That won't keep

me from lacking independence.

MR. GARRETT:

I understand that point, but

perhaps unrelated to independence, should there be

some professional rule with respect to the sort of

things that firms that hold themselves out to be
CPA firms and skill in auditing should engage in?
MR. KLION: Yes, I think compatibility is
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a very logical one.

Activities that relate generally

to the control structure of the environment, the
client—the services that derive out of that require
a pretty broad spectrum over the management problems

of the company.
Unfortunately, problems don’t compartmentalize

themselves very easily, and to solve problems which
clients request us to solve require a diversity of
skills that aren't easily defined within the constraints

that the amendment sets forth.
But certainly compatibility is one that I
would urge.

I don't think we ought to find out what

kind of soap powder the housewife wants to buy and

take that kind of poll.
MR. GARRETT:

Do you think we need a rule

on that or recommend a rule?
MR. KLION:

Yes, I think a rule on compatibility.

I have no problem with that.

MR. McCLOY:

Wouldn't we be charged with

having just as slippery a test as you have with relation
to skills, if you did that?

MR. KLION:
MR. McCLOY:

No, sir.
How do you define it?

We had

some difficulty defining compatibility, yesterday.
MR. KLION:

I am sure that is so, Mr. McCloy.

You observed before that it is very hard to define
independence.

It is a state of mind.

I find it distressing that in all of these
conversations the word "integrity" never comes up,
and that is the hallmark of any professional.
I guess in today's environment it is easy

to observe that we are all considered rascals, or a
great many of us are considered rascals, and without

any question there are rascals in every profession,
but we are defending against all of us being rascals,

when, in fact, that isn't really the case.
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I don’t know how you define integrity.

My

father used to tell me that the test of an honest

man is what he would do when he knew he wouldn’t get

caught.

I have lived my life on that basis, and

I think that is a perfectly fine way to do it, and

I yield to no one in the integrity of the accounting
I think they are the highest

profession as a body.

grade of people I have ever encountered.
So to define compatibility is a terribly

difficult task just as defining independence is.
You are saying that the only

MR. McCLOY:

criterion that amounts to anything now is the
independence theory.

MR. KLION:

Is that what you are saying?
Yes, sir.

There is no other criterion

MR. McCLOY:

that would be relevant?
MR. KLION:

MR. McCLOY:
MR. GARRETT:

on independence.

I put compatibility in there.

Compatibility.
But you wouldn't hang it

That is to say, you wouldn't say

for independence you must limit the scope of your

services to those that are compatible?
MR. KLION:
clouds independence.

I don't think compatibility
I just don't think it is

appropriate.
MR. GARRETT:

Room for compatibility

restrictions must have their base in something else,
than independence.
MR. KLION: Yes.
MR. GARRETT:
I have some more, but I will
defer to Bill.
PROFESSOR CARY:

May I say with respect

to integrity, the reason it hasn't been raised, it
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is assumed, and therefore, we don't need to raise it,

at least, that has been my attitude and I think
that is speaking for the rest.

I would like to develop a few points.

Obviously, you are the largest, I believe you are the
largest firm and the most diversified in the profession.

Isn't that correct?
MR. KLION:

We are the largest by the general

Our scope of practice is

numbers that are available.
among the broadest.

I can't speak to it precisely,

but certainly we are at that end of the spectrum.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I have been raising this

question perhaps, too, repeatedly about what would
you think about merging with a major management company,

Booz, Allen or McKinsey.
Probably you don't need to because you have

already reached that stage, but if you did merge with

them, would that offer any new areas of activity that
you do not presently perform?
MR. KLION:

In the first place it would

surprise the daylights out of me.

It would not concern

me provided I could apply to the firm that was
affiliated with us the same constraints that we apply

to our own practice.
You have mentioned Booz.

Booz does a great

many things which are wholly competitive to what we
do and they do a great many things which are not
competitive to what we do.

This is obviously not a value judgment

on their scope of practice.

It is simply describing

my understanding of their firm.
PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. KLION:

Such as?
They do a great deal of technical

We would not wish to do that. We don't
have that competence, to use a word that we have been
research.

struggling with a little bit before.
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I don't think

it is compatible with our firm, but to the degree

that they counsel with industrial and not-for-profit
clients, as we do, in areas that broadly relate

to the control structure of those clients, if there
was a commercial reason for so doing, affiliating
with that kind of a firm would not bother me.

I don’t believe that a CPA firm ought to

be 80% consulting and 20% auditing, although I
would observe that most small and medium-sized

practice units might have that kind of a relationship.
Their attest function is very much the

smaller portion of their practice, but the perception
of that in the major firms I think would be distressing.

I don’t know what a proper mix is, sir.
In our own firm our MAS practice is approximately

13% of the firm.

of the firm.

Our attest function is two-thirds

That is to say our accounting and

auditing function, not all of which is attest.

If

MAS services should be 18% or 20%, I wouldn't

be terribly disturbed, and I know some of my
competitors, some of my excellent competitors,

have MAS departments that approach 20% of their
total firm.

MR. GARRETT:

Would it bother you if it

got over 50%?

MR. KLION:

Yes, sir, I think it would

because I do think we offer ourselves as a major
business service CPA firm, and I don’t think we

should be more than 50%, but if you ask me why 50
and not 40 and why 50 and not 60, I would be hard
pressed to say.
We have grown in this area.

We have

rendered management advisory services for 70

years.

I have on my wall a draft of a report that

we did for the Boston Navy Yard in 1907 or something
of that order, and we have been looked to for that
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kind of work since the profession started.
Most people believe that the profession

started in the attest function.

so.

That simply isn't

The firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, an

enormously competent, highly regarded firm, was
founded by Messrs. Haskins & Sells who did a

consulting job for the U.S. Congress in the last

decade of the Nineteenth century.

That kind of

business counseling permeated the accounting

profession from the day the first man established
himself as an accountant until today, so there
is nothing new about rendering business counseling,

business advice to clients.

As I said before, I believe in the
medium and particularly smaller practice units,

advice giving is the largest portion of their

Like Henry Moss, I fear a so-called

practice.

ripple effect.

I don't believe there are two

standards of independence.

If you impose one on the large firms,
you will impose it on all firms.

PROFESSOR CARY:

What I am trying to ask,

maybe this is a question of compatibility, but
we are always searching for some definition of
it.

But where does a firm of your diversity,

and which is growing, and by the way, everyth
ing
is growing.
growth.

I have seen the emphasis is on

I mean, growth and success at the same

time. Where do you stop? Why, for instance,
couldn't you go into investment counseling?
You probably move toward having more

economists in your firm.

I should think that is

a necessary ingredient of a firm of your magnitude

and distinction.
MR. KLION:

For auditing purposes.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Why wouldn't you move
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on to investment counseling and things of that kind?
MR. KLION:

for that.

I think there are several reasons

One is compatibility.
Was it Mr. Justice Potter who said he couldn’t

define obscenity but he surely knew it when he saw it?
Compatibility is much the same way.

I

guess there are just terrible risks in investment

counseling, and most people don’t do it terribly well.
It only gets very close—

MR. GARRETT:

The risks are the customer’s

risks.

MR. KLION:

Not in today's litigious society.

I just don’t think it is a proper area of practice
for an accounting firm to render investment advice.
MR. McCLOY:

Would you apply a rule to it?

Would you suggest that the POB should apply a rule or

recommend a rule?
MR. KLION:

If the rule were part of this

compatibility problem which we have been speaking, I

would have no problem with it.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Do you see any areas directly

at the moment which a firm of your character could move
and should move perhaps over the next five years?
MR. KLION:

Do you mean new areas which

we presently are not?
PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. KLION:

Right, new areas.

I don’t think so.

I think our

scope, which has, incidentally, not changed over the

last ten or fifteen years, is as broad as we choose

it to be because we think it responds to our perceptions
of compatibility and our perceptions of what our clients
seek of us.
It is very hard to be quite specific about
that, Mr. Cary.

As new developments come up in

computers, for example, there may be things that we

didn't do work 10 or 15 years ago such as tele251

communications.

You can’t be in computers now without

having data transmission problems, and I guess
you could argue that is a new scope or an extension

of an existing scope.

That type of thing I can

perceive, but major new areas such as investment

counseling, I do not believe so.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I have one other question

in this area, if that is all right.

I don’t want

to take too much of your time, but it relates to
the point made by Mr. Gunders yesterday who is here,

I see, and I think it was new to us, or at least
it was new to me.

Insofar as he indicated, and

perhaps I am misstating, Mr. Gunders, on the ASR-250,
I believe you were referring to, and the indication
that in the near future there would be this possibility

that clients would be judging the auditing firm in
part on whether or not or what areas of MAS and

other services they were performing, and that that
in turn might likely affect the possibility of a

firm like your own of being selected.
Have you found any evidence of that?

He

seemed to indicate that there was evidence of it.
MR. KLION:

There is no question that there

has been evidence of it, and I would suspect that

every firm in this room that has major management
consulting practice with SEC clients has already
seen some evidence of it.
The rule, as I understand it, provides

that proxy statements issued subsequent to

September 30 of this year will disclose whether
the audit committee of the Board, and the Board

itself, has pre-approved all non-audit services as
defined that were rendered to the company by its

principal accountant, will itemize each of those
services and will indicate the percentage of fee
of each service as a numerator of a fraction, the
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audit fee being the denominator.

The relationship,

I must say, escapes me as to relevance, but that is
what we are talking about.

Now, to put that in cold terms, if you have
a client whose annual audit fee is $200,000, and that

is a very nice client, indeed, asks you do do some

work with respect to the cost system of a small

plant in upstate Iowa, the fee for which is $8,000,
according to ASR-250, there must be disclosure as to

whether or not the audit committee pre-approved that

work since $8,000 is obviously more than 3% of
$200,000.

Such an engagement is a perfectly normal,

routine type of service.

I postulate a service

that would not be under anybody’s proscription of
service if you accept the fact that MAS does exist,

and you are now placing management in the position
of saying—management now, not the board—of saying,
"We have a choice.

We can go to our board and get

such prior approval, all the while convening a
meeting of the auditing committee which may be

spread all over the country, and then disclose
the fact that we had done so in our proxy statement,

or we can go to another firm and have the same
service done, presumably with the same degree of
quality, possibly more expensively because of
the startup cost and make no disclosure at all

in the proxy statement."
I submit, sir, that it will take a very
confident and secure management to opt for using
the principal accountants when disclosure must be

made, and go through that routine, rather than
going to a competitor when no disclosure need be
made.
There isn't any firm here who hasn't

been affected by it.

I know of my first-hand

knowledge of at least three situations already
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where we have been told we will not be considered
for work for just this reason.

PROFESSOR CARY:

It seems to me, therefore,

that yours being the most diversified would be the
most jeopardized.

I mean, that seems to follow.

I

don’t know.
MR. KLION:

No, sir, I don’t think diversity

will be the impact here.

We are, as far as we can tell, not the
largest MAS practice among the big eight firms, socalled, and I think the other question that will have

to be asked is:

What percentage of the work is done

for SEC registered clients, and all other clients?

I guess most of us who have labored in these

vineyards have been concerned that we haven’t done

enough work for SEC clients rather than having done
too much work for them, so I don’t know who will

be affected more, but there is no question that
all of us will be affected.

I think what the SEC has done by rule

making is to indirectly try to achieve what appears
to be the desire of our critics.
I have no doubt that there are a number of

clients who will believe that this is—forgive me—

a bureaucratic requirement that they are willing to
live with, and they have sufficient confidence in the

posture of their principal accountant and their

competence as to go through the procedure that I
have outlined, but there is no doubt that some will

not.

All that means is if we are accused of being

too aggressive now, if I may use my friend, Henry

Gunders’ firm, that we will look after PW clients
and PW will look after PMM clients.

I am not sure

that is particularly in society's interest.

MR. McCLOY:

suggested to us.

We have had several priorities

You suggested one.
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He suggested

one yesterday.

You kill ASR-250 and we will acquire

merit.

MR. KLION:

I share his view as to the

distressing impact of it, I will tell you that.
(Off the record.)

PROFESSOR CARY:

One other area that I am

not alone, I think, in wanting to discuss, we have had

these discussions by the actuaries yesterday, and we
somehow on the points of difference we have never been

able quite clearly to identify.

I understand you have a fairly large
actuarial service.

MR. KLION:

Yes, sir.

PROFESSOR CARY:

You are undoubtedly keenly

aware of the positions taken by the actuaries.

How

do you respond to their basic criticisms?
MR. KLION:

The actuary and the accounting

profession really started together.

The first

professional association of the two professions was
in Scotland, the Society of Actuaries and Accountants,

or some name of that nature, and they have been
interrelated for 125 years.

Actuarial work is obviously quantitative

in nature, and by the narrowest scope definitions that
one would want to provide, including accounting-and
auditing-related skills, as a functional criterion,
that is a rational relationship.

I am not an actuary, and perhaps I don’t
plead the case as well as my actuary partners would,

and to that end I would refer the Board to an article

that appeared in the July issue of the Journal of
Accountancy, July, 1978, written by our National
Practice Director of Actuarial Services and our Vice

Chairman for Accounting and Auditing, Mr. William
Dreher and Mr. Clifford Graese respectively.
I
incorporated that article in my testimony.
Let me
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say briefly to respond, Mr. Cary, we believe, and

our actuaries believe, just as I have described before,
that one does not make a management decision.

One requires in doing competent actuarial
work that the client understands the substance of
the actuarial assumptions and the alternatives that

are available to him, and then makes a judgment based
on the alternatives that are available.

It is the actuary’s responsibility to

educate his client that way, and it is the client’s
responsibility to be educated that way.

One of the concerns that has been expressed,

I am sure, is that if the auditor and the actuary
are in the same firm that, in essence, the auditor

is auditing his own work, as it were.

But such is

not the case.

As I indicated in my introductory remarks,
I served on a task force that led into SAS-11 which
deals with the use of non-accounting specialists.

When

an auditor examines actuarial work, he is not auditing
the actuary.

He is trying to establish the actuary’s

qualifications and credentials.

He is trying to

establish that alternatives have been set forth and

that assumptions are rational.
The auditor does not have the competence to

make actuarial judgment because he is not an actuary.

I am sure the illustration has been used of
the geologist or the gemologist or any other kind of
a specialist, and the actuary is the same.
If the actuary offers, as many do, that only

an actuary can understand what an actuary has done,
then they sort of have a Catch 22 argument.

Then

they can’t accuse the auditor of auditing his work
because by definition an auditor is not an actuary,
and therefore, he doesn't understand what an actuary

is doing.
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As I say, I would prefer that the Board for
its research consider Mr. Dreher’s and Mr. Graese’s

article because it is a very logical exposition, I

think, and it is done with a great deal more
scholarliness than I have just done it.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I gather that they think

it is practically impossible.

That is their point.

It is practically impossible to inform the management.

In other words, you are willy-nilly making management
decisions.
MR. KLION:

They say that, Mr. Cary, but

they carry water on two shoulders.
There is a citation in that article which
is relevant.

As you know, the actuarial profession

divides itself into several pieces.

One relates to

employee benefits, using that phrase broadly; one to
the life insurance industry.

There is also some

casualty work as well.
There is a precept in the actuarial profession
that actuaries impose upon themselves, that says when
an actuary is employed by an insurance company, and

he provides actuarial services to his employer,
(speaking of independence and clouds and appearance,

of course) that in fact, the employer is his client
and the executives and the shareholders and trustees

and directors are all his clients, and it is required

of him that he inform those people as to the
assumptions that he has made, the very things that I
have just cited.

I don't believe you can argue that that is
an appropriate environment for one piece of their
profession but not for another piece.
If they can

persuade trustees and shareholders and executives
as to the assumptions that they use, and they

require that in their codes of behavior, we believe
that is fine.

257

All we are saying is that that particular

approach to professional services is a decent one
and should be applied to all of their services.

We

don’t agree that you can’t inform clients because,

in fact, we do, and we obtain from clients confirmations

of the fact that they do understand what we are talking
about.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.

One last thing, Mr. Klion.

The suggestion was made yesterday, I believe by Mr.

Vanatta of Arthur Young, who had the same basic view
that you expressed, the nature of the skill or the

nature of the service is unrelated to independence
and independence should be the criterion.

It was

also suggested that perhaps something could be done

to beef up or extend the peer review to more expressly

examine into MAS as it relates to independence.
We didn’t have all the time in the world
to explore it with him or with anybody else, but

we have been puzzled in thinking about it as to just

what a peer review team could do.
It is easy enough for them to identify the
services that the firm provides.

Does it seem practical

to you that they could do something that would have

some meaning to it in the way of reporting, whether
the firm did or did not participate in management

decisions to a degree of compromising their independence?
MR. KLION:

Yes, sir, I think it is because

we try to do the same thing within our own firm, and

most of my competitors do the same as well.
There is no question that it is somewhat
more difficult

to try to re-establish after the fact

the environment in which a problem has been presented
and the solutions that have been offered.

But you

certainly can measure—we do, and we have very successful

work programs to which this Board is quite welcome—
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to measure the administrative controls that are placed
upon the engagement, the criteria which we impose upon
our engagement teams, the extent to which alternative

judgments have been reached because we document those,
the offers of alternative recommendations to our
clients.

It would not be hard to include to certain

specific constraints which might be established by
the SEC Practice Section or this Board and the SEC,

to include those in our work programs.

We read all of our proposal letters, the
fact-finding which is documented in our work, the
reports that are submitted to see whether they hang
together logically, and whether there is a rational

presentation of the case.
We also include in our own firms, and I

think other firms do as well, an on-the-job quality
assurance review.

That is to say, during the course

of an engagement we will send in a review team.

We put constraints on jobs in excess of
certain limitations, and in greater complexity to be

sure that judgments are properly rendered.
MR. GARRETT:

So there is something in

the peer review team.

MR. KLION:

could be done.

I think there is something that

It is not quite the same thing as

auditing, but I would be perfectly comfortable with

it, and we would be very happy to submit to it.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you very much.

Go ahead, Dick.
MR. STARK:

Since Mr. Klion's firm is so

heavily engaged in the actuarial work, I wonder if
it wouldn’t be worth pursuing that just a moment
further.
Yesterday one of the witnesses explained

that an auditing firm that is reviewing actuarial
work will go further than merely testing the
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qualifications of the actuary.
Does your firm generally apply tests and

make examinations beyond the qualifications of the

actuary when your firm is auditing, say, an insurance
company or is involved in looking at the pension plan?
MR. KLION:

I am not sure I quite understand

your question, Mr. Stark.

We do have insurance

actuaries on our staff who are partners, and I might
add that some of them are certified public accountants
as well as Fellows of the Society of Actuaries, and

they will test actuarial valuations as part of the

audit activities.

They do not provide those services

to audit clients who do not have either their own in

house actuarial services or use third party actuaries

to provide it.
That is to say, we are not the principal

source of that actuarial service, but we satisfy
ourselves as to the competence of the actuarial work
because after all, in an insurance company, that is
the very guts, the very heart of the balance sheet.

We will do that as well as satisfying

ourselves as to the quality of the actuarial
assumptions that are made and the actuarial services
that have been rendered.
MR. STARK:

So you go beyond SAS-11?

MR. KLION:

Yes, we do.

MR. STARK:

In the case of an actuary other

than your own where the actuarial work is other than
your own firm?
MR. KLION:
MR. STARK:

Yes.

In the case where your firm

provides the actuarial work, how do you go about—I
guess you satisfied yourself in SAS-11 because you know
your own actuaries, but how do you go beyond the
qualifications?
MR. KLION:

As I say, in insurance companies
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we don’t do the primary actuarial service on the

accounts to which we attest.
MR. STARK:

You mean as a matter of principle,

you do not?
MR. KLION:

not.

As a matter of principle we do

On the benefit side, to the degree that we

attest to pension plans, for example, where our

actuaries provide valuations, we satisfy ourselves

as though they were non-PMM actuaries.

There is some professional literature that
requires that special care be given because of the
potential appearance of this relationship, and we

satisfy ourselves accordingly.
I might add, incidentally, that the Department
of Labor which has jurisdiction over ERISA, has quite

explicitly indicated that an auditor and an actuary
being in the same firm does not create a conflict of
interest or a cloud on independence.

There is a specific regulation which is

again cited in that article.

It is quite explicit

on the subject.

MR. STARK:

But you would be having different

people on your audit side than the people on the
actuarial side, and applying as you say, extra care

because of the self-audit potential.
MR. KLION:

That is correct.

We have auditors

who are trained in the area of auditing pension plans

and other types of products of actuarial services

who are especially trained for this purpose.
MR. STARK:

And they would apply, I suppose,

in principle, the same tests to actuarial work done
by some one other than your firm.

MR. KLION:

Absolutely, because the bulk of

the pension plans which we audit, we do not provide

actuarial valuations for.

MR. STARK:

Do you find the proposals of
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the Executive Committee as to insurance actuarial

services and employee benefit consulting services to

be unduly restrictive on your firm?
You have already said that you have conformed.

I take it that was done as a matter of policy and
that it has not had a material impact on your firm,

but as a matter of principle, do you find these
proposals unduly restrictive?

MR. KLION:

Without trying to be redundant,

Mr. Stark, I find the structure of that amendment
conceptually incorrect.

Now, if you pass that point

and say, "Here is what I have," no, sir, I do not.
That caused us no restriction at all.

It is the

concept that I have a problem with, and if I can
make one more comment to that, there is an ill-used

cliche about salami slicing and that is what we are
afraid of.

We think the concept is wrong, but we

can live with it and the interpretations that come

with it in peace, let us get on with our business.

But if this becomes the point from which we now
make additional concessions, that we are building a

house on a very poor foundation in my view and that is
what I object to.
MR. STARK:

You salami was not sliced by

this one but it will be by the next one?
MR. KLION:

No, sir.

It was modestly by

search, unwisely in my view because I think you are
permitting us now to do unprofessional work instead

of professional work, and we won’t do that in any
case.

But I think it is an incorrect constraint.

I don’t think it accomplishes what you seek to, but
I am willing to live with it explicitly, and we are

living with it right now.
MR. STARK: Do you think that the rule
should be expanded to say that a firm will not audit

its own actuarial work for insurance companies?
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You

say you don't do it as a matter of principle.

That

is only as a matter of internal policy with your firm?

I don't think we are limited.

MR. KLION:

I don't think we are the only firm that says that.

MR. STARK:

You say you can't do it.

MR. KLION:

You can't audit your own work

now.
MR. MATUSIAK:

What about the employee

benefits area?

In employee benefits the wording

MR. KLION:

is a little close.

The employee benefits, the ERISA

rules as I understand them require that the actuary

prepares the reports for the plan.

I think that is

close to the wording, which we may, in fact, audit.
We impose the same requirements on that as
we do as I have described before.

We believe that the plan as an entity to be
audited should understand very clearly what it is that
has been done, and agree with the work to be done—
the assumptions and the presentations and the alternatives.

There is no solution in actuarial work as I understand,

and there are alternatives from among which choices
are made, and we do require that our people inform
their clients accordingly.
MR. MANZONI:

We were told yesterday that

in the area of the employee benefit actuarial

determination, the law requires that the actuary himself
file the report with the Department of Labor but also

that the determinations and the actuarial assumptions
are those of the actuary and not those of management.

Do you agree with the statement, or is it
something that you are sufficiently involved in to be
willing to give an answer?
I am not sure I can speak as
credibly as I would like to, Mr. Manzoni, because I
MR. KLION:

am not an actuary.

I would be happy to get you a
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specific answer.

If you will just give me one second,

I think there is a reference to that in here.
The reference here, it says: These principles
of professional conduct have been reinforced by ERISA
which requires that an independent CPA be engaged on

behalf of all plan participants to conduct an audit

of the financial statements of the plan, and that
an enrolled actuary be engaged on behalf of all plan
participants to prepare the actuarial statements

specified in Section so-and-so of the Act.

I cannot speak more precisely than that.

If you like, I will see that you get that information

or at least give you my perception of it anyway,
but just to conclude, the Department of Labor which

has regulatory responsibility for ERISA has considered

this specific issue, that is, independence, and has
concluded in Regulation 2509.759 that "The rendering

of services by an actuary associated with an accountant
or an accounting firm shall not impair—shall not

impair the accountant's or accounting firm's

independence."
MR. MANZONI:
question.

It was really a different

What I was getting at, in all these other

MAS areas we are told about the role of the accounting

firm and the role is advisory.
It would seem that if the statements made by
the actuaries are correct, there is departure from that

role in this one narrow area.
MR. KLION:

If, as you describe it, I guess

you could argue that way.

Again, I believe that,

at least in the way we practice, our clients have
available, admittedly through our education and
their willingness to be educated, the alternatives

that are offered, and make those judgments before
the die is cast, as it were.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much, Mr.
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Klion.

We appreciate very much your views.

Incidentally, we have two cancellations
for this afternoon.

Let us now take 15 minutes for coffee.
(A short recess was held.)

MR. GARRETT:

Mr. Elliott.

We will now

resume with Mr. Elliott and Mr. Mitchell from the
MAS Executive Committee and MAS Division of the AICPA

Will you proceed, please.
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MR. MERLE S. ELLIOTT:
I am a CPA.

I am Merle S. Elliott.

I am active in the AICPA’s MAS Division.

With

me today is John Mitchell who is the Director of the MAS

Division of the Institute.
who just testified before

I have also asked Mr. Stan Klion

you to join us.

He is the Chairman

of the MAS Executive Committee of which I am a member and on

whose behalf I am here today.

The Executive Committee has previously submitted
written testimony which you have.

I will not read that.

It

is my intent today to give a brief summary of the points that

were made in that presentation. The MAS Executive Committee
is the AICPA’s official voice on MAS matters.
By way of personal background, I am the Executive

Partner of Smith Elliott Kearns & Company.

I founded my own

predecessor firm as an individual practitioner in 1956 and

created along with my partner in 1963, by merger, the firm
that is presently so named.

We have a staff now of about

60 people, and we practice in Western Maryland and South
Central Pennsylvania.

For the past 22 years, since I formed

my own practice, I have constantly been involved in advice

to management.

In fact, that was my very beginning in

public accounting.

I was in public accounting on my own

account for several years before I had my first audit client.

I believe that this advice to management is considered by

our clients to be the most important service that we render.
Many of our clients today receive such service from
our firm by way

audit work,

of background of the firm; we have about 22%

about a third tax work with the balance consisting

of accounting services and advice to management.
Some portion
of our audit work might be construed to be advice to management
since we don’t necessarily break down in full detail work done

by auditors when they are involved in advising clients.
Our clients ask for advice.

They expect it.

Such

advice is in areas that are not necessarily related to the
audit function.

We have full-time personnel to provide the

more formal MAS advice, and we have a fairly significant staff
266

that provides accounting services and tax advisory services.
Through our affiliation with approximately 85
other firms, we have more sophisticated, more highly
specialized professionals, to provide the more highly

structured MAS services and more complex engagements.

My own service to clients is largely the sort
of thing that does not relate to the conduct of audits.
I have not been personally involved in auditing other than
as an advisor to auditors, for some time.
As I said, my purpose is to summarize the Executive

Committee's formal statement previously submitted to you.
I intend to emphasize the conclusion of the MAS Executive

Committee, that the provision of MAS does not threaten audit
independence.
Additionally, as a subsequent report from the

Institute, we have submitted on behalf of the AICPA Private
Company section of firms their comments with respect to this
hearing, emphasizing certain points that they have that relate

to matters which I will comment on a little bit later in my

presentation.
First, I would like to point out that we consider

that there is no basis for a prohibition of MAS services.
We consider that surveys of attitudes are not evidence.
Factual research has not disclosed any cases of an impairment

of audit quality or independence as a result of providing
MAS services.

I won't go into lengthy quotes about the research
of the Cohen Commission which is probably the most

definitive factual research with respect to that topic.
But as has been pointed out to you before, there has been

no empirical evidence of an impairment of audit independence.
On that basis the Commission concluded that there would be

no justification for a prohibition if that were the only

thing to be consider
ed.

Nevertheless, the Commission did

determine that there was a significant minority that should

be considered even though it could not be proven that there
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was a problem, but, they further stated that, on balance, there

is no justification for the prohibition of any particular
The Cohen Commission further observed that the

service.

fears of those who express

concerns about threats to audit

independence decrease as their familiarity with the
services provided by CPA firms increases.

We feel that it is appropriate for us to forcefully
argue that there is no reason to curtail MAS services.
From my perspective as a smaller practitioner, I

know that in many cases our clients would not be able to
secure the services in management advisory and other advisory
services if it were not for the CPA.

cases the only source.

In fact, we are in many

We believe that without any evidence

of an auditing inadequacy resulting from management
advisory services that a prohibition of such services is

unjustified and wrong.
In a more positive vein, let me briefly comment
on what we believe are the benefits that are derived from
the provision of MAS services.

We think that MAS competencies enhance better

audits.

We know that many of the skills that are

necessary in audits with respect to the evaluation of
systems controls, the analyzation of financial controls,
evaluating internal controls, the application of latest

business technologies and the understandings of the
operations of our clients' firms are greatly enhanced
by the management advisory skills that we have developed.

Our auditors better understand the signs that
come from the tests, and I think it is important to
realize that audits cannot completely test or

completely

examine every transaction in a business.

Auditors test the records.

On the basis of testing the

records, they test the systems.

They have to understand

the basis for these tests for them to have validity.
If
they don't understand what the systems are about, they

can't really do effective audits.
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Management advisory

services skills enhance the auditors' abilities to do a
better job.
We think that the clients have a better
impression of CPA firms and of auditors because of the

breadth of services and the ability of CPAs to attract
more competent, more highly skilled individuals into the
profession.

This has resulted in improved audit effectiveness.
We believe, and we think we can demonstrate, that users

of financial statements better respect the audited
financial statements, recognizing the high level of skills
and the breadth or range of skills that are

applied

to support the decisions that are made by auditors in the
application of their audit judgments.
We think the clients benefit most particularly.

CPAs have an ongoing familiarity with the client, and
as a result, are able to be extremely effective in

providing management advisory services to clients.
Continuing client relationships gives a

great incentive for the maintenance of a high quality
standard of management advisory work.

We think that in

many cases, and from my personal experience, I am certain,

that recommendations by CPAs made as a result of a

advisory services engagement are more likely to be fully
implemented (as opposed to being in a book placed on a
shelf and never referred to again.).

This is true

because of the continuing relationship of the CPA with the
client.
Following are disadvantages that would result from
the prohibition of management advisory services.

The major disadvantage is the loss of the

advantages (particularly from the perspective of the smaller
firm) would be the business-absorbed cost increases and the
difficulty in getting those services from some other source
(assuming such services were even available).
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Now, normally we would expect that the result

of the SEC Practice Section’s prohibitions with respect
to management advisory services would only apply to

registrant companies, but we know from past experience

that that will not be true.

We know that it will filter

down and it will affect all CPA firms and all clients

for a couple of reasons.

One, two standards, two sets

of independence standards, will simply not be acceptable.
They won’t be acceptable to our clients.

They won’t be

acceptable to users of financial statements, and they

won’t be acceptable to CPA firms.

CPA firms will fear a

charge (or an appearance) of inferiority from a competitive

standpoint, and additionally, they will be concerned
about the possibility of increased legal liability resulting
from the possibility that a court will later hold that

the more stringent standards ought to have applied.
Though it might be possible in theory for two
standards to exist, we don’t believe that it is possible

in fact.
Let me summarize and offer a few conclusions.

Given competence and due professional care, we believe

that independence is the only criterion for the rendering
of services to audit clients or to other clients.
It has been pointed out previously that the

profession’s roots are in the early accounting and

financial advisors to business.

My own practice evolved from

that, and I perhaps flatter my firm, but I believe that its
evolution is in a manner the profession in miniature.

From one client with an annual fee of $125. to our present

size with a steady increase in the percent of fees represented
by auditing.

We have always provided accounting and financial

advice to our clients.

That is how we kept them.

That is

how we got more.
Our firm’s clients view those advisory services

as the most important thing that we do.
Audits are generally imposed by third parties.
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Advice to management is something that management itself
seeks out.

As a profession, the MAS Executive Committee

and the entire Institute is concerned about threats to
audit independence.

Audit independence has been one of

the standards of auditing for a long time.

concerned about any loss of independence.

We are
We have ethical

constraints that address that concern.
With respect to the activities of CPAs, and their
role in serving businesses, it has long been established,
as amplified by the SEC itself, that advising business is a

proper role for a CPA.
Decision making and management is the prerogative of

management.

I would like to conclude with these comments.
Obviously, we think that what we do in public accounting

is an appropriate thing to do.
agree.

We think that our clients

Otherwise, they wouldn’t continue to have us do

these things and they wouldn’t continue to pay our

fair charges and expand the services that they have us
perform,

(the additional services that they request of us)

if they did not think these

services were useful.

We

think we should be permitted to continue to provide these
services and I certainly hope that you will agree.
Further, we strongly recommend that the conclusion

of this Public Oversight Board be communicated and promul
gated in such a way that the thought processes with respect
to independence as it relates to the provision of MAS

services be available to audit committees and boards of
directors of registrant companies and other companies in

assessing the independence of their certified public
accountants and their auditors.
That is a very brief summary.

Our more complete

formal presentation has already been submitted to you,

In the interest of conserving time, I have limited our
oral presentation.
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At this point I would like to respond to any

questions that might have been suggested by my remarks or
our formal testimony, or the testimony that was submitted
on behalf of the private companies group.

Mr. Klion as Chairman of the MAS Executive
Committee is here to further respond where that is appropriate

as is Mr. Mitchell.

Thank you for your attention.
MR. McCLOY:

I gather that you think that the

proposals that are put forward in the Notice are unduly

restrictive.
MR. ELLIOTT:

From my personal perspective.

Mr. McCloy, I do, and from the perspective of the Committee,
we also think that they are unduly restrictive.
However, the Committee has agreed by formal

action that we can, in fact, live with those.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. ELLIOTT:

Live with this?
Right.

We don’t accept the

rationale, but we do accept perhaps the necessity.
MR. McCLOY:

I don’t think I have anything

further.
MR. GARRETT:

Would the Executive Committee's proposals

cause a severe curtailment in the services that your firm
provides?
MR. ELLIOTT:

No, as a matter of fact, Mr.

Garrett, they would cause no curtailment at all in our
particular case.

MR. GARRETT:

But I suppose anything more drastic

in the way of prohibition against MAS would shatter the firm.

MR. ELLIOTT:

It depends on whether we decided

to continue to do audits.
MR. GARRETT: You might drop auditing?
MR. ELLIOTT:

That is right.

MR. GARRETT:

We keep coming back to the idea

that the possession of MAS skills with firms improves

audits, and yet we keep hearing that the MAS personnel don’t
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do auditing, and frequently aren’t even CPAs.
MR. ELLIOTT:

That isn’t true in our case.

MR. GARRETT;
MR. ELLIOTT:

It is not?

No, sir, we do not have the tight

formal structure that larger firms evolve into.

When I

started in practice, Mr. Garrett, I did everything there
was-including typing the reports.

appropriate to get a typist.

Later on I found it

Later on I employed auditors.

Just recently we have added MAS skills, and our one full-time
and two part-time MAS practitioners are CPAs.

All of them

graduated, if you will, from our auditing section.

MR. GARRETT:

It seems at least conceivable that

if the auditing personnel, the CPAs were also in between

audits,so to speak,

providing management services and

advisory services to the same client, you would generate a

degree of familiarity and involvement that would threaten

objectivity.
MR. ELLIOTT:

I certainly question that.

I have

had such experiences fairly recently in my lifetime.

I don't believe that my integrity will be compromised.

If as a result of audit, I find that a person I recommended
be employed had turned out to be a thief, it does not
follow, that I won't blow the whistle.

I think there is a question of integrity that

must be taken into account with objectivity.

As Stan

Klion said earlier, I don't think that our profession is

comprised totally of rascals, although, there obviously
are some.
MR. GARRETT:

Certainly we would not suggest

that, but it is also true that some rules and ethical
canons exist for prophylactic purposes or for appearance
purposes, or as one of the persons yesterday said, to avoid
the proximate occasion of sin.

This is most obviously true in the financial
interest test of your independence.
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MR. ELLIOTT:

Right.

MR. GARRETT:

I haven’t checked the history of

it, but I dare say when the principle was being established
and the independence required the absence of financial

interest, that nobody observed that there weren’t any cases

proving that the ownership of 100 shares of stock of a
client caused an impairment in the quality of the audit.
The question would have seemed almost irrelevant,

and I think the same idea persisted in this area.
MR. ELLIOTT:

May I comment.

I think that it is

true that you can’t prove that there has been an impairment.

Conversely, we can’t prove that MAS services do not cause
the possibility of a threat on independence.

In fact, I

personally believe that in some cases, they do cause a

threat to audit independence but I think the trade-off is so
much worse from the standpoint of our economy of small
business.

That if you put these constraints on the people

who are knowledgeable and can provide those services,

(throw the rascals out and throw the baby out with the

bath, so to speak), that the negatives of not having those
MAS services are so much worse than taking the chance of maybe
a little bit of appearance of the possibility of impairment.
That is overcome by individual integrity in almost every case.

MR. GARRETT:

thought.

Let me finish along that line of

You would say there is no need for the auditor to

ever have a financial interest in the client, and there is an
obvious suggestion of temptation, and therefore, no harm is
done by prohibiting it since its being there wouldn’t do any

good, but when you turn to MAS, you would say the same things
are not true.

There is some benefit in the MAS, and while it

can have an appearance of impairment of objectivity, the pros
outweigh the cons.
It is that line of thinking that has led us to
question the validity or the cogency of the argument
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that there is no record of problems because it isn’t
susceptible to a record.

At least, what we are worrying

about it not provable, what the critics are worrying about.
MR. ELLIOTT:

It would be very difficult for me

to testify that I say him not do it.
MR. KLION:

(Laughter)

Mr. Garrett, may I comment to a

question that you put to Mr. Elliott and I guess

inferentially to me about the number of MAS practitioners
who are not certified and how that assists in the examination.

In my own firm, we have in excess of 800 full-time
professionals in MAS work.

I would say something on the

order of a fourth to a fifth are certified.

Some smaller

number are probably seeking to become certified and the

great preponderance, certainly more than half, never will
be certified.
Having said that, they are almost always

scheduled, depending upon their skills, quite formally into our
audit procedures because our audits require the kind of

talents that they bring to bear.
The rationale is that if a man comes up with,

let us say, data transmission skills which is important to

an audit of a multilocation client, he will ask the
question:

I am trained as an accountant doing data processing

work, and I want to keep current in my profession which

happens to be data transmission, and to go through the

procedure of getting a CPA certificate, which I will
never practice as such, simply diverts my efforts away from

what I do very well into something which has more of an
appearance than a factual benefit to my career and to my
clients.
We have 135 or 140 MAS partners, and the same
proportion obtains. Perhaps a fourth are certified, and the
rest are not.
MR. GARRETT:

They directly participate in audits?
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MR. KLION:

Yes, sir.

Not every single one

of them in every audit, but virtually every audit, has MAS
Practitioners if no other place than a review

of the data

processing center, and there are other places, too, but that

is clearly the one that gets the most attention.
That is a formally structured thing.

The time

goes into audit time sheets or audit contracts, and they are
very much a part of it.

We train people along these lines, some of whom

have MAS backgrounds, and some of whom do not.
interchange our people for their own benefit.

We
We put some

MAS people on the audit staff for a year or two, and
conversely, some auditors on the MAS staff for a year or

two because we feel that cross-training makes them better

auditors.
MR. GARRETT:

So a young CPA coming in could

look to a period of time possibly, that is, in the MAS
Division?
MR. KLION:
in the MAS Division.

Yes, sir, and some of them stay

Every year we probably have three

or four partners who are admitted to the MAS practice who
started as auditors.

MR. GARRETT:

It at least offers a possibility

for them of additional experience.

MR. KLION:

Yes, sir.

The managing partner of

our Chicago office, which is our second largest office,

is both a CPA and a very distinguished consultant.
The Regional Vice Chairman on the West Coast,

the same observation. He is a consultant and he is
certified. He brings to the management of the firm

skills that we think are quite appropriate for his position.
MR. GARRETT:
I stepped out of our usual order,
but I might as well go on with one more question, and that is,
Mr. Mitchell, I would like to know what the MAS Division

of the AICPA does.
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Do you promote, or do you fuss at MASers?

Technically, the MAS Division

MR. MITCHELL:

consists of the staff which is myself and Mr. Kuttner and
a secretary, and the members of the MAS committees
and task forces.

The staff’s responsibility is primarily to support

the committees in whatever activities they undertake, which
could be the development of standards, the development of

guidelines for specific practice areas, it could be
assisting the Executive Committee in developing a statement
It could be considering

such as the one submitted here.

new approaches to the education and training of MAS

personnel, but our basic function is to support, the staff’s

basic function is to support the committee activities.
MR. GARRETT:

I see.

Thank you.

MR. KLION: At the risk of embarrassing
Mr. Mitchell, he does it with great distinction.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I’ve just got a couple of questions.

First of all I would like to ask you, Mr. Elliott,
you have pointed out that your firm does 22% audit, and the
balance is in other areas including tax and MAS.

Obviously, you can’t speak for the whole spectrum,
but let's take a firm of 200 professionals, and less.

That

would be a good cut-off point.

Are there many firms having that relatively
minimal percentage of audit and time predominantly in other
areas.

MR. ELLIOTT:

There have been two surveys, one in

1974, the Roper survey, and one more recently, more narrow

in application, that addressed just that question to the
smaller firms.
It seems to follow, and Mr. Mitchell may be able
to comment more definitively on this—it follows that
the smaller the firm, the larger a percentage of nonaudit
activities or advisory activities.
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In my own personal experience that follows

because, when you are a one-man organization, you have a

small number of clients and you deal an awful lot of the
time in helping them solve problems in their real world,
and their real world is making money in their business,
not getting an audit.

obligation.

That is a third-party imposed

They are more concerned about making a "buck."

PROFESSOR CARY:

Thank you for that.

The other

point that we harped upon a bit over a period of time, it
would seem in addition to independence, many of you would

accept some sort of concept of compatibility.

Maybe you

would accept some sort of concept of compatibility.

you wouldn’t.

Maybe

I don’t know.

MR. ELLIOTT:

My own personal view, sir, is that

I think competence and skill and ability are the only
criteria other than independence.

Obviously, we would not as a firm undertake to
design a space ship to go to Mars, nor would we attempt to

advise in the installation of a 370/158.

(We hardly even know

what one looks like). But, I could say that an IBM 370/158
is compatible, but we don’t have the skill to do anything
with it.

We don’t even know how to deal with it, but we do

know how to deal with the smaller computer.

PROFESSOR CARY:

As I recall, I think Mr. Klion,

you said compatibility was something you might consider.
MR. KLION:

I share Mr. Elliott's view.

Competence is clearly the overriding consideration, but I

guess you could argue if a CPA firm wished to do so, it
could get competent people to take opinion surveys, and

design space ships.
I don’t think we would do that.
PROFESSOR CARY: I just wonder.
This is probably one
question I should have asked you initially, Mr. Klion, because
we are all searching for what we mean by compatibility.

As you take some of these forms of service which
are specifically addressed in this implementation of the

scope of services criteria, and apply it, for example, to such

things as plant layout and product design and so forth, could
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we then ask the question whether or not, at least, the

limitations that are suggested here have a basis in compatibility
without using the work "skills" at all?

MR. KLION:

I think more so.

That is to say, I

agree with what I understand the thrust of your statement

to be.

Conceivably, we could get engineering skills on our

staff, and indeed, we have some registered professional
engineering backgrounds.
When we get involved, for example, in activities

in a manufacturing plant, it relates to the control structure

of the company, the effectiveness with which manufacturing
activities are performed and the collection of data for entry

into the accounting system or inventory management or things

of that nature.
We might speak to the location of plants or

delivery points from a cost effectiveness point of view,
using mathematical techniques to come up with those answers.
We certainly wouldn't design the structure
because we don't have and

don't wish to have construction

engineering skills, and I would say that is a function of
compatibility, not a function of a skill-related criterion

that spoke to independence.

I guess I could argue very

easily designing a building would not compromise my

independence as an auditor.

I just don't think it is

something I should do.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Therefore, in a sense you don’t

object to some of these limitations if you accept the
compatibility theory.

MR. KLION: I do not object to the limitations,
save the one in search on the basis of its pragmatics.
I think the rationale that puts it there is what concerns

me.
PROFESSOR CARY:

Fine.
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Thank you.

You might go out and hire a

MR. McCLOY:

space expert, might you not, if you saw space was

becoming a pretty important commercial activity in this
country?

MR. Klion:

Not likely, Mr. McCloy.

There are

more easily attainable targets of commercial advantage

that we might do which we also elect not to because we
fundamentally —

But you wouldn’t have a rule that

MR. McCLOY:
restricted you.

You would leave that to the market.

MR. KLION:

We have a self-imposed rule.

You would

MR. McCLOY:

have your own rule,

but you wouldn’t have an externally imposed rule.
MR. KLION:
I think there is a merit to the
perception of what you do.

I used the phrase before, the

control structure of a company.

My own sense is that is

a fair set of parameters around which we would work.
That is a good phrase.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I am

not sure I know what it means because after all even

law firms, God forbid, which are most individualistic

have some forms of control.

Therefore, everybody has a

control structure.
MR. KLION:

The name of our department used to

be the Management Controls Department, and I found it a
very useful—it was a self-defining title.

I am not

sure I don't wish I still had it.
MR. MITCHELL:

Mr. Cary, in that connection,

yesterday Mr. Vanatta itemized the criteria that his
firm uses acceptance of engagement.
part of the control structure.

That is a going-in

We have also heard about the subsequent review
or the while the work is being done review and control
structure, the subsequent review within the firm, and I

think Mr. Vanatta made a strong case for peer review and
applying peer review to the acceptance of MAS engagements.
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I think those are the things we are thinking of
when it comes to a control structure on MAS and particularly
its effect on independence.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.

We, at least I, have also been

exploring playing with the notion that there is some sort

of notion involved that certain things are not appropriate
for people to hold themselves out to be professionals in

I think you could easily think

the accounting field to do.

of some absurd examples, but it is a little hard to imagine

just how that might be phrased, and the truth of it may

be since we are not looking at a list of horrible examples
of auditing firms, member CPA firms that are now hawking

stuff that embarrasses the profession or what-not, that

we needn’t really worry about it very much.
I think there is a sort of lurking principle in
your own thinking, and your own decisions as to what sort of

services you want to add to the auditing function, but maybe
it doesn’t need precise articulation, I am sure.

MR. McCLOY:

Your weren’t suggesting that you

put another criterion of absurdity?

too.

(Laughter)

MR. ELLIOTT:

Or lack of it.

MR. GARRETT:

There might be a marketplace function,

Perhaps an auditing firm that was also known to be

hawking debit insurance around the

neighborhood or

what-not would lose standing so fast.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. KLION:

Sort of the department store idea.
There are management consulting

firms that deliberately engage in renting management.

They are quite good.

There is one in Philadelphia and one on

the West Coast, and their purpose in being is to, in essence,
rent management to troubled companies.
Most management consulting firms quite clearly

avoid that type of procedure, but there are at least two quite
reputable firms that do that.

MR. GARRETT:

There are bookkeeping firms, too, or

accounting firms that don’t or ought not to hold themselves
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out, at least, as auditors with respect to the same company.

Not those of any size, I presume.
Have we any other questions?

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

We appreciate

it.
MR. ELLIOTT:

Thank you, gentlemen.

MR. GARRETT:

Mr. James A. Korreck.
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MR. JAMES A. KORRECK:

My name is Jim Korreck.

I am Chairman of the MAS Committee for the Illinois

CPA Society, and I want to thank you for allowing me

the opportunity to present to you the views of the
Illinois Society with respect to this most critical
issue, that of limiting the scope of services that
CPAs are allowed to perform.
The Illinois Society represents over 11,000

active members.

As Chairman of the MAS Committee,

the responsibility for developing a position paper
fell upon our committee.

I can assure you that that

responsibility was not taken lightly.

We spent many

hours deliberating these various points arguing, both

pro and con, for an against, the various positions,
most of which have been presented in the last day and
a half before you.

In a committee such as the Illinois Society,

we are a little bit unique.

The committee is made up

of representatives from different firms and different
viewpoints as a result from different firms having

different viewpoints.

As a result, the committee evaluated several
positions before reaching the final position.

The first position paper adopted by the

committee parallelled the logic of the majority of
those who have been presenting position papers here
today and yesterday.

That was, that the sole criterion

should be independence and competence.

A CPA should

perform those services which do not jeopardize his

independence with respect to the audit and those
which he is competent to perform.
This position was based on the following

factors, many of which have been presented again

before.
There is absolutely no factual evidence to
substantiate the allegation that independence has been
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impaired through the provision of MAS services.
It is also the firm belief of our committee

that the CPA enjoys a privileged and unique position

of trust with respect to users of financial statements.
It is also the feeling of the committee that
there are adequate controls within the profession and

outside the professionto insure that independence is

protected.
We also feel that there are positive benefits

to be derived by the client and the public when the
CPA is allowed to perform management advisory services

along with the audit function.
The MAS function has evolved to the status
it has today not because of some Machiavellian attempt

to control all management services but rather has
evolved in response to the needs of the profession and
our clients.

This need has been precipitated by two

major factors, one, the advance of technology and
secondly, the technical awareness of management.

are constantly in a changing environment.
years ago computers were not even a factor.

We

Fifteen

We

wouldn’t even have considered them in our audit.

Today it is absolutely essential that we understand

computers and their impact on the controls of a
corporation.
We have developed statistical techniques

which we employ in auditing to assist us in providing
a more comprehensive audit, more objectivity of
criteria.

For example, use of statistical sampling.
Our clients have become more educated, more

knowledgeable in advanced techniques.

They want and

they look to their CPAs to provide them with assistance

in implementing some of these advanced techniques

that they perhaps have heard about in college, have
taken some courses on, but do not fully understand.
They are asking for us to assist them in employing
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these or implementing these techniques to help them
better manage their corporations.

The committee points out, in its final
position paper, that it accepts the fact that there

is a significant minority who believe that independence
in appearance may be jeopardized when a firm is

permitted to practice diverse and unrelated fields.
The final position of the Illinois Society reads as

such.

CPAs should not be constrained from providing

for audit clients any services which, one, do not

compromise audit independence, and two, which utilize
accounting-and auditing-related skills.
For non-audit clients, the constraints

limiting services to those related accounting-and

auditing-skills are not applicable.

I would be more than willing to answer any
questions that the committee has.
MR. McCLOY:

MR. GARRETT:

I don’t think I have any.
You came back to what is

substantially the Executive Committee's proposal, did
you not?

MR. KORRECK:

That is correct.

MR. GARRETT:

Not necessarily endorsing

their analysis of various tenets but accepting the

principle of accounting-related skills.

Why did you do that—the committee?
MR. KORRECK:
I think it is evident from the
testimony that you have received today and yesterday

that although there is absolutely no question about

independence, and the provision of MAS services, there
is the compatibility factor.
We don't believe that CPAs should be involved

in services which are not related to accounting and
auditing.
MR. GARRETT:

Anything that would require

people with completely different types of backgrounds
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and training you think would be inappropriate?

MR. KORRECK:

We feel we have the opportunity

to get into that field, but it would not be compatible
with the image of the CPA firm as we believe it to be.
MR. GARRETT:

That is really a bow to the

perceptions of the significant minority, that the

Cohen Commission referred to.
MR. KORRECK:

Yes, it is.

Our first position

paper said that there should be absolutely no controls

whatsoever, but we felt that we were avoiding the
issue.

The fact of the matter is that there are

people who have this perception and what can we do to
alleviate that misperception?

I can tell you that

there were some heated debates going on and that a

"significant minority," on my committee, felt that

we are succumbing to external pressure.
But in light of the real world, as we see

it, it is essential that we limit somehow the scope
of services on a compatibility basis, not as it impacts
on independence.

MR. GARRETT:

We were not privy to the

deliberations of the Executive Committee, but we get
the impression that your reasoning rather parallelled

theirs.
MR. KORRECK:

Yes.

MR. GARRETT:

And perhaps they weren't too

thrilled with their own logic either, but they saw
the necessity to adopt some sort of standard to cut

off at least—I don't want to say abuses, but cut
out the things that cause the most alarm and suspicion

on the part of the public.
PROFESSOR CARY:

And as I see it, the way

you have framed it, compatibility and skills are
rather co-related.

In other words, it is something

that is deemed incompatible because it requires a new
skill.
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MR. KORRECK:

I avoid the use of the word

"skill" and prefer the expression that Mr. Klion used,
accounting and auditing related and control related.
Control is an important aspect of the audit, and I

think, for example, performing inventory control
studies is well within the scope of services that a

CPA firm should provide.
PROFESSOR CARY:

One other point, just to

get your reaction, since you are representing Illinois

group and a very large number, what about size in
terms of relatively—I have asked this question before—

How do you find the percentage

relatively small firms?

of activity in those firms generally to be?
MR. KORRECK:

There is no question that

the smaller the firm, the greater the MAS services

provided.

PROFESSOR CARY:

That seems to be accepted

by you, too?

MR. KORRECK:

Oh, yes, very definitely.

There is no question about it.

The problem is that

these may not be formal MAS engagements, but rather

informal engagements.

MR. GARRETT:

What is your own affiliation?

MR. KORRECK:

I am with Harris, Kerr, Forster.

MR. GARRETT:

I see.

Did your committee

consist of people from small firms?

MR. KORRECK:

committee.

Yes, we had 18 members on the

We had six who were Big 8 representatives,

five national firms, non-big eight, and the rest, six
local practitioners and one executive search consultant.

MR. GARRETT: Could you break down the vote
according to those?
(Laughter)
MR. KORRECK: No, I can tell you that it was
very close.
MR. GARRETT:

I wondered about your willingness

to make the concession to this significant minority,
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whoever they are, whether it was predominantly a big
firm willingness or—
MR. KORRECK:

No, it was evenly split.

MR. GARRETT:

Evenly split.

MR. McCLOY:

Are there any other elements

that you think that this Board could recommend that

would enhance the concept of independence?

asked that question before of others.

I have

Is there

anything that we can do to improve the credibility

and the actual fact of independence that this Board

might recommend, in your judgment?
MR. KORRECK:

education.

The Cohen Commission recommended

I would be lax if I didn't suggest that

we better educate the public, but I accept the fact

that that is almost impossible.

We can't even educate

the judges, much less the general public, so in answer

to your question, no.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. GARRETT:

No, you don't have anything.
Not all lawyers are beyond

reach.

There will be education, I suppose, at least
with respect to the 34 Act active reporting companies
in proxy rules, but in a sense it may only display the

alarming side rather than the other.
I believe that completes our questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Korreck.

Thank you for coming.

Mr. Dowell, thank you for coming.

proceed.
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Please

MR. LARRY L. DOWELL:

We appreciate the

opportunity to present our views.

By way of introducation, I am Larry Dowell,

a partner and the Management Advisory Services Coordinator
of McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & Company.

We are a

regional CPA firm with 31 offices in seven Western

and Midwestern states.

We employ approximately 800

people and of those 27 are full-time management advisory

services specialists.
MR. McCLOY:

How many?

MR. DOWELL:

27.

Of those 27, approximately

half are CPAs and have come up through the audit ranks

of our CPA auditing practice or other CPA firms.

We

have performed management advisory services in some

form for our clients since the establishment of the
firm in 1926.

We serve over 23,000 clients,

approximately 30 of which are Section 12 SEC clients.
So the vast majority of our work is performed for

non-SEC reporting clients.

MR. GARRETT:

How many clients?

MR. DOWELL:

Approximately 23,000.

MR. McCLOY:

Of which 30 you said are SEC

MR. DOWELL:

30 are SEC reporting clients.

clients.

By further way of introduction, I am a member
of the Iowa Society of CPAs, the Illinois Society of

CPAs, a member of the AICPA Management Services

Executive Committee that presented their views, and
I am Chairman of the Management Advisory Services

Committee of a group of CPA firms called Associated
Accounting Firms

International which is composed of

firms with various sizes of practices throughout the

United States and several other countries.
The views that I am presenting are my views

and my firm's views.

We did provide the written

comments in response to your request for information.
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I would like to just very briefly highlight some of the

things that we consider to be most important.
We have provided written comments in response
to your request for information and views concerning

management advisory services by CPA firms and we would

like to emphasize several of our comments.

These points

are:

We do not believe that the providing of

management advisory services to an audit client
compromises the auditing firm’s independence; it only
creates the appearance of compromising this independence

to a very small audience.
We believe that the question of scope of
services should be directed toward that of role rather

than the proscribing of specific services based on
the functional or technical aspects of the services

performed.

In this regard, we feel strongly that

the role of the CPA firm in providing these services

to its clients should be advisory and providing

technical assistance, and should not include
participating in the client’s management decision
process or providing ongoing operating assistance.

As business and their related systems and
governmental regulations become more complex, it will

become increasingly important for CPA firms to be

able to staff and make available the needed expertise

to satisfactorily perform audits of their clients’
financial statements.

The maintenance and continuing

development of these needed skills requires that
firm personnel possessing these skills be given
opportunities to develop, refine and maintain the

needed skills.

During recent years we experienced

needs for additional skills in connection with audits
involving sophisticated data processing systems and

some of the various types of operational audits and
reviews requested and needed by governmental agencies
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of various types.

We believe that this can be best

accomplished through retaining these individuals

in a management advisory services practice which
utilizes those needed skills in performing other
services for clients.

We believe that any restrictions of management

advisory services for publicly-owned audit clients
will eventually affect management advisory services

for all clients, regardless of whether the client is

public-owned.

We fear the precedent, that regulators

will attempt to continually increase the restrictions.

Because we believe that eventually any
proscribed services will spill over to these services

performed for all clients, we believe that the

proscribing of management advisory services could be
very detrimental to small and medium-sized companies,

whose CPA firm is probably the only logical source
for obtaining that needed advice and assistance on an
economical and practical basis.

The innovator, the

entrepreneur is already discouraged by an excessive

number of regulations and "don’ts."

increasingly discourage him.

One more would

Concern about this

possible spill-over effect is perhaps our greatest
objection to the proposed proscriptions.

We would be happy to respond to any questions

that the Board would like to ask concerning either
our written or oral responses.

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.

The association

to which you belong, your firm belongs, Mr. Dowell,

do you take advantage of each other’s special skills
in the MAS area?
MR. DOWELL: We do.
MR. GARRETT:

If some of the members of the

association have a skill that you do not have, you would
draw upon it?
MR. DOWELL:

Right, and some of the firms
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who belong to that association are small firms who do
not have full-time specialists on board, and we

continue to receive requests for help.

MR. GARRETT:

Your skills would be available

to them then if they had a client that wanted that

sort of help?

MR. DOWELL:

Right.

We assist a number of

those firms every year.
MR. GARRETT:

On the other hand, that would

be a non-audit client with respect to your firm,

wouldn’t it?
MR. DOWELL:

We would be performing a

service for that other CPA firm.

MR. GARRETT:

I don’t know whether I am

asking you a sensitive question or not, but do members

of the association plan the development of skills?
MR. DOWELL:
MR. GARRETT:
particular skill.

One of the purposes—

You say:

"We need a

Let's decide who is going to have

that?"
MR. DOWELL:

One of the purposes of the

organization is the banding together so some of these

skills do become available on a basis that they feel

comfortable with.
The association has a number of professional

education programs, joint sharing-type programs, that
are really geared to increasing the skills of the

firms represented.

MR. McCLOY:

Do you do recruiting?

MR. DOWELL:

We do a very minor amount of

recruiting.

Most of our work in that area is limited

to interviewing.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. DOWELL:

For financial jobs?
For financial and data processing

jobs, providing a client with our opinion as to technical

skills.
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MR. GARRETT:

Can you observe any relationship

between the availability of MAS services and the
gaining of clients, the retaining of clients or the

loss of clients because of the absence of it?

Can

you see it or feel it as a competitive factor?
Mr. DOWELL:

I feel a competitive factor

is whether you can provide full services.

I think that

with some clients this relates back to being able to
adequately handle the audits to cope with their systems.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Just a question.

Of course,

your firm is a very substantial size, but when you look,

out in your area, you may be aware of much smaller firms.
Would you confirm the statement made in the past that
as a firm gets smaller, the non-audit role of the firm

increases?
MR. DOWELL:

views.

I believe I would share those

I think the management advice provided by the

smaller firms is probably a higher percentage than
larger firms.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Despite the fact, just taking

your own, you have 27 MAS people out of 800, and you are

smaller than the big eight considerably, but, therefore,
a larger percentage of your work is not of MAS work,
is it?

MR. DOWELL:

Right.

It is not.

I believe

in a couple of the surveys that were referred to, there

was a very high percentage by some of the smaller firms
while some of the medium-sized firms dropped down to

a smaller percentage.
MR. GARRETT:

As it gets smaller, it seems

to vary a lot according to the accidents of the
particular background of the dominant partners.
The 23,000 surprises me.

How many clients

does Price Waterhouse have, Mr. Gunders?

MR. GUNDERS:

A very small fraction of that.

MR. GARRETT:

You don't have 23,000 clients?
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MR. GUNDERS:
MR. DOWELL:

MR. GARRETT:

Nowhere near.
This would be total clients.

Where do you turn to for

management consultants for keeping track of the 23,000?
(Laughter)
MR. DOWELL:

MR. GARRETT:

MR. DOWELL:

We keep a computer running.
I imagine you do.

I believe that number refers to

tax clients and clients of all types.
MR. STARK:

Individuals.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. DOWELL:

That includes individuals?

Right.

That would be our total

client base.
MR. GARRETT:

MR. DOWELL:
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you very much, Mr. Dowell
Thank you.

Mr. Hebert.

in the scheduled order
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We will proceed

MR. S. BEN HEBERT:

I am Ben Herbert, Chairman

of the Management Advisory Services Committee of the North
Carolina Association of Certified Public Accountants.

I

am here today as the representative of this Committee
to express its views on the Scope of Services to

the Board.

The Committee has approved this statement, and

does not require approval from any other body to present
it.

Although it does not require any other approval,

it has been passed by our society officers, and they
concur with the statement.

Some information on the make-up of the Committee, as
well as my own back-ground, may be helpful to the Board in its

The Committee is composed of

evaluation of these comments.

thirteen members, all of whom are members of the North
Carolina Association of Certified Public Accountants.

Of

these, eight are sole practitioners or members of local firms,
two are members of small regional firms, one is a member
of a large regional firm, and two are members of
"Big Eight" firms.

I believe the mixture of firms represented

on the Committee is significant to the evaluation of these

comments.

I am a partner in the MAS division of A.M. Pullen
& Company, a large regional firm headquartered in

Greensboro, North Carolina.

Prior to joining Pullen, I

managed my own local firm in Tennessee for some six years.
Before that, I was employed in sales and sales management

with Burroughs Corporation and later with the Business
Equipment Group of Litton Industries.

Before moving into the main topic, I would like to
point out that the thoughts, views, and conclusions expressed

here by the Committee are the collective views of its members,
and do not necessarily represent the position of the firms

with which they are associated.
The area to be covered is large, and has been the
topic of much research and many writings in recent years.
We could not possibly cover all aspects of this issue, and
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make no attempt to.

We will, however, address the relevance

of the criteria, advantages of management advisory services
provided by CPA firms, and the impact of restricting management

advisory services on the profession and the public.

We would also like to point out here that the

profession did not have its origins in the attest function,
as stated in the Board’s notice.

Indeed, public accountants

were performing a variety of accounting, management services,

and other services for their clients before independent
audits became widespread.

Thus, there is historical precedent

for the present day CPA’s provision of management services
to his clients.

We also observed that the Board’s notice refers

in several places to tax and management advisory services.
These are two entirely separate areas of practice, and we
have confined ourselves to the area of management
advisory services.

If there is concern about tax advisory

services, perhaps separate hearings on that practice area
are in order.

The criterion of independence has been in the
past the cornerstone of the profession, and we believe that

it should continue to be so.

It is the quality which gives

the underlying value to our work.
However, we feel that the second criterion, that

of accounting and auditing related skills is both vague
and restrictive.

It ignores the variety of backgrounds and

skills represented by many members of the profession,
especially those engaged primarily in the field of management

advisory services within many CPA firms.
We believe that requiring a CPA firm to possess the

expertise necessary to perform any specific engagement with
professional competence is a better criterion.

This substitute

criterion would allow the varied educational and experience
backgrounds of many of the profession’s members to be taken into

296

account.
A number of outstanding writings on the

advantages of management advisory services exist.

The

most recent of these is Stanley R. Klion's article, MAS
Practice:

Are the Critics Justified?,

which appeared in the

June, 1978 issue of The Journal of Accountancy.

This

article is in your possession and was referred to in the
Notice of Hearing.

Mr. Klion makes a number of very fine

points in his article, but in the interest of brevity,

we will not review them all here.

The principal point is that

the performance of management advisory services by the CPA
enhances, rather than diminishes, the quality of audits,
and that seems to be the heart of the matter that this

Board

is

addressing in these hearings.

In fact, the

Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities in its Report,

Conclusions and Recommendations states on page 95:
"An audit requires considerable knowledge

about a company, its operations, and its

industry.

Providing management advisory

services for an audit client may increase

the auditor's understanding and knowledge
and prove advantageous in conducting the
audit."

We submit that the very fact of the auditor's

independence enhances his ability to perform management

advisory services engagements.

His objectivity and independence,

in concert with his professional competence, give authority

to the findings and conclusions developed in the performance
of management advisory services engagements.
The vast majority of American businesses are small
to medium sized privately owned enterprises, which generally

lack the resources necessary to maintain in-house capabilities
in many areas of today's business activity.
These areas
are the ones to which management advisory services engagements
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are usually directed.

Many of these business feel

that their best, and sometimes only, source of

competent advice on a host of business problems is their
CPA. Any restrictions on the scope of services of CPA’s
would have a detrimental effect on these businesses, and

would ultimately have an adverse effect on our economy.
This would clearly not be in the best interest of the
general public.

The proposal that restrictions be placed on
management advisory services only for audit clients, or

only for publicly owned clients establishes a clear
Such a double standard would be unacceptable

double-standard.

to both the profession and the business community because it
implies that one standard is inferior to the other.
Restrictions on management advisory services would

be detrimental to the profession generally, but particularly
to the smaller practice units which spend a substantial

amount of their client-chargeable time providing
management advice.

This time has been reported by some

small practice units as almost forty percent of their
client-chargeable hours.

The economic impact on these

firms and their employees is obvious.
Of particular concern to the smaller practice
units is the question as to whether the definition of

management advisory services (if such a definition should
be formulated)

should include day-to-day consulting.

If

this informal advice is included in some expanded

definition of management advisory services, which services
are subsequently proscribed, the impact on both the smaller

firms and their clients will be much more serious.
The key point in the Scope of Services issue is

perceived as independence.

Indeed, the problem does not seem

to be in the fact of independence, but in the appearance
of independence. We again call your attention to the Commission
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on Auditor’s Responsibilities Report, Conclusions,

and Recommendations, page 102, which states:

"Except for the Westec case, the Commission’s
research has not found instances in which

an auditor’s independence has been compromised

Indeed, some

by providing other services.

of our research indicates that performing
consulting services may improve the audit

function and benefit users.

If the

empirical evidence were the only consideration,
the Commission’s conclusion would be clear:
The evidence does not support the theory.
No prohibition of management services is

warranted. ’’

On examination, we find that the Westec case

involved the rendering of advice on accounting principles,
and thus was not a management advisory services engagement

in the sense which has been implied in the Board’s notice
of hearing.

We believe that the Commission felt this was not

a typical management services engagement and implied as much

by referring to "other" services rather than to management

advisory services.
We have no knowledge of any new hard evidence

supporting the assumption of impairment of independence, and
in the absence of empirical evidence in support of this

assumption, urge the Board to recommend that there be no
prohibition of management advisory services.

We believe

the Commission's Report says it most eloquently on page 94:

"Decisions on the other services offered
and used should be made by individual

public accounting firms and boards of
directors of clients."
Should the Board have any question on the comments
made in this presentation, or desire amplification of any

of these comments, I will be happy to respond.

On behalf

of the Management Advisory Services Committee of the NCACPA,
I wish to thank you for this opportunity to present our views
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to you.

MR. GARRETT:
MR. McCLOY:

Thank you, Mr. Herbert.
What, if any, menace do you

see today to the concept of independence.

I am not limiting

it to MAS.

Do you see any area where you feel that the
independence of the accountants is being impaired or any
threat to it that you think we ought to take cognizance

of?
MR. HEBERT:
I can think of nothing that I
would conceive as a real threat.
I think again it is a

question of appearance of independence.
I would like to expand, if I might, and endorse
the comments that Mr. Vanatta made yesterday as well as
Mr. Mautz' from Ernst and Mr. Klion’s comments this

morning.

I think that, and I really believe, that the

best answer to this problem lies possibly in education.

Maybe

I should say not possibly, but very definitely in education.
which is a difficult thing, I know, to accomplish, but I

think that having the boards of directors and audit committees

responsible for overlooking the independence of their principal
accountants, it is a very positive step.

I believe extending

the peer reviews to include peer review of MAS engagements

is a positive step.
Certainly while it may not respond quite as quickly

I think that the marketplace is an excellent place to have
our practices limited if they are to be limited.
MR. McCLOY: But you don't see any other threat to
the independence of the profession that we ought to take

account of?
MR. HEBERT:

Very frankly, Mr. McCloy,
I hadn't
tried to think of that in advance, and nothing comes to mind

offhand.
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Are you engaged in the MAS

MR. GARRETT:

operations of your firm?
MR. HEBERT:

Yes, I am.

MR. GARRETT:

What services do you perform—not

you individually, but does your firm supply?

MR. HEBERT:

We are pretty well engaged in a

broad range of services with the exception we do not provide
any plant layout.

We are not in executive search, and we

are not in actuarial services.
I might expand that to say that we are not in

executive search because we don’t feel that we have the
competence at this point to do a professional job in that

area, and we are not in the actuarial services for the

same reason.
I don’t know that we would ever want to be in

plant layout.
MR. GARRETT:

One thing that has not be explored,

at least at these hearings very much, was smaller firms,
particularly, and I guess not just the smaller firms, is the
extent to which it matters whether we are talking or the

Executive Committee’s proposals are considering only advisory

services that reach the dignity or the formality of separate

engagements for which separate statements are rendered as
against what you described as the day-to-day consulting
operations which presumably, at least, increased the
inquiries, I imagine, that would frequently come to the

audit partner or the manager that the client is familiar
with because that is who he saw during the audit.
MR. HEBERT:

That is correct.

MR. GARRETT:

I suppose for the sake of

information the audit partner might turn to the MAS people
if it was something he didn’t know.
Do you have a formal MAS department?
MR. HEBERT:
MR. GARRETT:

Yes, we do.
And do you engage in both types of

services,
that is to say, those in which you are retained
or your department is retained for a specific piece of work

301 -

and a separate statement goes out, and then also, those

in which audit partners will call you and say:

"So-and-so

Can you help us?"

has asked this.

MR. HEBERT:

The way our firm is structured, our

department is really engaged in the formal type of

services, formally structured services, but it is not at
all unusual, in fact, it is very commonplace, for the audit

partners to call some one and say, "I had a client with
such-and-such a problem. What do you think I ought
to tell him?"

Or, "I told him such-and-such.

Was that a good answer?

Should I call him back and

maybe tell him something different?"
MR. GARRETT:

So you get both types?

MR. HEBERT:

Yes.

MR. GARRETT:

With the very small firms,

I suppose most what we are talking about is the day-to-day
consulting type.

MR. HEBERT:

Very definitely.

MR. GARRETT:

How about with your firm,

Mr. Elliott?

What is the breadown with your high percentage

of MAS?

MR. ELLIOTT:

6% of the practice.

The formal MAS would be about

The informal MAS, I really don't

know because it gets mixed in, as I said before, in

various other areas, but it has got to be 25 or 30% of

The informal counseling.
In my own personal case, other than the

our total time expenditure.

administrative work I do for our firm, almost 100% of my
time in informal advice and counsel to clients both in

accounting area, the tax area and in general business

advice.

MR. GARRETT:

I don't know that the Executive

Committee was even trying to reach the day-to-day

consulting, the telephone call sort of thing, the
curbstone advice.
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MR. ELLIOTT:

You can't deny that is

exactly the same thing as the formally structured MAS, if
there is an impact on independence or anything else.

I could not say that I can advise a client

to take an action informally and not sacrifice independence
and on the other hand, say if I did it formally, I would.

That would be unreasonable.

So I think both have to be

taken together.
MR. GARRETT:

If there is any contamination

involved, perhaps it is worse the other way.

If it is

the audit partner who day to day is helping the fellow
run the business, if there is any possible impairment
of independence, it might come more from that than

it would in the formal retention of the MAS department
which would perhaps, at least, in some firms be different

people engaged in different affairs.

MR. HEBERT:
MR. McCLOY:

Yes.
You charge for all this service,

don't you, by time?
MR. ELLIOTT:

As Mr. Moss said this morning,

we do as his firm does, we charge for our time.

If we

are doing something productive for a client, we charge
the time.
The only inaccuracy in accumulating that would

be if we charge it to an improper function, but the
client will be billed for it.

MR.

McCLOY:

What is your chief MAS service

consist of?
MR. HEBERT:

About 55 to 60%

MR. McCLOY:

That is compared with audit,

MR. HEBERT:

Our formal MAS department accounts

how much?
for about 4 to 4-1/2% of our total firm revenues.

Within

MAS, about 55—a good 55% of our engagements are directed
at computer and computer-related types of activities.
MR. McCLOY:
MR. HEBERT:

Computer, yes.

If I could make one further
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statement, I would like to, and that concerns the ripple

effect that we heard this morning.

It is not in our

formal response, but to expand a little bit on the two

sets of standards that might be developed here, I know
in Ashville, North Carolina which is where I am located,

which is a very small town, relatively speaking, that
we have three local firms there who have already joined

the SEC Practice Division, who have no SEC clients and

have probably no real

prospects of acquiring SEC clients,

but they already perceive that membership in the
SEC Practice Section will be viewed as being superior to

membership in the Small Firms Division, so I think
we are already seeing some of this ripple effect.

PROFESSOR CARY:

You did mention one case.

You said you had no evidence, that there was no evidence
you knew of, of MAS and other activities having impact on
the audit performance, but you said except in the Westec

case.

Did I misstate that?

I just wanted to get that

clear.
MR. HEBERT:

No, I said I knew of nothing in

terms of MAS engagements, and then in fact, the Commission
only found one engagement which I would not typify as an
MAS engagement.
MR. McCLOY:

You would differentiate that one,

though?

MR. HEBERT: Yes. I would.
PROFESSOR CARY: It wasn't quite clear when you

mentioned the case.

I just wanted to make sure.
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Thank you.

DR. JOHN C. BURTON:

MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.

We appreciate your coming.

Proceed.
DR. BURTON:
is John Burton.

I am pleased to be here.

My name

I am currently the Arthur Young

Professor of Accounting and Finance at the Columbia

Graduate School of Business.

I was previously Chief

Accountant of the Securities & Exchange Commission and
Deputy Major of Finance of the City of New York.

As I indicated in my letter, I believe that
the Public Oversight Board should urge the SEC Practice
Section not to adopt scope of services limitations

beyond those now included in the AICPA Code of Ethics.
I think the AICPA criteria of competence and compatibility

have been satisfactory.

I think the requirement of

Section 3(a) of the requirements for membership which
provides that a majority of firm members are CPAs

does prevent the tail wagging the dog problem that I
sense Professor Cary is a little concerned about.

Basically, I believe this for three reasons.

First, there is no evidence to support any limitation.

As SEC Chief Accountant, I was, in effect, the pathologist
at many autopsies of deficient SEC practice and

deficient auditing practice and while I found
deficiencies, the disease was not based on management

consulting in any case that I can recall, and I have
thought back upon them.

Secondly, I think the Board and the Section

should have as its principal concern the quality of
audits.

Independence is not a sufficient condition,

although it is a necessary one, if you define
independence in the sense of unbiased professionalism.

If you define independence in the sense of absolute
avoidance of relationships with the client, I don'
t
believe that independence is even a desirable criteria.

But in the sense that it is normally used, the sense
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of unbiased professionalism, I think it is a necessary,
but not sufficient condition.

I think accounting

expertise and knowledge of the client’s business are

also necessary conditions, and that consulting
services clearly enhance both of these.
Fundamentally, consulting services enhance

expertise and knowledge of client business in terms of
the quality of personnel, where I have watched as a
university professor the accounting firms attract a

far higher quality of personnel because they do offer
consulting services, and because of the knowledge

of client business which consulting provides to
auditors.

In addition, the improved quality of

client systems which emerge from consulting practice
leads to more efficient audits.

Therefore, I believe

that by the test of quality of audits, the consulting

practice adds to rather than subtracts from professional
performance.

The third reason that I believe the Board
should not urge any scope of service limitation is
that I think the appearance of independence problem

cannot be solved by a ritual sacrifice of this nature

or even by a real sacrifice, and quite frankly I
don't view this as a real sacrifice as the profession

has adopted it.

The appearance problem is dominated

One, the basic fee relationship that
is associated with the auditor-client relationship,

by two factors.

and secondly, the cooperative approach to an audit
which is, in my judgment, essential for both the

economic and effective performance of the audit
function.

To the extent that there is an appearance
problem associated with consulting, that problem is
in the very areas of accounting-and auditing-related

skills, not in the more or less peripheral areas.

As the SEC moves to require reports on the
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adequacy of internal control,as I think they should

and will, the problem of appearance in the accounting
and auditing areas would become even greater.
The profession's only approach, it seems
to me, is to stand on its integrity and competence
which I think broadly speaking has been demonstrated

over the decades.

I do believe there are a number of positive
steps the Board should take which I think would enhance

its stature and the stature of the profession and
would perhaps have a positive effect on the appearance

problem.

First, I believe, it should suggest amendment
of Rule 3(C) on the requirements of members to require
peer reviews to include the firm's entire practice

rather than simply the accounting and auditing practice.

Secondly, I think that an auditing standard
should be established, and the Board should suggest

this, that requires the auditor to review the work
papers of any consulting engagement undertaken by his
firm.

In addition, consultation between audit and

management services staff should be required to meet
certain continuing education requirements in auditing
and accounting problems, so that they will be sensitive

to the implications of circumstances which they may

discover in their consulting work.
These are all proposals to tie together more

closely the auditing and consulting functions and
thus achieve the benefits of better information that

arise from them.
Finally, I suggest that the appearance
problem can best be resolved by full disclosure and

openness about all auditor-client relationships.
An open environment reduces suspicion.

Thus, I believe

the Board should suggest amendment to Rule 3(G)8 of
the requirements (which requires disclosure of clients)
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to include total fees paid by each client broken down
by audit, tax and consulting services, and further,
I recommend that the Board suggest to the SEC that

disclosure of all facets of the relationship between

auditor and client be required in proxy materials
including the processes of auditor selection,

compensation and communication with the Board and its
audit committee as well as fees.

I think you are aware, in general, of my
views from my letter.

That is a summary of them,

and I will be delighted to discuss any of them with
you that you are interested in discussing.
MR. McCLOY:

those three things.

Let me be sure I have got
You are talking about the effect

You would go beyond what

on the appearance problem.

is now required in the disclosure area, the inclusion
of fees paid.

DR. BURTON:

I believe that the problem of

appearance to a significant extent arises from the
suspicions that are engendered by a private
relationship that is not disclosed.

I think this can be assisted by requiring
the disclosure of this relationship.

I think it is

beneficial to have disclosure of the total financial

relationship between the auditor and the client and
that this will enhance a feeling of openness and
will reduce the suspicions among those who perhaps

today believe that first, there is an unholy alliance
between the client and the auditor, and second, that

consulting plays a major role in it, which I don't

think it does, and I think that the evidence has
not suggested that it does.
MR. McCLOY:

What was your third?

DR. BURTON:

I had the amendment of the rule

to require peer reviews to cover the entire firm's
practice.
Second, that auditing requirements be
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established which mandate the review of consulting

engagements by the audit partner so that he is
aware of them, and that there be continuing education

requirements placed upon consulting personnel to
sensitize them—
MR. McCLOY:

Tie that together.

DR. BURTON:

Yes, to sensitize them, and the

third was the question of full disclosure which would

include both the disclosure of fees to the AICPA and
in the public document filed, and POB recommendations

to the SEC that there be disclosure of all facets
of the relationship in the proxy materials which would
include the processes of auditor selection, compensation

and communication with the Board and its audit committee.
That is part of the disclosure.

So basically, the three suggestions I have

are first, the expansion of peer review; second,
tying together consulting and auditing in a more

effective manner to make sure that the auditor has
the use of the consulting expertise; and third, the

full disclosure of the auditor-client relationship.
MR. McCLOY:

Is there anything else you can

DR. BURTON:

No, I think those represent

think of?

my thoughts, at least at the present time, on that

subject.
MR. GARRETT:

Keep him talking, though.

Give him a little time to think.

(Laughter)

To the extent that I was concerned or curious

about the way in which audits would be improved and
audit personnel made more competent by the presence
of MAS services in a firm, in light of the semi-Chinese

Wall that seemed to exist, at least in some of the

more structured firms, you would suggest that rather

than further separation and departmentalization,
there be a direct interchange and involvement so that
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MAS people would be brought right into the audit

process.
DR. BURTON:

I think that this is the way

in which their expertise can be best used, and you
have protection against what would seem to me to be

a disastrous situation where the management services

people would be discovering all the bad things in an

area while the audit personnel were blithely moving
ahead to opine on financial statements.

I think I mentioned in my letter one case
where I was involved as a consultant in credit

policy where our consulting engagement directly

benefited the audit, and it would have been most

unfortunate for the audit personnel to have been
not aware of what we were doing in the credit
policy area.
MR. GARRETT:

There is a practical and

legal hazard there.

DR. BURTON:

Yes, there would be a practical

and legal hazard as well as a problem in terms of
the public interest, so-called.

MR. GARRETT:

How does the presence of MAS

stimulate or make it more exciting for students?

Do they imagine themselves going with firms and

at least having the opportunity to get into broader

things than strict auditing?
DR. BURTON:

I think it is fair to say that

to the best students in graduate business schools,
the term "auditing” leaves an impression which is not
exactly consistent with what auditing is, but which
gives a very negative reaction.
Most of the best students say that they don't

want to be auditors.

When they get into the firms,

they often discover that auditing can be a quite creative
activity, particularly where it is related to client
services in a variety of ways, but they are immediately
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attracted to the consulting side of the firm or to the

opportunity to go into the consulting side.

Some go

directly, but interestingly enough, some of my best

students who have originally gone directly into the
consulting side wandered back into the auditing side

because they have seen that as the basic product of
the firm, and they have gotten interested in it.

I

believe there is no question that if I were identifying

the very best people whom I have seen go into public

accounting from Columbia, a very significant proportion

of them, of the order of magnitude of certainly a third
to a half, were attracted by the consulting functions

which the firm performed.

MR. GARRETT:

They also report, at least in

some surveys that I have seen, that auditing isn’t
very well taught.

(Laughter)

I am more sympathetic with that than it
sounds because I have done some law teaching, and I

know that must be the kind of operation that would be
difficult to each or make exciting while you are

trying to teach it.
DR. BURTON:

Auditing is an extremely difficult

course to teach, and I would say that I have personally

been less satisfied with auditing courses that I have
taught over the years when contrasted with accounting

theory and some of the other areas.

MR. GARRETT:

It would somewhat like trying

to train lawyers in certain procedural litigating

contracts and investigations and things of that sort.

It is hard to bring into the classroom.
DR. BURTON: Ultimately, I believe, the
training in auditing is increasingly and appropriately
being taken on by the accounting firms, that the

auditing course are giving some institutional
background about the profession, about ethics, about
the way in which auditing standards are set, this
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type of issue, but that increasingly, I think, at
least the major business schools are viewing their
role as not to train entry level auditors in the
techniques of auditing because that is both dull

and it can’t be related to their experience which
is the real problem that you have.

MR. McCLOY:

I must just give a comment.

The other day I was consulted by a young man who came

to me and said, should he go into law, should he go
into accounting.

One of the big eight was offering

him a good job, and he said, "They are telling me,

gee, they are opening up a tremendous field here,
and it is not only auditing.

Gee whiz, they know

They can do everything

all about the business.

in this advisory business," so I just wonder how

much of this is propaganda from the schools and which
is the leading factor.
I can see how the argument can well be

made.
I know of another former colleague of mine
who went over into one of the big accounting firms
because he thought he was getting a better breadth

of view in the whole business world than he was getting
in the law.
DR. BURTON:

Certainly than the law.

MR. McCLOY:

I gather there is great competition

for talent that goes on now.

(Laughter)

This is one of the arguments

that is used.
DR. BURTON:

This is true, and the accounting

firms have traditionally paid somewhat less than
business enterprises, but they have offered a breadth
of experience, and to the very best students, they have
said, "There is more to this than simply going out and
ticking and checking.

What you have to do is try to

understand the business.

with business.

You are trying to consult

You are trying to do many different
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things," and the consulting aspect of the firm has

been a major drawing card.

it.

There is no question about

It may be public relations in part, but it is a

major drawing card.
Certainly, if you want to

MR. GARRETT:

practice tax law, the accounting firm would be the
place to go.

(Laughter)

MR. McCLOY:

Are you opposed to any

limitation, whatever, on the scope?

I believe that the basic

DR. BURTON:

limitations which are in the Code of Ethics now,
which deal with competence and compatibility, are

working satisfactorily.

I think that it would be

inappropriate for accountants to serve, for example,
as investment advisers.

In the first place, there

would be a conflict of interest and an insider

information problem, and a lot of others, but even
beyond that, I think it would be inappropriate,

if not incompatible.

That is a judgment I make;

I don’t think it would be compatible.

On the other

hand, within the consulting area where you are

providing advice to the management, I see no areas
where there would be a particular problem in my

view, and I think that today there is not a major
problem in the firms adopting reasonable positions
in this regard.

As I have seen consulting practice,

it doesn’t seem to me that there are examples or

at least not many examples of services that are
incompatible which are still being performed, so
I am not unhappy with the system as it exists

today.
I wouldn’t think that the accounting firm
should be able to acquire a department store,
and I similarly don’t think that McKinsey & Company
should be able to hire 25 CPAs and start an audit
practice, which is perhaps a more interesting

question even than the accounting firm acquiring
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McKinsey, and again I think the limitation that says

a majority of CPAs is a satisfactory protection again
a tail-wagging-the-dog type approach.
MR. McCLOY:

Do you have any difficulty at

all with the actuarial issues before us?

DR. BURTON:

No, I don't.

I think that

there is always some problem of the CPA auditing his
own work.

That is a problem that I think has been—
MR. McCLOY:

Don’t they audit their own

work in a great many cases?

client.

DR. BURTON:

That is correct.

MR. McCLOY:

Computers.

DR. BURTON:

Again they are advising their

If the CPA was serving simply as a black

box where he was just giving the client the number
and then putting it in the financial statement and
then auditing it, then there is a problem, but I

don't think it works that way.
I think in many cases there is this where
the CPA is advising on items that are very significant

to the financial statements.
MR. McCLOY:

I treat that as sort of a cliche,

the argument that you are reviewing your own work because
it seems to me that in reviewing your own work, it is
a matter of direct or indirect relationship, but in

many respects, you are doing it, so per se, I don't
think that is a condemnation.

You have to go further

with your condemnation.
DR. BURTON:
MR. McCLOY:

I would agree.
You don't have any problem with

executive recruitment?
DR. BURTON:

No, I think that my own experience

with it, and as I cited, I am a director of one company

that has used their accounting firm, indicates that
the service was an extremely valuable one that has
contributed to the quality of systems and the quality
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of personnel, and thus enhanced the financial statements
and the audit.

I don’t see an executive recruiting problem.
I think it is a natural service for the firms to

perform, and I think that in general the step of

professionalizing it rather than making it entirely
informal has been a beneficial one, both to the clients
and in terms of any potential problems.

It is more

than just recommending a friend now.

MR. McCLOY:

Do you place any value on this

principle that you should recommend six or five rather
than one?

DR. BURTON:
one recommended.

It wouldn’t trouble me to see

I mean, I think that in any search

process it is unlikely you will emerge with only one
candidate, but I certainly would not hesitate to see
a CPA firm say, "We have interviewed five candidates,

and you have interviewed three, and we think this
one is the best."

I see no problem in that.

MR. GARRETT:

I would like to add one

question to that, and that is would you draw any

line.

Presumably, you would not, at the rank of the

person being put in?

Executive recruiting could

extend to Vice President Finance and the Controller,

or the top officer himself, without you having any
problems.

Some firms have said: "We stop short,

if it is somebody that is key to the management
decision whether to hire or fire the auditors."

DR. BURTON:

No, I don’t see a problem,

and I have heard some people raise questions in
regard to whether or not executive search should be
utilized to identify potential outside directors.

For the same reason, I don't personally see the

problem.

It does not seem to me that the evidence

supports the suggestion that this will create a
problem, and as I get back to the question of
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appearance, the appearance is so dominated by the question
of fee, if I were talking about it—those who are
suspicious are going to remain suspicious, and providing
them with a ritual sacrifice is not going to allay

that suspicion.

That is why I disagree with Mr. Klion's

statement this morning which said:

to do this and be done with it.
are not going to be done with it.

Well, we would like

If you do this, you
This is merely the

first step because those who are suspicious, are going
to remain suspicious, in fact, more so because they

will see something that appears to be something that
it isn’t, and that will make them more suspicious
rather than the other way around.

PROFESSOR CARY:

I think you have covered

most of the things that I had in mind, particularly

that one that I addressed frequently and talked with
you about such as the merger with McKinsey and whathave-you.

You did say that it bothered you to see

them go into investment counseling and what-have-you,
and that is the question of compatibility, as I see

it.

What that means is that you are drawing
some lines, and the issue is whether or not any of
the lines that, for instance, have been drawn in
this proposal, in the Notice, were wrong or right,
or whether, in other words, when they limited
themselves, in respect to plant layout, I assume that

is based on the compatibility theory and justifiable,

or what do you think?
DR. BURTON:

It seemed to me in the first

place that there was very little limitation in the
proposal.

But I don't believe that very specific

limitations are desirable.
facts in each cash.

You must look at the

The general principle of

compatibility is sufficient without drawing lines.
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I have no problem, for example, with the

area of contract research which was mentioned this
morning.

It seems to me that there is no reason

why an accounting firm should not undertake a

research project for the Financial Executives
Institute that would deal with certain problems.

I also see no problem with psychological testing

within the framework of executive testing within
the framework of executive search.

I think this

may be a useful tool.

I think there do come some questions where,
if you employ an independent group of four

psychologists, and you say: "This is our psychological

testing department," and they are going to do just
psychological tests, you raise a question, in my

mind, at that point, as to whether that is compatible,
but I don’t see a way of drawing a line by rule
because when you draw a line by rule, you have to

cover 100% of the cases, and that is extremely

difficult.

So my view is that it is sufficient

to establish the principle of compatibility and to
identify certain examples of extreme cases, and

such as I practicing law or investment counseling

or brokerage.

I can see you explaining why certain

cases are extreme, but I don't think it makes sense

to come down and say: "We are now going to write

a rule that explains the difference between dusk

and dark," even though I can tell the difference
between noon and midnight, as they say.

PROFESSOR CARY: Looking at the whole
profession, you don't see any evidence that they
are moving in new directions?

One, are they moving

in new directions; and two, if so, are they directions
that one would be concerned about, if we don't have

some rules, if we don't have some line?
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DR. BURTON:

I am not

sure that they are

moving in enough new directions, to tell you the
truth, but I do not see any new directions that are,

at the moment, dangerous to the profession.
I believe that it would be very desirable
for the profession to move more in areas such as

corporate directorship and areas such as education,
greater continuing education activities.

There are a variety of things that I think

would be beneficial both to society and to the profession.
I do not see anything on the horizon that

strikes me as representing a substantial risk.
PROFESSOR CARY:

The last question is, we

have referred several times to this ASR-250.

Mr.

Gunders raised it, and it has been further developed

by Mr. Klion.
You have spoken in favor of disclosure, but

is this the kind of disclosure you would favor?
DR. BURTON:

I think that the disclosures

in 250 are not the right ones to a significant extent.

I commented to the Commission endorsing the fee
disclosure proposals that were originally made.

I think that it is desirable to lay out on
a regular basis the full nature of the relationship

between the auditor and his client.

I think it is a

mistake to single one out and say: "If you do consulting,
then you should disclose the percentage of fee, and

you should disclose whether the audit committee has

approved," because that implies a criticism of the
consulting practice.
I think it is far better to have as a routine
disclosure of the full aspects of the relationship

between the auditor and the client which includes:

How is the auditor selected?
with the board?
committee?

How does he communicate

What is the responsibility of the audit

What are the services he performs?
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And

this should be put out in the open on a regular
basis rather than identified as something that is
a little questionable, which is sort of what is

implied in 250.
So I don’t think 250 is the right approach,

but I do believe in a disclosure approach.

PROFESSOR CARY:

Do you think 250 is going

to have some unfortunate results as might have been
indicated by earlier speakers?
DR. BURTON:

I believe, and I admit if I

were out on the firing line, selling consulting

services, I might have a different view, but I think
that the effect will not be in any long-term basis

very significant.

I think it may this year as audit

committees are particularly talking with lawyers

who may be nervous and concerned beyond reasonable

levels, so there may be some short-run effect,
but I don’t think it is going to have any significant

long-term effect.

The disclosure will become routinized even
in this regard, so it may be a first year effect.
I don’t think the long-term effect will be bad, but

I don’t think it is the right approach.

MR. McCLOY:

But you would advocate

disclosure?
DR. BURTON:

I would advocate disclosure.

I believe it has to do with the openness of a
relationship.

When you are talking about the

suspicions that people have, and that is really what

you are talking about when you are talking about
the appearance of independence, people are suspicious
because they know that the auditor is paid by his

client.

least,

MR.

McCLOY:

That is the main reason?

DR.

BURTON:

That is the main reason, so at

lay it all out.

Let it be known, and they you
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say: "Yes, it’s true," but then you have to educate
people to the counter balancing pressures on the
auditors, and they are significant.
I don’t suggest any method other than having

the auditor paid by his client.

I think that is the

best approach of any that I have heard suggested.
MR. McCLOY:

Is there any place in the world

where anybody but the client pays the fee?

Does

the government pay the fee anywhere that you know?

What about alternatives to the client paying
the fee?

DR. BURTON:

I am not aware of any place

where there are other approaches.

There are some cases

where, for instance, in the United Kingdom there is
disclosure of the audit fee by all companies.

That

is a standard, but it is paid by the client still.

There are a couple of places, I believe,
where there are certain responsibilities that government
officials have to look into things, but still the

basic auditor relationship is the same.
If you are looking for approaches, you
could have a pool of funds administered by a stock
exchange.

There are other approaches, but I don't

believe you should remove the economic discipline

of the client-auditor relationship.
If you look at the world of medical
reimbursement, you see what happens when you eliminate

all economic discipline.

is necessary.

I think the economic discipline

It is part of keeping the audit fee

within reason.
MR. McCLOY:

Isn’t there a suggestion in

this ASR-250 of some implicit disapprobation of the MAS
concept?

Before I came to this hearing about a week

or so ago, as a lawyer I was consulted about ASR-250.
There was a feeling of the client being discouraged

about obtaining MAS services from the auditing firm.
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So why have the risk with all this litigious atmosphere

that we are in today?

Why not just go and take the

MAS from some other firm?

And that is rather unfair,

I think, in view of all the argumentation we have had
here about the benefits of MAS to the audit function,
you are suggesting that that implication is diminimus.
DR. BURTON:

I think the first year effect

may be significant, but I don't think the first year

effect may be significant, but I don't think in the

long run it is going to be a major problem to the firms.
I do think there is implicit in ASR-250 a criticism
of services which I don't believe is appropriate, so

I think it is the wrong approach.

Rather than create

a regular disclosure vehicle for all services, it
sets out something as a particular disclosure which

leaves an implication of criticism.
MR. McCLOY:

One other suggestion was made

this morning by someone—I forget just who it was now—
they were against this limitation of scope just because
we were already overregulated in business.

this business is being overregulated today?

Do you think
(Laughter)

You say you are a professor of business.
DR. BURTON:

I would say two things to that.

One, overall, the answer was yes.

But as is typical of

those who are criticizing government involvement who

don't think government involvement is good in areas
in which they are not particularly interested but favor

it in the areas they are, I think in the disclosure
area, there is not overregulation.
I think disclosure is the right answer in a
society such as ours. On the other hand, if you ask me
about OSHA and a few of the environmental requirements,

I think the cost benefit trade-offs are not recognized,

and the costs are far greater than the disclosure costs.
MR. GARRETT: We all witness, with respect

to companies, the tendency to equate disclosability
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with impropriety.

I notice that particularly in the management
perk disclosures where sometimes there they were

right, but not necessarily.
I take ASR-250 as also implying that there is
some significance in the relationship of the total

revenues that the auditor receives from the auditing

function as against all others.

Does that suggest that there ought to be some
limitation, that one cannot have more than 40% - 50%

relationship, or something of that kind, that you get
more corrupt.

You are making more money out of selling

your MAS than you are out of your auditing.
DR. BURTON:

I don’t believe that is correct.

I think in a particular year you may have a massive
consulting engagement, and it may represent three times

your audit fee that year.
On the other hand, on a continuing basis,
it is unlikely that your consulting activity will ever
be substantially greater than your audit fee.

One of

the protections as well as one of the risks in consulting

activity is that if the auditor does a really bad job
in either, he is likely to lose the other, and particularly

since the audit is normally an ongoing job, audit partners

are always concerned that the consultants will go in
and butcher a job and it will cost them the audit

relationship as well.

But I don't see any need for

a quantitative limit on consulting.

Again, I think in the aggregate, when you
say that more than half the members of the firm must

be CPAs, you are building in some protection, and that
really avoids what could be a problem of consulting
becoming the dominant factor.

MR. GARRETT:

Some, though, we hear are

hiring industrial engineers and sending them to school
at night to get a CPA.
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DR. BURTON:

a bad situation.

I don’t think that is necessarily

I think you could construct a

hypothetical where I would say that there is probably
too much consulting where the accounting and auditing

expertise of a firm is no longer a key element in its
economic success.

I think in the final analysis there

must be a recognition on the part of firms that are
in the accounting area that accounting expertise has

to be a key element in their economic success.
But I see those limits as so far removed

from anything we have today that I don’t see that as
a major problem, and as I said, I think the limitation

of

50%

CPAs

is a reasonable one because I think when

you go through the training for CPA you are then

sensitized to the kinds of problems CPAs must face.
MR. GARRETT:

We spent some time yesterday

worrying—at least I did—about certain types of
advisory projects, that would cause the firm to be

so involved, so concerned with the success of a

project that they helped plan and recommend, that it
might corrupt, however subtly their judgment with

respect to recognition of defects or in the extreme

case, recognition of the need to write it off.
Does that cause you any concern?
DR. BURTON:

I suspect you could construct

a hypothetical where there could be a problem in that

situation, but I think in large part one of the big
protections in such a situation is that there are

countervailing forces of significant magnitude against

allowing your audit judgment to be swayed by something
of that sort. The existence of liabilities and the
existence of the risks that you would take, if you
allowed your judgment to be swayed, are such that I

believe they represent a reasonable protection against
this abuse.

MR. GARRETT:

I suppose internally within
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the firm, too, as far as that is concerned.
DR. BURTON:

MR. GARRETT:

Yes.
The audit partner might not

be very eager to make his MAS partner look good at
his expense.

DR. BURTON:

I would say that the audit

partner would be more worried about what would happen

if he was wrong.

It would not be so much a question

of worrying about letting the MAS partner look good

but what would happen to him if he really went too
far.
MR. McCLOY:

That comes up in connection with

acquisitions and mergers?

DR. BURTON:

It might.

MR. McCLOY:

Or major overhaul of the business.

DR. BURTON:

There would be situations.

Acquisitions.

I

mean, you could construct a hypothetical.
MR. McCLOY:

A tendency not to write off the

mistake as early as you should have.

DR. BURTON:

There is such a tendency unless

you have a bad year anyway in which case you tend to
write it off earlier than you should.

MR. STARK:

(Laughter)

Dr. Burton, yesterday Mr. Gunders

of Price Waterhouse suggested that for a number of reasons

including antitrust concerns and other reasons, the
profession should not impose restrictions on itself

with respect to the scope of services, but he suggested
that the SEC should have a role in this area.

My

question is whether you see a disposition or a likelihood

or a pressure that might develop for the SEC to act
in case the profession doesn’t act on this particular
issue.
DR. BURTON:

There is certainly that

possibility because if you are looking at a political

judgment, which is really what the question is, it is
possible that the SEC will make the political judgment
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that they must take some action.
However, if this is to be a political judgment,

I believe they are the ones who should make the political
judgment and the profession should not attempt to take
a position that we are going to do something not
because it is right, but because we want to avoid the

political judgment which the SEC might make.
In addition, if it is to be a political
judgment, it is probably not bad to allow the SEC to

make it and to be able to go to Capitol Hill as heroes.
I think that is in the best interest of the

profession rather than to have the profession go there
and say:

along."

"Here is what we did, and the SEC meekly went
I mean if it is really a political problem

and someone has to take a step, take a stand, which is

not based on logic or rationality but based solely on

political phenomena, I think the Commission is the
better one to do it.
MR. GARRETT:

There was also a suggestion

of antitrust exposure.
DR. BURTON:
variable.

Antitrust is an additional

I guess I am already on record as being

concerned about this whole structure in that framework
as a possible problem.
MR. McCLOY:

Do you think the POB may be

liable for antitrust suits?

DR. BURTON:

I believe that the ability of

the Oversight Board and the Section to impose effective
disciplinary sanctions, which I think is an essential

component in its ultimate success, is subject to question
on antitrust grounds.
I am not an attorney, but I
have been told by various people who are attorneys that

there are some legitimate questions that might come
up, and if the Oversight Board ultimately is to be

successful in the public eye, I think it must be seen
both within the profession and outside as imposing
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effective sanctions where deficient practice is discovered.
MR. McCLOY:

Do you know where any legal

memoranda on this reposes?

Have you or the SEC collected

an authority on that?
DR. BURTON:

No, I would refer you to Mr.

Pitt at the Commission who I understand studied this at

some length, and I would not propose to practice law in

this area.
MR. GARRETT:

We had better hurry, do you agree,

because in a couple of weeks it will be expensive?

(Laughter)
DR. BURTON:
MR. GARRETT:

in Mr. Gunders' mouth.

That is true.
One other idea, putting words

He can speak up if we misquote

him, that something could be gained by further exposure
and perhaps even codification or restatement of the

series of interpretive advices that the staff have

given with respect to prospective MAS engagement and
independence.

I don't suppose you are familiar with
everything that has been written or said over the 4 0-

some years.
DR. BURTON:

I have looked at a number of

them in connection with SEC consideration of particular
problems.

I have not made a study of the totality of

them.

I think that it is always worthwhile where
a staff or a group is making a series of ad hoc

determinations to look at them from time to time and
see if there are any principles that could be enunciated
as guidelines.

But again, I am troubled by trying

to write a rule because I think that each factual
circumstance has so many variables that you have to

be able to consider the variables rather than just
look at one or two in each situation, so I don't
think that you will get or should have a rule book,
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but it may be that from time to time where advisory
opinions have been given that there should be some

attempt to bring together these opinions and draw

some general guidance from them.

I don’t think it

should be an official rule that is drawn from these.
At least that would be my reaction.
MR. GARRETT:

No, but it could be

susceptible of the common law process of taking a
bunch of specific cases, all of which must imply some
abiding rule and trying to draw conclusions from them.

I don’t know what we would find if we did
it, but it would be interesting.
DR. BURTON:

You might also at the same time,

as well as looking at those, go to the description of

practice that the various firms have and see whether
there is anything.

I know I have heard today a couple

of firms describe their limitations, and you must
have on the record a number of these things, and there

might be from that also some general principles that

could be drawn, but I am hesitant about writing a
rule simply because I think it is very difficult

to contemplate all of the situations that you might
find.

MR. MANZONI:

One of your recommendations

led to disclosure of the relationship to accountants,

including disclosure of fees.

I am not entirely clear how that would cause
anyone’s suspicion to be subsided at all.

In fact,

it seems it may raise a lost of confusion in people's
minds as to why fees among different firms from
different audits may vary quite a bit for reasons
which wouldn’t be disclosed in those documents. One

firm may have very effective internal control procedures
which, as I understand it, would cause the audit fees

to be somewhat lower than someone who didn’t.
Isn’t it possible that kind of disclosure
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could really create a lot more confusion than solve

some problems?

How do we approach that part of the

problem?
DR. BURTON:

It seems to me that if there

are dramatic differences in fees that there are

legitimate questions to be asked from varying viewpoints,

both from the viewpoint of whether or not an economical
audit is being performed, and secondly, from the viewpoint

of whether this says anything significant about the
differences between firms.

It may well be that under

some circumstances there will be some additional
disclosure if the firm feels its audit fee need

requires explanation, but I think that in the first
place, I am a believer that there are effective
countervailing forces that exist today againstdeficient audits, and that it is appropriate that

there be improved information that will allow the
economic system to work in a competitive way on
maintaining some control over the cost of audits as
well, and I think that this would have some benefits

in this respect.

I think if you allow concern over the
possible confusion that might arise to dominate your

decision as to what will be disclosed, you won’t
ever disclose anything because there is always the

possibility of confusion.
I guess I feel that on balance there would

be a benefit to having this relationship an entirely
open one and a disclosed one. Not that you could
not point to some potential problems, but I think
I would solve those problems by more disclosure
rather than by eliminating this disclosure.

MR. MANZONI:

Do you go so far as to reach

other suspicions related to joining the same clubs
and playing golf every Saturday and having been a

college roommate and a lot of other things like that.
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Where does it all lead to?
DR. BURTON:

I think the suspicions are more

in terms of the economic relationships.

That seems to

me, as I have heard discussed, the greater suspicion.

There are, of course, some who view the whole world

as a conspiracy and those people will not be assuaged
by anything, but I believe that the disclosure of
economic relationships would go to what I think has
been the most significant concern.

I am not suggesting

that it would solve the concern, but it might reduce
one source of suspicion.

thing.

I think it is an on balance

It would contribute to the openness of the

relationship and the perceived openness of the relationship.

I think that there is always the danger of
greater suspicion in situations that are not disclosed.

So I think on balance it would be beneficial.
I don’t think it would fully solve the
problem because you can’t solve the problem of those

who are fundamentally suspicious.

In the final analysis

they will remain suspicious, but you take a step, and

that is the kind of step, I think, should be taken
if this Board wants to do something.

The proposal

of the Section is, on the other hand, a step that says:

We will appear to eliminate some limited number of

services, and thus show our good will.

I just don't

think that makes sense at all.

MR. McCLOY:

ripple effect.

We have heard a good bit about

I am sitting here as a lawyer.

Are

you going to "ripple" over the legal profession and
make them disclose their fees?

MR. GARRETT:

I shudder at the thought.

Well, you do if you are on the

Board.

DR. BURTON:

I am a believer in general

disclosure, and I would not exempt the legal profession
although they write the laws and thus have generally
been able to exempt themselves from many of them.
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(Laughter)
MR. GARRETT:

But they also manifest great

self-restraint in limiting their behavior to strictly

legal matters.
We hear a lot about suspicion, and it always

puzzles me that the surveys are not too compelling.
I know a couple of people in Washington that displayed
a good deal of suspicion, but most of them don’t

impress me with the factual experienced background upon
which it is based.

Do you in teaching or otherwise get the
feeling that there really is an image problem with the

accounting profession as a whole, particularly with
respect to publicly owned companies?
DR. BURTON:

I don’t believe that scope of

services is seen as a major problem.

I mean, if you

send people a questionnaire, and you ask:

Is there

a greater problem when people do consulting services

than not?

And you simply ask that question without

exploring costs and benefits, there is an inclination
to answer yes.

More business, more problem.

don’t think there is any widely held concern.

But I

There

are certainly a few individuals, some of whom are
forceful and articulate, who expressed this, and then

there are some who have basic suspicions about how
the whole system works, and this is merely one of the

manifestations of that, but I don't think it is a
major problem of broad public perception.

I think

it pales to insignificance when compared with the fee
question which is the major problem, and which I
think can't be adequately resolved.
I think there
has been more attention given to it than perhaps it
warrants in the terms of how public perception exists.
MR. GARRETT: Thank you very much.
It was

very kind of you to come and we appreciate it.
DR. BURTON:
It was my pleasure. Thank you
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for listening.
MR. GARRETT:

We shall now reconvene at 1:45.

(The hearing recessed at 12:30 o’clock.)
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FRIDAY AFTERNOON SESSION

AUGUST 18, 1978
The hearing reconvened at 1:55 o'clock with
Mr. Garrett presiding.

MR. GARRETT:
with you to proceed?

Mr. Varley, is it agreeable

We have got the two cancellations.

Mr. Frechtman is not here yet, so you are the next in line.

MR. CARL J. VARLEY:

I am Carl Varley

We have about 20 offices

with Clifton, Gunderson & Company.

spread between Ohio and Colorado.

The clientele is mostly

small businesses.
I think I could count on my hands or my
fingers and toes the numbers we have with sales volume in

excess of ten million dollars.
My comments today are going to be based on

three what I consider factual statements, and they are:
one, the small businessman has a very limited number of

advisers upon which he will rely.
Two, the primary service, which we as Clifton,
Gunderson are selling, is not auditing but is general
advice.

Three, for

us to remain competitive, we have

to be in both sections of the AICPA.
I would like to get into this a little bit
further.

My best partners are the ones who have an

advisory relationship with their clients.
the ones who are the best auditors.

They are not

It's the ones whom

the clients will listen to, the ones whom the clients

come to for advice, basically a confidant relationship.
Our advice as partners to these clients covers

a multitude of areas and that will include employee

recruiting, plant layout and in some cases a bit of
marketing advice.
Normally, they do this, I would say, on a
fairly informal basis, but it still comes under the
category of providing MAS services.
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For an example, we are currently looking for

three second-line managers for what to us is a fairly
large retailer client.

The owner has a very unique

personality which is typical for many of our clients.

We are in a position to know this client, and also to know

how he is able to get along with people.

I think we can

provide a very valuable service in finding some one or
two or three which we can propose to him that we feel have

a chance or surviving, and I mean that literally.

We also spend a great deal of our time working

with our clients on conflicts within their management

or within the owners, between the owners.
Currently, we have a client which is 50-50 owned

by two individuals.

One fellow currently feels he is

doing all the work, and the other guy has benefited from
it, so again, we are providing advisory service for a client

for which we are doing an audit.

Again some people might

say this would taint our independence.
Another example is we are working on two
engagements where we are helping a client improve his

productivity and his manufacturing process, and this will

be through revising plant layouts to a certain extent.

Again it is rather general and not an in-depth study,
but I think it does fit under the plant layout category.
In the marketing area, we provide ideas to

clients where we feel something needs to be done.

One

of the main items here is trying to help the client

improve his visibility.
We have many clients where it is amazing how they
expect business to come to them when they really make

no effort to show the

public that they are open and

available for business.
And finally, we assist many of our clients in
negotiations of buying and selling, labor negotiations
and that sort of thing.
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Why do we, Clifton,

So the question is:

Gunderson, need to provide the service?

Why not someone

else?

I think we have gained the respect of these

clients.

They respect us as advisers, plus, and very

important, we understand the financial implications of
the activities and of the advice we provide.

The question comes up, does this hurt
independence?

our

I don’t think so because none of our

clients are large enough that we want to stake our
reputation with banks which are the primary reader of

our financial statements.

We don't want to stake our

reputation with banks which are the primary reader of
our financial statements.

We don't want to risk our

reputation with banks and to a certain extent bonding

companies.
Finally, our audits are better because of this

knowledge we have of the client.

We know things about

the client including his personal marital problems

that I am sure does not occur with much larger firms.
So in concluding, I would like to say that if

we don't provide this broad business advice, our services

become much less marketable.

If all we are doing

is

providing an audit, then I think it should be basically

the low bid gets the job, but by providing these

additional services we understand the client much better
and do a better, job at the audit.
Secondly, if we don't provide broad business

advice, our clients will be losing a very valuable
service and I say it is very valuable because they seem

to be eager to pay our fee.

It is not a problem that they

don't think they are getting their money's worth, and
finally, it would seem to me, a personal opinion that
regulation is getting somewhat out of hand, that we seem
to be going around trying to find someone to protect, and

this is creating a lot of time being spent and a lot of
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dollars being spent when basically, I guess, we are assuming

that the public is not too intelligent.
Believe me, as far as our clients and the people

that read our reports, I have found them to be quite
intelligent.

Thank you.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.

How large do you say

the profession staff is of your firm?
MR. VARLEY:

We have approximately 250 personnel,

yes.

MR. GARRETT:

And you have a separate MAS

department?

MR. VARLEY:
MR. GARRETT:

Yes, there are five of us in it.
Five.

Is most of the advice

that you are talking about from MAS?
MR. VARLEY:

MR. GARRETT:

Absolutely not.

Or day-to-day consulting

that we were talking about this morning?
MR. VARLEY:

It is day-to-day consulting, yes,

sir.
MR. GARRETT:

And you sometimes help the

partner that gets the call, I suppose.

MR. VARLEY:
MR. GARRETT:

ME. VARLEY:
MR. GARRETT:

That is right.
Do you also have separate engagements.

Yes, sir.
That are from your department?

MR. VARLEY:

Definitely.

MR. McCLOY:

Your recruiting has been in

the lower range of the accounting-financial areas?

MR. VARLEY:
MR. McCLOY:

Not necessarily.
Have you recruited CEOs?

MR. VARLEY:

No, it is the owner that is

hiring us , so he is not looking for his replacement.
MR. WOOD: Do you recruit a chief financial
officer?
MR. VARLEY:

In many cases that will be a
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bookkeeper, but yes, we will recruit a controller.
MR. WOOD:

How many states or cities do you

operate?

MR. VARLEY:

We have 20 offices between

Colorado and Ohio.
MR. GARRETT:

But your typical client, if

not every one of your clients, needs an audit only for
bank purposes or—

MR. VARLEY:
MR. GARRETT:

Yes.

—there may be some members of

the family that are not active in management who want it

and that sort of thing.
MR. VARLEY:

Right, a group of doctors

feel better if they have had an audit.

MR. GARRETT: But they are not investors in
the ordinary sense?

MR. VARLEY:
MR. GARRETT:

No.
If the Executive Committee

proposals were to become the rule, would it force you to
curtail a significant amount of the services that you

render, do you believe?
MR. VARLEY:

Not as I understand they are

stated because we have, I think, one SEC client, and
that was the result of a recent merger.
MR. GARRETT:

But even there, do you think

you go beyond what they would condone or say was
all right?

MR. VARLEY:

I think if you took it literally,

I have partners and myself giving advice to clients
which would violate.

MR. GARRETT:
decisions

Would they be management

or not auditing-skill related?
MR. VARLEY: Not auditing-skill related.

MR. GARRETT:
I see.
I don’t suppose you
can be sure unless you fall within one of their express
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examples because one of our problems is that we are
not sure either just where the audit-skill related

stops.
Right.

MR. VARLEY:
MR. WOOD:

Are your five MAS people also

accountants?
Three of us are, but one is also

MR. VARLEY:

a Ph.D. with civil engineering, so it is kind of
a shared profession in this case.

MR. GARRETT:

Two are not.

So it would be, I suppose, as

a practical matter, satisfactory for your firm if a
distinction were made between the SEC Practice Section—
no, it wouldn’t since your members of the Section, I

presume, or you wouldn’t be here.

Yes, and we feel we must remain

MR. VARLEY:

that way to be competitive.
MR. GARRETT:

But there could be a distinction

with respect to services provided to non-SEC clients.

If it would hold, right, but

MR. VARLEY:

I assume that eventually it would filter down and become
for non-SEC also, the restrictions.

MR. GARRETT:

If it is theoretically based

on independence, I suppose it would have to, wouldn't it?

Yes.

MR. VARLEY:
MR. GARRETT:

Since you can’t make that

distinction.
MR. MANZONI: Which services do you provide
now that you think may not satisfy the skill-related
criterion?

The recruiting, plant layout,

MR. VARLEY:
marketing.

MR. MANZONI:

It is hard to tell when they

do and don’t, but those are the ones you think of.
MR. VARLEY: Yes, those are the ones that I
would be concerned.

The others I don’t feel that we will

ever get involved with, with our clientele.
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MR. GARRETT:

This plant layout is for production

purposes, and not for paper flow and information flow
purposes?
MR. VARLEY:

Right.

MR. McCLOY:

It is for production purposes?

MR. VARLEY:

Yes, sir.

Not initial layout,

but many of our clients kind of start out in a garage, and
start throwing in pieces of equipment, and then eventually
as they grow, it gets pretty obvious that something has
to be done, so we may, in fact, say: "Why don’t you

shift things around a bit?"
MR. GARRETT:

Is that the larger part of your

revenues from MAS Generally?

When you say that, what do you

MR. VARLEY:

mean?

MR. GARRETT:

Is the larger part of the firm's

revenues from nonauditing services, or can you tell, so
much of this is on a day-to-day consulting basis?

MR. VARLEY:
in all honesty.

I don't think we can really tell

So much of our fees are billed accounting

services, and yet it is the partner advising the client on
some decisions the client has to make.
PROFESSOR CARY:

You don't bill separately for

an audit?
MR. VARLEY:

Not necessarily.

yes, but not always.
PROFESSOR CARY:

In some cases,

A period basis, I see.

Are the pension plans of your

MR. WOOD:

clients governed by ERISA?
MR. VARLEY: Yes.
MR. WOOD: And do they use outside actuaries?
MR. VARLEY: Yes.
MR. WOOD: Do you audit the unfunded

pension liability?

How far do you go to take a look

at their findings?
MR. VARLEY:

Now you are getting out of my

area of the practice definitely, but to the extent of
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my knowledge, we have on occasion asked the client, and
most of these are insurance company plans, to have an

independent actuary look at it also because we weren't
quite sure if the insurance company's information
was correct.

And you would accept the findings

MR. WOOD:

of the retained actuary then in that case?
MR. VARLEY:

insurance company.

Yes, if they agreed with the

If we have the two, then definitely.

If there is a conflict, then we may have to go further.
MR. GARRETT:

You used an interesting

argument as to why there is no impairment of independence.
You have so many little clients.

scornful way.

I am not saying this in any

I can understand it very well, I am sure,

the lack of any client on which you are beholden or

that is terribly important to your total revenues is a

corrupting possibility.
MR. VARLEY:

True, and I think I have seen

examples where I have felt some firms had a major
client that it had to be a consideration for them at

least, but in our case, it has not happened.
MR. GARRETT:
MR. McCLOY:

I think that is all.
I don't have any.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. GARRETT:

No questions .

Thank you very much, Mr. Varley.

Now Mr. Frechtman.
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Please proceed.

MR. A. BERNARD FRECHTMAN:

Thank you very much.

Among all of the professional accountants, I feel a
little like a fish out of water.

I may be the only

lawyer about.
I am A. Bernard Frechtman, general counsel to

Robert Half Personnel Agencies.

Its President, Robert

Half, wanted to be present here today, but because of
a previous out-of-town commitment he is unavailable.
He does, however, feel that the work of this committee

is very important and designated me to convey his views

to you.

On his behalf, I want to express my appreciation

for your permitting me to attend and as well your
accommodating to my own legal commitments.

The responsibility of certified public
accounting firms for avoiding conflict of interest

problems was well set forth in a report issued by the

Accountant’s International Study Group entitled
"Independence of Auditors" in which it was stated:

"The concept of the auditor’s independence
cannot be precisely defined because it is
considered a state of mind and character.
Independence is viewed from two perspectives-independence in fact and independence in
appearance.
Independence in fact refers
to the quality of not being influenced by
regard to personal advantage.
Independence
in appearance refers to the absence of
certain ascertainable circumstances that
give rise to a potential loss of
independence or conflict of interest,
which may lead third parties to conclude
that the specified relationship poses an
unacceptable threat to the auditor’s
independence."
Personnel selection is the most important of
all management functions and the manner in which it is
carried out largely determines whether there is
independence in fact as well as independence in

appearance.
It is the function furthest removed from the
auditing responsibility and is the clearest case of
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present and potential conflict of interest.

As long as certified public accounting firms

participate, even slightly, in the selection of

personnel, either by direct recruiting or by staff
transfers, they do in fact become part of the management

of the clients they audit or eventually may come to
audit.
It is simple to understand the conflict as
it comes from the situation that exists when a certified

public accounting firm acts as an employment agency

in recruiting personnel either on behalf of a client or

on behalf of a company that in the future may potentially
become its client.

In both instances a subtle

relationship of allegiance arises between the newly

placed employee and the certified public accounting
firm acting as an employment agency which found that

employee the job and the employee's expectation that
future jobs are similarly available.

A thread now

exists between the employee and the certified public
accounting firm acting as an employment agency, that

if undisturbed by future action can be strengthened
to provide for the growth of the employee's own
professional future.

But an even more insidious practice, which
is not so easily discernible is that of certified

public accounting firms, whether or not acting as

employment agencies, in making transfers of their own

staff to the staff of a client where they often assume
a key position.

If that staff member owes the job

to the certified public accounting firm, it is clearly
impossible to maintain either an actual independence
or the appearance of independence as the Accountant's

International Study Group said.
In fact, this
establishment of an alumni placement bureau is a form
of patronage that gives an employee a total feeling
of security that the employee is highly unlikely to
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disturb.
But the faith of the employee in making his

future progress in this way is falsely placed.

In fact,

were the certified public accounting firms prohibited
from acting as employment agencies, employees would have

an expanded opportunity for upgrading their positions
and employers would likewise be able to find competent

personnel more easily.

As things now stand, a certified

public accounting firm will rarely recommend that a

client hire staff personnel from another certified

public accounting firm.

Its prime motive in transferring

staff is to assure that the client company is populated

with as many people as possible who own strong allegiance
to the former certified public accounting employer

while simultaneously providing itself with an easy
egress for its unpromotable employees thus making

room for recruiting young fledglings.

Since all large

accounting firms share this philosophy, it places

severe restrictions on the staff person who relies on
the accounting firm to secure an accounting position

outside the public accounting profession.

Each

placement made by a certified public accounting firm

helps perpetuate the cozy relationship that exists
between the auditor and the client.

The net result

is a drastic reduction in objectivity.

If you intend to eliminate questions
concerning the credibility and integrity of the

independence of a certified public accounting firm’s

audit, whether those questions deal with reality or
appearance, you must mandate a complete elimination
of the involvement of certified public accounting

firms in the employment process.

Only in that way

can we be sure that the certified public accounting

firm and its clients, and vice versa, are completely

free of influence. Without this complete separation
there will always be a subtle question of the
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integrity and independence of the audit.
If certified public accountants continue to

be permitted to recruit key employees for non-clients,
they will end up with strong loyalties as those
employees may likely go out of their way to bring
the account to that certified public accounting firm.

Then we are back to the conflict of interest.

Now

that the professions are permitted to advertise,
aggressive certified public accounting firms will

promote their recruiting service by direct mail and

newspapers and magazines since they can afford
massive advertising campaigns.

They will in this

way obtain non-audit clients for this recruiting
service frequently ending up with them as audit
clients and thus causing a further concentration

of large client audits.

In other words, non-auditing

services advertised by big money will ultimately
force the small and medium-sized firms to lose

clients.
Mr. Chairman, somewhere out there is a
fraud "incubating" as a result of some quasi

relationship established between a certified public

accounting firm and the placement of an employee

at a client which is the subject of an audit by
that very same firm.

Attorneys now armed with

facts relating to these kinds of personnel activities

could be involved in some sort of litigation resulting
from an outgrowth of that relationship.

Of course,

there is no proof that anything adverse has happened

as a result of the conflict of interest I have just

described.
In the cases of proven fraud, there is
no necessity of showing this conflict of interest.
The fraudulent act is generally sufficient.

On the

other hand, the appearance of the conflict of interest

may give rise to a further basis for predicating
appropriate litigation given the proper circumstances.
343

I urge you to stop it now before there will

be an embarrassment to the entire accounting profession

as a result of the charge that in fact there exists
outright collusion between an accounting firm and

employees of its clients.

I urge you as well to

consider that the only way you can regulate the "state

of mind and character" of an auditor’s independence
to assure that the opportunity to put a blemish on it

is to prohibit the possibility of its occurrence by
barring both recruiting and staff transfer.

MR. GARRETT:

Have we any questions?

PROFESSOR CARY:

May I ask, your firm has

no accountants and it is primarily a personnel firm, or
am I clear?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

PROFESSOR CARY:

My firm is a law firm.
The firm which you are

representing.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

The firm which I represent is

only in the personnel business.
PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. FRECHTMAN:

No CPAs?

The only CPA in the firm is

Bob Half who is a CPA, who is not engaged in the practice

of accounting by your own rules that prohibit him from
doing so.

There are, however, among the franchisees

who operate Robert Half Personnel Agencies throughout
the country, Canada and Europe, some people who are
CPAs, but likewise, they do not practice.

PROFESSOR CARY:

They specialize primarily

in persons having a financial and accounting background?

Exactly. That is their
They have been doing it for about 30

MR. FRECHTMAN:

entire expertise.
years now.

MR. WOOD:

So a generalist would not be

recruited by the Half Agencies?
MR. FRECHTMAN:
By generalist you mean?
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MR. WOOD:

Marketing.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

such as that.

Yes, marketing, sales people

They would only deal with accountants,

controllers, financial people, EDP, financial vice
presidents, bookkeepers, and so forth.

I just wanted to ask, you

PROFESSOR CARY:

made the point that accounting firms will seldom

recommend staff from their competitors, and yet I
suppose they might seldom recommend a staff member
from their own firm if they think the person

is particularly good and perhaps of partnership
caliber.

Isn't that right?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

If they are partnership

caliber, it is not likely they are going to recommend

them.

If they are not partnership caliber, and there

is no place for them to go within the firm, and while
they may be otherwise competent and capable, it is
very likely that they would recommend them as a
staff transfer.

It happens in law firms as well,

except law firms are not engaged in any kind of

executive recruiting activity, and they don't audit
their clients.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. WOOD:

I understand the parallel.

Would you see the same possibility

of compromised relationships if the CPA firm recruited

an assistant controller for its clients, its audit
client, from another auditing firm?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

Yes, I think that the subtle

relationship that exists is the one that says that

that employee in some way being recruited by the CPA

firm, the CPA firm has exercised an influence in
judgment in the selection process and subtly could
likewise influence the future of promotability of that

particular employee.

MR. WOOD:
It seems to me that you are
assuming that the management of the employer is
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deferring its judgment in his capacity to its CPA firm.
You are downgrading the competence of the personnel

department and the officer to whom the assistant
controller reports.
MR. FRECHTMAN:

I don't think so.

that they probably run parallel tracks.

I think

I don't think

there are some subtle judgments that are made and there

are very subtle relationships that exist.

Whether

or not they are real in all instances, they are certainly
real in their appearance of being in conflict.

If the personnel department in the company,
and we are dealing with both large and small companies,
so personnel departments as a fact may be one person

or may be one of the managers of the company, the
personnel department makes a judgment about an employee,
a potential employee, and then says: "But I want my
CPA firm to interview them." then the final judgment

may very well be made right there rather than in the
company.

They may just want your concurrence, but

the applicant doesn't know that, totally.

MR. WOOD:

Would you object to the CPA firm

helping management to define the type of person that

is needed, the scope of the job, what to look for, and
then turning over the recruiting to the chief

executive or to his personnel firm?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

My impression is that there

should be no objection to that.

I may not be as

qualified as Bob Half is to answer that question, but
I couldn't see any objection to it personally.
MR. GARRETT: The objection that you see

in the practice, is that based primarily on the fact
that, in fact, perhaps if not in form, the auditing

firm makes the hiring decision or is to some sort of

lingering feeling of gratitude and closeness and
dependence?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

In which instance are you
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referring to, because there are a couple.

One is where

they are making the referral, where they do the
recruitment and make the referral and make the suggestion

or recommendation, and the other instance is where it
comes the other way, and they are asked to confirm
the judgment of the company, and the third instance
is there they make the suggestion of one of the firm’s

own employees.

In all instances I would suggest that the

choice, the referral and the judgment is clouded by
either the real or apparent conflict that is not clear,
that there is this thread that is maintained between

the CPA firm and that particular employee.

MR. GARRETT:

Who is that bad for?
The public.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

In the ultimate

it is bad for the public.

Because?

MR. GARRETT:

MR. FRECHTMAN:

Because we are dealing with

conflict of interest both in fact and appearance.

I

mean, we both have to deal with problems in terms of
ethics, and when I say "both," I mean as accountants
and as lawyers.

We have to stay very clearly away from both,
in fact conflicts of interests as well as appearance

of conflicts of interest.
Many times we make judgments in our firm,

small that it may be, not to engage in a particular

matter and not to represent a particular client or not
to do a particular thing because although we know that

it is not a conflict of interest, we also know that it

might seem to be one.
If we are now judging the integrity of what
you are concerned with and what you are focusing on,

which is the audit process, which the public has to

rely upon, which is what your concern is, then it
would seem to me that you would want to maintain

- 347 -

as much of a sacred circumstance surrounding all of the
internal procedures that go on in doing the audit as
well as all of those who are participating in doing

the audit, and the relationships between those who
are doing the actual work of recruiting and those

who are doing the audit.

So in the ultimate, it seem

to me, it is the public.
So in your view the problem

MR. GARRETT:

wouldn’t be cured if this were a casual activity on

the part of the CPA firm rather than a well organized,

active, personnel placement bureau, so to speak?
Not at all.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

I think that

you ought to be totally prohibited from engaging in
the practice.

Any involvement at all.

MR. GARRETT:

Directly or indirectly.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

If you are going to do the audit, then you ought to

be prohibited from being engaged in the recruiting

activity.
I am not suggesting there is anything totally

illegal in what is is that is going on.

I am talking

about the fact that there is an appearance of the

possibility of compromise as it relates between the
individual who has been placed by the firm that is

doing the audit or there is also the possibility, as
I suggested, that could incubate as a result of it.

Somebody passes over something more casually because
of the relationship.
MR. GARRETT:
MR. McCLOY:

I think I understand your point.

Wouldn’t it be very unnatural,

though, to proscribe any contact between the client

and the accountant?

Suppose he called up and said:

”I have got an open spot.

Have you got any ideas for

an assistant controller," or "Can you give us some
help." or "What do you hear in the trade about X?"
He doesn’t charge any fee for it.
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Does he just say,

"I am sorry.

I can’t talk to you about that."

MR. FRECHTMAN:

A lot of times we tell our

clients that we are very sorry, but we are prohibited
by the Canons of Ethics from dealing with a particular

matter, and if you are prohibited, then there are other
sources to which the client can go in order to verify

the information.

MR. McCLOY:

It seems rather unnatural, though,

to say that he can’t express an opinion in regard to

a matter.
MR. WOOD:

Taking Mr. McCloy’s question one

step further, suppose that Robert Half Associates had

recruited a controller, and Mr. McCloy as chief
financial officer of this company calls up his CPA
and says, "I would like to have you interview this

fine young man that Robert Half has brought to me.
Check him out.

Ask him a lot of questions.

Give me

your judgment on his qualifications, his record."

Would

you object to that?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

Are you talking about now

making a judgment predicated upon his qualification?

MR. WOOD:

You bet.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

If the company is otherwise

unable to do so.
MR. WOOD:

Wouldn't it be logical if Mr.

McCloy’s XYZ Company is hiring an assistant controller,

and you recommended three candidates, and after he and
his personnel man have interviewed them, to ask Arthur
Andersen or whoever it is that audits his company to

conduct their own interview and analysis of his

background?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

I would think that if Mr.

McCloy was going to make a judgment as to the qualifications

of the individual, that that could be done with a degree
of independence, but when he makes reference to, just

to use your observation before, when you are dealing
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with a thing that is being unnatural, in that you have
a problem in turning down a client with respect to making

certain kinds of judgments, that is casual, I think
that that creates a problem.

But if you are going

to test the qualifications of an individual and you

are not otherwise engaged in this kind of an activity,
I don’t really see that as a problem.

It is a very fine line we draw.

It is when

you start going over the line that I think you create a
problem.
MR. MANZONI:

Are there other personnel

agencies besides yourself that specialize in these types

of placements, financial and control people?
MR. FRECHTMAN:
MR. MANZONI:

Yes, there are.
Are there a large number of

non-accounting firms who are doing it?
MR. FRECHTMAN:

On, yes, there are a lot of

independent companies throughout the United States.

MR. MANZONI:
MR. FRECHTMAN:

But with this kind of expertise?

I think that Bob Half would

like to suggest that he has the most expertise.

His

people probably do, and they are probably the largest

organization of its kind, probably in the world, in
terms of financial placements and temporary personnel
in the same area.

But there are executive level agencies,

personnel agencies throughout the country, from locality

to locality that can among other things provide expert
guidance and recruitment in this area.

You would not be without sources of finding
personnel if you eliminated yourselves from the business
of being in the recruitment of this kind of personnel.
MR. MATUSIAK:

You are suggesting then that

if the CPA firm decides to discontinue the services of
employment to employees, that they just merely hand

him his pink slip and say, "Sorry, you are on your own?"
MR. FRECHTMAN:

That sounds very brutal,
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doesn’t it?

But the fact of the matter is that there

are all kinds of out-placement activities that take

place in large and small corporations and law firms
and can likewise take place in accounting firms as
well.
MR. MATUSIAK:

Then if I understand your

recommendation, that the CPA firm would be prohibited

from rendering any kind of assistance to an employee
that was discharged.
MR. FRECHTMAN:

I don’t think that we are

talking about the employee that is being discharged.
The employee that the CPA firm discharges isn’t

necessarily sent to a client.

It is the employee that

they transfer to the client who is an employee who
doesn’t make partner in the firm.

MR. MATUSIAK:

You make that sound as though

it is solely the decision of the CPA firm and not the

prospective client.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

decision of the CPA firm.

No, it is never solely the
What I am suggesting is that

the participation of the CPA firm in making a decision

creates what I consider to be a conflict of interest.
At least, if not in fact, in appearance.
MR. MATUSIAK:

But you would suggest that

a CPA firm be not allowed to render any assistance to
a departing employee in finding a new job?

MR. FRECHTMAN:

No, I never said that.

They

could send him to a personnel agency.

MR. MATUSIAK:

Preferably to a Robert Half

Personnel Agency?
MR. FRECHTMAN: Not preferably, but if they
wanted to get to the best, I suppose that is the place
to go.
MR. MATUSIAK:

That is not giving him any

assistance.

MR. FRECHTMAN:

Oh, it is.

What does the

company do when they discharge an employee?
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They

engage in a lot of other activities.

You are transposing

I am suggesting to you not to focus on the

something.

undesirable employee in the CPA firm because that

person is somebody you probably would not want to have

transferred to a company client.

We are not talking

We are talking about the

about that individual.

individual who achieves a particular level within the
CPA firm and then can go no further.

wants to make room for its own growth.

The CPA firm
They suggest

therefore some kind of lateral transfer to a client
where the individual would be competent and capable

of doing whatever it was that they would have him do.

MR. McCLOY:

Might not the accounting firm

be better equipped to supply a vacancy than your firm
would just be reason of the fact that they have had
this contact with the company?

about the company.

They know something

They know more about the company

than de novo calling on you who have had no relationship
with the company before that.

We have heard a great

deal about the benefits, this morning, to the audit

function that was involved, but there are some benefits
it may be argued also to the company as a result of

the accountant’s wide knowledge due to the accountancy
relationship.

You discount that?

MR. FRECHTMAN:

No, I don't discount it.

I think I am suggesting you have to forego it.

MR. McCLOY:

Because of the potential conflict

of interest.

Exactly.
I think you have
to make a very firm decision that says essentially what
MR. FRECHTMAN:

is and what isn't a conflict of interest.

If you do

make a judgment that it constitutes a conflict of

interest, they you must make a judgment that you forego
that kind of activity in business.

When you really cut it down, what you are
really talking about is a balance between maintaining
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a professional standard and accommodating a

professional standard to an economic interest of a
firm engaging in another business.

There is no question but that the personnel
recruiter, the executive recruiter or the personnel

agency, all those firms that are out there engaged in
this on a highly specialized basis can become just as
proficient and just as familiar perhaps with some more

objectivity with the activities of a company so as to

make judgments in the personnel area.

After all,

if the CPA firm is engaging in this practice they must,

of necessity, establish people who are no longer engaged

in the audit or accounting process, but engaged solely
in personnel functions, so what you really boil it

down to is: Who operates the employment agency?

If you

want to operate the employment agency, then you operate
the employment agency, and then you run the risk of

what I am suggesting to you may very well be a severe

conflict of interest, and it leads to some question
of the integrity of that independent audit and the

relationship.

Why else hold on to the stake?
Thank you very much.

MR. GARRETT:
MR. FRECHTMAN:

inviting me.

Thank you very much for

You were very gracious.

MR. GARRETT:

Howard I. Bernstein.

Mr. Bernstein is from Chicago.

Have you any

idea where to reach him, Lou.
MR. WOOD:
MR. McCLOY:

Try the telephone.

While we are waiting for the

telephone, does anybody from the audience have suggestions

or additions they want to make to the testimony they
have made or comment on anybody else's testimony?
MR. WOOD:

It is a rare opportunity,

gentlemen.
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MR. RAYMOND J. LEISNER:

My name is Raymond

I am a CPA, a self-practitioner, and I

J. Leisner.

limit my practice to management advisory services.
I have spent all, or most all of my professional

career in MAS, previously as a partner in one of the
large firms.

I would like to address myself to two
observations.

I have sat through these hearings

yesterday and today.

One is the so-called fall-out

issue of the prohibition of major firms in MAS or

restriction of their practice which would cause a
diminution in their total effort.
We have heard about the impact on their

practice.

The impact on the profession as a whole,

could be substantial in that most of the technical

resources of training, continued professional education
committee work, papers, et cetera which Mr. Mitchell

and his group administer and coordinate, it has been

my observation emanate from these larger firms out
of sheer size, and accordingly, I would think that

the smaller practitioners who are seeking to upgrade
their skills in an ever-expanding way would be

adversely affected.
I happen to work with small practitioners
and serve them in their consulting practice and with
my years of experience, I have no personal need for

such training, but part of my job is the helping
in the development of their staff, many of whom
are accountants, CPAs to be or in some cases partners

in these firms who are skilled in auditing and who

seek through these professional courses to expand
those skills.

I have seen nowhere in the literature

or the comments on this issue this question of what
would it do to our total professional capacity of

the AICPA and our state societies to meet the
continued professional education requirements of
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our profession if we had this kind of diminution, and

I would suggest that that be incorporated somewhere
in the analysis you are going to make.
My second point would run to the question of

perceived problems of independence versus real.

We

have seen repeatedly this reference to the Cohen
Commission Report, that we really couldn’t find any
problems, but there must be one because somebody said
there was.
I can remember when this issue first came

up in the mid-’50s, and we have been at it for twenty
years, and I would like to underscore that I believe
the profession should take a stand on the real issues

and not be precipitated into something because, after
all, we have some perceived government regulation
which is based on this.

As others have said before, this is the
time to look at the issues and say:

This is for real,

and let’s close it out one way or the other through
some action which you gentlemen would recommend

hopefully.

That is really all I have to say, and I

couldn’t resist the opportunity for these ad lib remarks.
They were not as well prepared as the others that have
been here.
MR. GARRETT:

You came across very well.

MR. LEISNER:

Thank you.

Thank you.
MR. WOOD:

I gather, Mr. Leisner, that you don't

in 20 years of practice see any real compromise of
independence from the MAS practice.
MR. LEISNER: No, Mr. Wood, as a matter of
fact, I believe that the degree of independence that

a consultant must have every day in dealing with the
politics of internal management is a much higher degree

of independence, or at least, as great in reality as
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what his audit brethren must practice, so independence
is a very important criterion of the consulting
practice.

MR. WOOD:

However, doesn't a consulting

practice compromise the independence of the audit partner

of the same firm?
MR. LEISNER:

of that.

I have never seen any evidence

In fact, we bend over backwards generally to

be sure that we are as some one said like Caesar’s

wife in this regard.
MR. WOOD:

And it is your hope that out of

these hearings and our recommendations to the Section

that there will be a pretty decisive answer rendered on
what you can and cannot do in the MAS area?
MR. LEISNER:

Yes, sir, I do.

I believe that

every accused has a right to a due process, as was
mentioned, which means a definitive opinion, and I

believe that an examination of the facts should be

able to put this in perspective.
MR. WOOD:

Thank you.
To your knowledge, has there

MR. McCLOY:

been any sort of hearing such as this in the last 20
years on this subject, or has it just been discussed

in the periodicals?
MR. LEISNER:

I remember addressing comments

in the 1950s on what I called the independence of ignorance

which it was alleged because you knew so much about a

client, it would impede your independence, whereas, it
goes the other way.

At that time it was mostly in

the academic journals, but I can think of going back

to the mid-’50s.
MR. WOOD:

Has anyone seriously recommended

that clients be required to change their auditing firm

at regular intervals?

Do any of you know whether this

has ever been advanced by anybody in government?
MR. GARRETT:

The Metcalf Report recommended
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that.
MR. WOOD:

That is what I thought.

MR. MITCHELL:
MR. WOOD:

That doesn’t surprise me.

MR. McCLOY:

Sauss.

I think Ralph Nader has, too.
Mr. Gilbert has, too, and Wilma

And Evelyn.
MR. GARRETT:

The Metcalf Report did more

things than that.

I think we will break for ten minutes.
(A short recess was taken.)
MR. GARRETT:
order.

Gentlemen, may we come to

Mr. Bernstein, will you proceed, please.
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MR. HOWARD I. BERNSTEIN:

several firms.

Yes, I represent

I am not speaking on my own.

I would like

to tell you the firms that I am representing.

Each of the following firms has consented to the association

of its name with these comments:
Bansley & Kiener
300 West Washington Street
Chicago, Illinois
60606
Bernstein and Bank, Ltd.
6200 North Hiawatha Avenue
Chicago, Illinois
60646
Blackman, Kallick & Company
180 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois
60601

Checkers, Simon & Rosner
33 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois
60602
Clifton, Gunderson & Co.
900 Commercial National Bank
Peoria, Illinois
61602

Doty, Jarrow & Company
20 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois
Friedman, Eisenstein, Raemer &
Schwartz
233 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

Gale, Takahashi & Channon
120 South LaSalle
Chicago, Illinois
Goldberg, Geiser & Company, Ltd.
20 North Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois
Thomas W. Havey & Company
105 West Adams Street
Chicago, Illinois

B. L. Rosenberg & Company
Suite 2300
180 North LaSalle
Chicago, Illinois... 60601
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This statement represents the collective
opinions of eleven local Illinois CPA firms employing over
607 partners and staff and billing about $21,250,000 per

year.

Based on a meeting of eight of the firms, and

subsequent telephone calls and reviews of the draft of this

statement, a consensus of all of the undersigned firms was
achieved.
The firms in this group may be further described as

follows:

1.

Not affiliated with each other in any way.

2.

Directly compete with each other.

3.

Clients are mainly owner-managed commercial

enterprizes.

4.

The SEC clients of each firm number zero to

a few.

5.

Directly and frequently compete with Big 8 CPA
firms.

One might logically guess that these firms would
favor the proscription of MAS work for SEC companies by CPA

firms, so that this MAS work might move from Big 8 CPA firms

to local CPA firms.

On the contrary, however, our group

unanimously and strongly opposes any limitations whatsoever

on the performance of MAS services by CPA firms for their
audit clients, whether SEC companies or not.

It is our opinion that restriction would be:
1.

Expensive and hurtful to clients.

2.

Extremely damaging for local CPA firms.

3.

Of no benefit at all to the general public.
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THE FORGOTTEN MAN - THE CLIENT
Several recent scandals have involved SEC companies

that went bankrupt, bribed foreign officials or maintained

political slush funds.

Nets cast out to restrain possible

future sharks will probably bring in the usual catch of
minnows and assorted unexpected creatures.

There is much

concern for creditors and public stockholders.

In the pro

cess, the client is forgotten and is caught in the net.

Typical clients of CPA firms in our group may be

described as follows:

1.

Owned and managed by a small (1-3 persons)

group.
2.

Annual sales of $100,000 to $50,000,000.

3.

Lack of management depth.

4.

Owner-managers each skilled in only one aspect

of business management such as sales, production

or engineering.
5.

Owner-managers lack financial management

6.

skills.
Most have no financial officer (controller or
treasurer).

Indeed, many are fortunate to have

a decent bookkeeper.

Our local CPA firms are likely to serve a client

over many years.

We become intimately familiar with the

financial and business affairs of the client.

This familiarity,

gained in the audit and other work, allows us to perform
efficiently and effectively when the client asks for help in
tax planning, business planning, assistance in securing financing,

installation of a cost accounting system, computer selection
and installation, etc.
Our wide exposure to the financial and business

affairs of dozens of clients further enables us to provide
meaningful service at reasonable prices.
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Very few clients of local CPA firms are capable of
hiring a controller, treasurer, or even a bookkeeper without

substantial assistance from the CPA firm.
a)

The CPA may:

recognize the need to hire, b) define the position,

c) describe the desired employee, d) interview candidates,
e) make suggestions as to the best candidates, and f) help
train the new person.

Many of our clients may not know

a debit from a credit and would be helpless without the

assistance of the regularly-employed CPA when hiring accounting

or financial staff.
The experience and objectivity of the CPA firm are

extremely beneficial to client firms interested in employee
benefit plans.

The CPA has no significant financial interest

in whether a plan is adopted or in the nature of a plan.

If

a client is interested in a pension plan, for example, we might
talk him out of it if the financial obligations would be

burdensome.

If such a plan is to be installed, it is

likely that we would recommend employment of an outside
consultant.

In that event, our advice is usually required to

aid and comfort the client.
Firms of our size are not likely to design and lay

out a plant, but we surely help the clients to analyze and
understand

the financial effects on the business of plant

expansion or rebuilding.
We would not be likely to design new products, but we do
help the client to determine costs and sales prices and to

project effects on the business.
We are not likely to perform insurance actuarial

services, but every one of our clients needs our advice when
considering proposals for life insurance policies.
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Clients are already heavily burdened by complex

reporting requirements that arose from a few SEC company

scandals.

Substantial additional burdens will result if

the CPA’s knowledge of the client cannot be reused in MAS

work.
LOCAL CPA FIRMS ALSO TO SUFFER

We would be less than candid if we did not
acknowledge our self-interest in this issue.

It is our belief

that the proscription of MAS work for SEC firms will:

1.

Make non-SEC auditors appear to be second-class

auditors,

2.

Eventually result in restriction of MAS
services to non-SEC clients, thus elimination
part of our business (the part many of us

find most satisfying), with the further result
that:

a.

It could be easier for clients to fool us

because of our reduced contact with and
and understanding of the clients.

b.

We will no longer be able to compete
effectively against Big 8 firms.
Most of our clients engage us because of the

personal MAS service we are able to provide.
Straight audit engagements usually go to
the lowest bidder, and Big 8 firms almost
invariably are significantly lower than we

are.
The people who seem to object most to MAS services

by CPAs are those with the least comprehension of this
situation (see notice of this public hearing - page 6).
We believe that it would be unfair to allow any group of
professionals to be dictated to by those least qualified
to make the required judgments.

Must everything and every

body in this country be reduced to the least-common
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denominator?

Government seems to pursue this cause, but it

is the duty of the private sector to resist.
NO BENEFIT TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC
It seems clear to us that the general public’s best

protection is the professionalism, ethics and unlimited
personal liability of the CPA.

It is our understanding that

there is no known instance of a lack of audit independence
resulting from MAS work.

Accuracy and completeness in audit work require
that the auditor achieve a thorough understanding of the

affairs of the clients.

The performance of MAS work can only

increase this understanding, thus increasing the reliability of

published reports.
Banks constitute, by far, the largest group, outside
of the owner-managers of clients, relying on financial statements

of our clients.

Many of these clients are recommended to

us by these banks; to our knowledge, none of these banks have

expressed concern as to our independence or the possible

effect of MAS work on our independence.

In many cases,

banker recommendations arise because of essential MAS
services that the banker and the client believe are necessary.

******

Of the approximately 71,000 AICPA members in public
practice, about 44,000, or about 62%, are with local firms.
Statistics covering over 334, 000 U.S. manufacturing firms

show that 90% employ under 100 people. Out of more than
1,7 million U.S. retail establishments, only 66,000, or 3.9%
have net worth over $200,000.

Out of over 463,000 U.S.

wholesale companies, only 29,000, or 6%, have net worth

over $200,000.

Out of over 898,000 U.S. service establishments,

only 13,000, or 1.4%, have net worth over $200,000.
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We respectfully ask the Public Oversight Board to
very carefully consider the effects that its actions will

have on the small companies that constitute the

large

majority of companies in the U.S.
If you wish to ask me any questions, I will try to
answer on behalf of the firms I represent.

We very much appreciate the opportunity to present

our views, and we thank you for your time and attention.
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MR. McCLOY:

If you can approximate your

answer, what are the chief MAS services that this group of

accountants perform?

Have you got any

concept of the first

three important services that they render?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

I would say financial counseling

of one type or another would be very important.

Many of

the business people really don’t understand financing.

They

may not have a good picture of the effects of some of their

actions on the future of the business or its ability to

survive.
Almost any major action that a client wants to

take is something that we are liable to become involved in,

whether it is plant expansion, buying machinery, buying life
insurance or taking on product lines.

The financial impacts

of these items.
This seems naturally to lead into actual counseling

in business matters.

I have never claimed that being a CPA

automatically makes one a superbusinessman, but then, neither

does anything else that I know of.
Our clients typically are in a relatively confined

environment.

They don’t have a lot of contact with peers.

They are concentrating on their day-to-day problems.
The advantage we bring them is contact with
dozens and dozens of other business situations over years

of experience and through the observation and collection of

knowledge we are sort of brokering to them, the experience
and knowledge that we have achieved with other clients.
MR. McCLOY:

What is your professional staff?

How much is it?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

Our own firm?

MR. McCLOY: Yes.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Our firm, as a professional

corporation, employs a total of 57 people.

PROFESSOR CARY: Professional?
MR. BERNSTEIN: No, there are seven clerical and
the rest would be professionals or some might be called

para-professionals.
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Do you do any industrial engineering.
Do you do plant layouts?
MR. McCLOY:

MR. BERNSTEIN:

No, I don't think that any of

the firms in this group would actually lay out a plant
or do industrial engineering.

And with respect to such

a

plant, we would very likely be involved in projecting the
financial effects and possibly even in assisting in the

financing, but not in the physical layouts.

MR. McCLOY:

You do the tax work?

MR. BERNSTEIN:
MR. McCLOY:

Income tax work, yes, sir.

Do you do executive recruiting?

MR. BERNSTEIN:

Of financial people.

I think

it would be most uncommon for any of us to recruit a chief

executive officer.
MR. McCLOY:

Most of your chief executive officers

are owners?

MR. BERNSTEIN:
MR. McCLOY:

That is correct, sir.

I don't know that I have any

other questions.
MR. WOOD:

Would your considerable involvement in

financial problems and other general business advice to your
clients mean that you would spend a number of days in consultation
with your clients, greater than in a normal situation?

Are you always available by phone to come out and sit

down with them?
MR. BERNSTEIN:
unreasonable notice.

On reasonable notice or sometimes

Yes, they call frequently.

Either for

telephone consultation or for meetings, and I think most of

th
e firms in this group tend to see their clients on a regular

basis.

It is not just an annual service which

certified audit.
MR. WOOD:

is the

That is what I was getting at.

MR. BERNSTEIN:
It might be monthly, quarterly or
semi-annually and/or other times as required.
MR. WOOD:

I take it it is your feeling that

although some of your associated firms who are associated
with your statement do not have any SEC clients, and
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accordingly, are not seeking membership in the SEC

Section, that if MAS is proscribed for SEC audit firms, that
it will trickle down in a short term to those of you who
are not in the Section.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

we fear.

Yes, sir, that is exactly what

I think there is a little bit more to it

than that.
We really had two things that motivated us
because in discussing it, the subject did come up:

Well, hey, this might be a terrific thing.

Now, if we

can stop all those big guys from doing this, and

some of the stuff that they can’t do is going to fall in
our laps, but we felt that it would trickle down to us, and
we also generally felt that we prefer freedom and free

enterprise as unfettered as possible, and that any sort
of restrictions on economic activity even if it would
benefit us financially was not something that it was in
our hearts to favor.
MR. WOOD:

We all agree with that.

MR. MATUSIAK:

Mr. Bernstein, in your statement

you said the Big Eight firms are invariably significantly

lower than you are in "bidding" on auditing engagements.
It is widely believed that the charged time

or hourly rates of the national firms are higher than the
hourly rates for the smaller firms.

How do you account

for the fact that their audit fees are generally lower

than yours?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

Let me say first of all that

there would have been at least one other firm that would

have agreed and had their name on this but for that one
They disagreed with our statement in that regard.
However, we do not favor any kind of profusion or assistance
point.

in competing with Big Eight firms. We favor unfettered
competition and free enterprise. We will just have to
continue to take our chances in the market place.
My real opinion of that is that typically we

would bump heads with them on an initial engagement.
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Initial for somebody, and I think that they come in with a

I think they may actually reduce it below

low price.

what otherwise it might have been, but that is not

exclusive to them.

It might be that somebody else

might do that as well.
I also have the feeling that they go more
for the over-all materiality, and I don’t know whether
any big eight firms are here, and if they disagree with me,
I am sorry.

I am not speaking from actual experience, for I

have never worked at a big eight firm, but my impression
is that they really do go for the overall material representations
in the statements which, of course, we do, too, but we
tend to get a little more nitty-gritty.

If the withheld tax payable account does not
exactly equal the amount that they owe, if it will not be
zeroed out by the next payment, then we would tend to
try to get that straightened out.

We are much more involved in the day-to-day
operations.

It is keeping things straight for the clients'

day-to-day work, and that may tend to raise our cost a
bit.

It is just my opinion.
PROFESSOR CARY:

About what percentage of your

work is in the MAS field vis-a-vis the auditing field?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

I have found a surprising

consistency among firms' percentages that I am familiar

with.

They seem to be very similar to ours.
At our firm certified audit work represents

about 35% of our billable time, and we figure that what

we call controllership, which is a mixture, it could be

anywhere from write-up or bookkeeping work to counseling
that is as esoteric as we get, is in the neighborhood of
50 to 60%.

PROFESSOR CARY:
MR. WOOD:

Thank you.

MAS is included in the controllership

in the broad base?
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It would be included in that.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

It is hard to distinguish in many cases.

Since we have

regular contact, we might be seeing the client every

month and we might prepare his financial statement in the
morning and sometime in the afternoon sit down and meet
with the client for some period of time, and somewhere in

there I think you ought to call it MAS work.

How much of this 50 to 60%

MR. MATUSIAK:

is from nonaudit clients?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

Most.

At least, speaking in our

case, the number of audit clients is much less than
the number of nonaudit clients.

Most of our engagements are

unaudited engagements, but the MAS services spread out over
both unaudited and audited, so it would be roughly in

proportion to the number of clients, or probably 2 or 3 or
4 times the amount of MAS work being done for nonaudit

clients than for audit clients.
MR. WOOD:

Do you seek to gain such confidence

of your clients that they will make you the auditors
as well as the supplier of services?

MR. BERNSTEIN:
MR. GARRETT:

Yes, sir.
When you say nonaudit clients,

do you mean mostly clients that don’t have audits by anybody?
MR. BERNSTEIN:
MR. GARRETT:
the auditing?

That is correct.
It isn't that someone else is doing

Or they don't need an audit.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

Offhand, I cannot think of any

clients of ours that also employ another CPA firm.

MR. WOOD: That is what I wanted to know.
MR. McCLOY: Your readers particularly are
the banks, generally?

MR. BERNSTEIN:

Yes, sir.

Outside of the

clients themselves, the great majority are the banks.

I did a study on that which I don't have with

me, but if you are interested, I could get it for you.
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I

studied over 140 financial statements that we had issued
as to where they went, and once you get beyond the client
and the banks, there is only quite a small percentage

left of other people that might see the statements.
They are generally either sophisticated readers or insiders.

MR. GARRETT:

Just as a matter of curiosity, is

most of this that would be MAS work sort of day-to-day
consulting, or a week-to-week, call up, or is some of it
formal engagements for special studies of an MAS nature?

MR. BERNSTEIN:

Most would be regular day-to-day

or month-to-month, but there are a certain number of special
engagements that we have, where we are asked to install a cost

system, hire a controller, analyze possible plant expansion.
MR. GARRETT:

That would be set up as

a separate engagement?

MR. BERNSTEIN:

It might be in many cases, or

it might just tend to just flow along with the rest of
the work.
MR. GARRETT:
Do you have an MAS staff,
division, group or something?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

We have a small MAS staff.

We have one person who devotes almost all his time to

it, and is in charge of that and he draws on others in
the firm as the engagement requires.
MR. GARRETT:

What is the professional skill?

He is a CPA?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

He is not a CPA.

He is a man

that has actually been with us longer than any other staff
person that we have, and we have found him to have

extremely excellent business sense, street sense, even,
if you will, and that his insights into business seem to

be extremely good and a large number of our clients recognize
that and value his counsel.
MR. GARRETT:

I gather that these 11 firms

that you speak of are not an association?
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MR. BERNSTEIN:

MR. GARRETT:
MR. BERNSTEIN:

That is correct.

purpose.

They assembled for this

No, they got assembled by one

of the gentlemen deciding that this would be a good

idea for one of us to be here, and he called a bunch
of his competitors.

of the gentlemen

We had never met before.

Some

I had never met before at all, and we

had a luncheon. Apparently I opened my mouth more than
the others, and here I am.
MR. WOOD:

You got the job.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

I think that was actually

about two weeks ago, and it has been put together within

the two-week period.
MR. GARRETT:

Have you some idea of the extent

to which the Executive Committee's
formal subject of this hearing,

proposals, that are the

would affect your

current practice if put into effect and applied to you.?

Have you tried to determine what we are doing as it would fit
under the accounting-and-auditing skill-related test and

the participation of management test?
MR. BERNSTEIN:
effects.

somewhat.

I think it would have two

Number one, it would reduce our practice
I don't think that the financial impact in

our particular case would be catastrophic for us,

although it would eliminate a good segment of our

practice and a segment that is profitable.
MR. GARRETT:

Is this the segment that is

not accounting or auditing-skill related, or are

you making a management decision?

MR. GARRETT: We have spent two days wondering
where the line is whenever the subject comes up, so don't
be surprised if you are not exactly certain.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

If you find out, I hope you

will tell me.
We get into things like trying to arbitrate
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or help settle arguments between family members in
family businesses.

MR. GARRETT:
you don’t do that.

That is lawyers’ work;

(Laughter)

There is a fine line there,

MR. BERNSTEIN:
too.

We have got two terrible wars going on now.

We

are just naturally drawn in because you know the people,

and you know the numbers.

Perhaps they trust you to

get drawn in, but I think for me, at least, one of the
worst aspects of not being able to do this kind of

work, is that I like to do it.

It is fun.

That is

why I am in this business, and if I get forced into a
position where all I do is check and tick and do audits, then

I am just not going to like my work any more.
MR. GARRETT:

There are very few, if any, at

least that have spoken these last two days, that
would favor abolishing all MAS by all members.

The

questions have been whether there should be some tests
of what they ought to be.

A lot of agreement that

independence is an important thing, but many saying that
it is the only important thing.
One of the practical questions with respect

to these proposals is how they would hit who, what they

would do.

It is not easy to determine if you

can’t figure out exactly how they work in particular
circumstances, but I get the impression that any restrictions

on MAS, you would oppose, and your group would oppose.
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MR. BERNSTEIN:
MR. GARRETT:

That is correct.
But you wouldn’t oppose the

independence standard where you are engaging in the
attest function?

MR. BERNSTEIN:
100%.

No, I agree with independence

I just don’t agree that these activities impair

it as long as we don’t own a piece of the client

and maybe some other criteria, but I think our
unlimited personal liability is really where they have

got us.

No matter what we do for the client, we

consider that, and the thing that has got to hurt

your independence more than anything else has got
to be the fees.

I can't imagine anything that we

could possibly do for a client that could compare
in any way to it.

Maybe the lack of independence

that might come from wanting to retain the fees.

You can’t get away from fees, I hope.

MR. MANZONI:

Do you think that getting

involved in management decision would impair your
independence?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

Advising management when

they have to make the decision.
MR. MANZONI:

We don't make that.

I understand.

When you get

closer away from advice toward actual involvement

in the decision-making process, is that something

that clearly impairs independence?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

I don't think so.

consider ourselves extremely independent.
with the clients.

We

We fight

We stand ready to lose them if

they don't like what we are going to do, and it is

always covering our assets and our unlimited
liability that matters. What is the difference?
How can you compare bending to a client, to getting

sued, losing vast amounts of money and reputation

to what you had built up over a career of work?
That is where independence comes from, and we just
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can’t escape getting drawn into these family situations,
these management decisions, and I have clients I

have personally worked on for 25 years.

families.

I know their

I know their business affairs from top

to bottom, and when something comes up that they have

to make a decision, it is hard for me to imagine
that they are going to look in the phone book under

management consultants.
Are these kinds of clients

MR. MANZONI:

the ones you typically might audit?

MR. BERNSTEIN:

It could go either way.

It

The length of the engagement has nothing to

depends.

do with whether they are audit clients or not.

What about the relationship?

MR. MANZONI:

Does the relationship have anything to do with whether
they are audit clients?

The closeness of these families

for a long time.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

When I said closeness to

families, I didn’t really mean on a social or family
basis.

I meant that if I had worked for someone for

25 years, that I am aware that he has a father in
a certain business or state of health and that he has

children.
At least, in my case, I am not a very social

person, I guess, and I am really not sociable with a
lot of the clients, but I know their affairs extremely
well, and I don’t think that knowing their affairs

well impairs our ability to be independent.

Witness

to that, I only point out, at least in our case, our
firm has been in existence for over 50 years.

started by my father.
25 years.

It was

I have been in the firm for over

We have never been sued by anybody for

anything any time.
MR. McCLOY:

Somebody similarly situated to

you testified that he was apt to know what all the
marital relations were.
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That would happen.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

When you

go through somebody’s checkbook, you never know what
you are going to find out.

(Laughter)

Do you do a lot of advising on

MR. McCLOY:

acquisitions, mergers, or doesn’t that come up, or

sales, I guess?
I couldn’t say a lot because

MR. BERNSTEIN:

our clients do not often buy or sell, but when they do,

I would say in the 100% of the cases that we will be

involved with them in making the acquisition or making
the sale.

Absolutely.

I think I understood you clearly,

MR. GARRETT:

but let me be sure.

A rule that, of the type being

proposed, that left you out altogether or left out the
largest part of your practice, you would still oppose?
MR. BERNSTEIN:

Yes, sir.

Because you don’t want to tie

MR. GARRETT:

your standards to the SEC firms for your type of firm.
On the other hand, you don’t think it would survive

anyway.
MR. BERNSTEIN:

We think it will spread to

us, and we don’t think that that is essential or desirable

to maintain independence.

Thank you very much.

MR. GARRETT:

Are there

any further questions?

That has been very helpful.

MR. BERNSTEIN:

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

I have another set of our statement which is

identical to the one that I sent to Mr. Matusiak except
that it does have the list of firms that approved of

this and it had some blanks filled in on the first page.
Thank you very much.
MR. GARRETT:
If there is nothing further,
would you like to declare the adjournment, Mr. Chairman?
MR. McCLOY:

So declared.

MR. GARRETT: We are adjourned.
(The hearing adjourned at 3:30 o’clock.)
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